The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received several reports of crashes involving automated vehicles (AVs) equipped with the Avride automated driving system (ADS) engaged at the time of the crash. The crashes occurred in Dallas, Texas and Austin, Texas. Each of the crashes involved the competence of the ADS with respect to performing at least one of the following driving behaviors: changing lanes, responding to other vehicles present in or entering the lane ahead, and responding to stationary objects partially obstructing the lane ahead.
ODI has performed a preliminary review of videos of each crash. The videos show instances of the AVs changing lanes into the path of or directly into other vehicles traveling in an adjacent lane and in close proximity to an AV; failing to slow or stop for slow-moving or stopped vehicles in the lane and path ahead; failing to slow for or avoid vehicles entering the lane and path ahead; and striking stationary objects partially obstructing the lane and path ahead. These crashes have resulted in property damage and one alleged minor injury. During each of these crashes, the AVs were operating with the ADS performing the dynamic driving task while under the supervision of an in-vehicle operator in the driver's seat. Furthermore, ODI understands that Avride is operating some of its AVs on the Uber ride-hailing platform and has offered passenger service to the public since December 3, 2025 in Dallas where many of the reported crashes have occurred. The ADS performance in these crashes may indicate inappropriate assertiveness and insufficient competence to execute these driving behaviors in a safe manner and may also constitute traffic safety violations.
ODI has opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate the performance of the Avride ADS in order to determine the scope, nature and severity of the potential problems and to assess the potential safety risks to passengers and other road users. This will include an assessment of technical and operational contributing factors and safeguards already in place, as well as any mitigating actions taken subsequent to a crash. If additional evidence received during this investigation implicates the competence of the Avride ADS with respect to other driving behaviors, these may be considered as part of this investigation as well.
The SGO reports cited in this Opening Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting.
31101-13612-1
31101-13612-2
31101-13612-3
31101-13616-1
31101-13621-1
31101-13624-1
31101-13625-1
31101-14066-1
31101-14070-1
31101-14148-1
31101-14150-1
31101-14166-1
31101-14200-1
31101-14235-1
31101-14286-1
31101-14328-1
31101-14509-1
31101-14653-1
","investigationNumber":"003","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-05-06T19:28:08Z","nhtsaId":"PE26003","openDate":"2026-05-06T19:28:08Z","status":"O","subject":"Automated Driving System (ADS) conflict avoidance, driving behavior competence and assertiveness"},{"id":1939119,"artemisId":102121,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is upgrading its Preliminary Evaluation (PE25006) of front steering knuckle fractures on model year (MY) 2014 through 2017 Range Rover Sport vehicles to an Engineering Analysis. ODI opened PE25006 on June 27, 2025, after receiving 12 Vehicle Owner's Questionnaire (VOQ) reports of the front aluminum steering knuckles fracturing in these vehicles. The reports describe the fractures occurring at the joint where the steering knuckle attaches to the upper control arm ball joint in one or both steering knuckles. Fracture of the front suspension knuckle can lead to detachment of the upper suspension arm. Detachment of the upper suspension arm results in the driver\u2019s inability to control the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
ODI reviewed information supplied by Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) in response to Information Request letters as well as reviewed the data with JLR on numerous occasions. ODI further reviewed relevant data on a peer vehicle with a significantly similar steering knuckle design, the MY 2014 through 2017 Range Rover. Much of the information is contradictory and requires a deeper analysis that is available in an Engineering Analysis.
On August 5, 2025, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) filed safety recall 25V514. This recall covers certain MY 2014 and all MY 2015-2017 Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles. The remedy for recall 25V514 addresses knuckles with and without a visible fracture. Knuckles that have developed a visible fracture will be replaced with a new knuckle of a substantially similar design. Knuckles with no fracture visibly present will have a brace attached to the upper portion of the front steering knuckle. JLR states that the purpose of the brace is to prevent the component from completely separating should a fracture develop.
NHTSA continues to receive allegations of fractures occurring in the front steering knuckles of Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles. Two of the most recent VOQs received by ODI involve front steering knuckle fractures occurring on MY 2020 and MY 2021 Range Rover L405 vehicles. ODI will continue to investigate the component design and assess the potential safety risk as part of this Engineering Analysis and evaluate the recall remedies for Recall 25V514. Further, the scope of this Engineering Analysis will be expanded to include MY 2018-2022 Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles as they have a substantially similar component design.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"003","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-04-24T13:22:49Z","nhtsaId":"EA26003","openDate":"2026-04-24T13:22:49Z","status":"O","subject":"Front Steering Knuckle Fractures"},{"id":1937033,"artemisId":102048,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on December 22, 2025, requesting a defect investigation into the hydraulic control unit (HCU) for the Anti-lock Braking System (ABS) on the MY 2010 Ford Fusion Hybrid. The petition alleges that an illuminated ABS MIL is associated with a failure of the ABS HCU, resulting in ABS malfunction, loss of traction and electronic stability control functions, and reduced braking performance, particularly on slippery road surfaces.
A defect petition has been opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11647929.
","investigationNumber":"004","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-04-09T17:55:37Z","nhtsaId":"DP26004","openDate":"2026-04-09T17:55:37Z","status":"O","subject":"Anti-lock brake system (ABS) Malfunction Indicator Lamp (MIL) illuminated"},{"id":1932391,"artemisId":102083,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a Petition dated February 5, 2026, requesting an investigation into model year (MY) 2006 Nissan Frontier vehicles. The Petitioner alleges that the vehicle poses an imminent fire hazard due to \u201c[a] powerful and persistent odor of raw gasoline\u201d that he says \u201cemanates from the vehicle\u201d and \u201cindicat[es] a breach in fuel system integrity.\u201d He further alleges that the vehicles can experience sudden engine stalling \u201cduring startup and operation,\u201d which he believes could cause collisions or loss of vehicle control.
The Petitioner further alleges these symptoms are identical to conditions addressed in previous NHTSA recalls (10V-517, 07V-435, and 10V-075) and that the issues persist in the 2006 MY Nissan fleet despite these past actions.
ODI is opening this Defect Petition to evaluate the Petitioner\u2019s allegations and determine whether to grant or deny the Petition. The Petition can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under NHTSA Number 11718552.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla\u2019s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system\u2019s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla\u2019s assessment of their safety impact.
Tesla\u2019s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system.
ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla\u2019s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period.
Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla\u2019s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla\u2019s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path.
In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system\u2019s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788.
The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-03-18T21:03:16Z","nhtsaId":"EA26002","openDate":"2026-03-18T21:03:16Z","status":"O","subject":"FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions"},{"id":1926540,"artemisId":102082,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a Petition dated January 9, 2026, requesting an investigation into the loss of the optional all-wheel drive capability in model year (MY) 2021-2023 Acura TLX and MY 2022-2023 Acura MDX vehicles. The Petition contends that the interfacing splines between the transmission and the rear wheel drive power take off unit are failing. Failure of these splines prevents the transfer of drive power to the rear axle, making the vehicle front wheel drive only. The Petition further alleges that this failure results in a reduction of vehicle directional control.
The Petitioner cites 48 complaints received by ODI alleging the same failure. ODI will evaluate these complaints to determine if they are related to the failure cited in the Petition and will conduct a technical review under 49 CFR Part 552.
This Defect Petition is being opened to evaluate whether to grant or deny the Petition. The Petition can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under NHTSA Number 11712885.
The VOQ numbers referenced in the Petition are listed below.
11615217, 11619288, 11633510, 11634618, 11634979, 11636677, 11637484, 11638577, 11638902, 11640757, 11642028, 11642839, 11644661, 11652130, 11652239, 11654456, 11664265, 11662805, 11662895, 11664344, 11664848, 11665162, 11665179, 11665477, 11666444, 11667007, 11667060, 11681206, 11689393, 11693166, 11693788, 11696489, 11696739, 11702530, 11557993, 11551829, 11635395, 11644548, 11647519, 11647996, 11661340, 11671314, 11682637, 11691842, 11693280, 11700591, 11700964, 11702881,
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-03-06T13:39:31Z","nhtsaId":"DP26001","openDate":"2026-03-06T13:39:31Z","status":"O","subject":"All wheel drive allegation"},{"id":1927357,"artemisId":102007,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on November 21, 2025, requesting a defect investigation to \u201cdetermine whether the absence of a redundant mechanical wheel-fastener locking mechanism constitutes a safety-related defect in motor vehicles and motor-vehicle equipment\u201d in the heavy-vehicle sector. The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11703245.
A defect petition has been opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-03-04T16:59:09Z","nhtsaId":"DP26002","openDate":"2026-03-04T16:59:09Z","status":"O","subject":"Redundant wheel fastener locking mechanism"},{"id":1925054,"artemisId":102046,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 19 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) alleging an intermittent or complete failure of the power steering assist system in certain Model Year (MY) 2022-2023 RAM ProMaster 1500, 2500, and 3500 vehicles. Failure of the power steering assist system can result in increased steering effort required to control the vehicle. An increase in steering effort can potentially lead to a loss of directional control of the vehicle. Several received reports allege failures of the steering rack with specific reports citing water intrusion into the electrical connectors of the electric power steering control module.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope and root cause of potential defects in 2022-2023 RAM ProMaster steering systems. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On March 21, 2025, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE25002) to investigate instances of unexpected transmission downshifting without driver input in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford F-150 vehicles (subject vehicles) manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). The complaints allege that, without warning or driver input, the subject vehicles experienced a sudden and rapid deceleration often accompanied by temporary rear wheel lockup, seizure, or skidding, resulting in a loss of vehicle control that increases the risk of crash and injury to all motorists, including those not within the subject vehicles. The MY 2015 and MY 2016 F-150 vehicles were equipped with the \u201c6R80\u201d transmission, while the MY 2017 vehicles were equipped with either the \u201c6R80\u201d transmission or the \u201c10R80\u201d transmission. This investigation was limited to MY 2015-2017 Ford F-150 with the \u201c6R80\u201d transmission.
ODI identified 329 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) related to this investigation and sixty percent of these consumers were interviewed to confirm the details of their allegations. Consumers reported that their vehicles\u2019 transmission suddenly downshifted to a lower gear, often to 1st or 2nd gear, without driver input or advance warning. Consumers described the downshift events to be regular and repeated occurrences, with some consumers stating that they no longer drive the vehicle due to safety concerns. Forty-three percent of consumers reported experiencing at least one wheel lockup event, during which the rear tires locked, screeched, or skidded during the transmission downshift. ODI also found that 114 of the 329 consumers reported having their vehicle\u2019s molded lead frame or valve body assembly (which comes with a molded lead frame) replaced, 80 of which were confirmed through consumer submitted repair invoices.
In its response to ODI\u2019s Information Request, Ford provided an assessment of potential root cause of failure for the subject vehicles and how this failure is different from the failure associated with MY 2011-2014 Ford F-150 vehicles that was addressed by four safety recalls (16V-248, 19V-075, 19V-433, and 24V-444). Ford has identified that the defect in the recalled vehicle population involved lead frame supplier production issues resulting in signal loss from the Output Shaft Speed (OSS) sensor. Ford has identified that the alleged defect in the subject vehicle population involved degradation of electrical connections within the lead frame due to thermal cycling and vibration over extended time in service resulting in signal loss from the Transmission Range Sensor (TRS).
Signal loss from the TRS can result in an unintended shift to neutral, unintended upshift, or unintended downshift which are regulated by a gear \u201cshift map\u201d based on the vehicle\u2019s speed at the time of signal loss. According to Ford\u2019s \u201cshift map\u201d, at speeds between 35-64 mph, the maximum allowable downshift would be to 2nd gear (i.e. a 6th to 2nd gear downshift event) which Ford has designated to represent the worst-case scenario for subject vehicles. Ford has also acknowledged that the worst-case scenario may also involve temporary wheel lockup. However, Ford has stated that the failure mechanism in the MY 2011-2014 F-150 vehicles\u2014previously addressed through recalls\u2014primarily involved OSS sensor signal loss that could result in 6th to 1st gear downshift events. This OSS-related failure mode is distinct from the TRS-related signal loss identified in the subject vehicle population.
ODI has identified an additional potential safety defect associated with the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Preliminary testing performed by NHTSA\u2019s Vehicle Research Test Center (VRTC) showed that when the TRS experiences an intermittent signal loss, one possible outcome is a change in vehicle direction. Specifically, if a vehicle is operating in reverse up an incline when the TRS signal loss occurs, then the vehicle may shift into neutral causing the vehicle to change directions and roll forward.
ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis (EA) to, among other things, perform component-level testing and vehicle testing, as well as review additional technical information to better understand the alleged defect that has been identified. To review the reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identi\ufb01cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-01-30T21:49:02Z","nhtsaId":"EA26001","openDate":"2026-01-30T21:49:02Z","status":"O","subject":"Unintended Transmission Downshift and Rear Wheel Lock-up"},{"id":1915944,"artemisId":102049,"description":"On January 23, 2026, Waymo LCC (Waymo) reported to the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) that a Waymo Automated Vehicle (AV) had struck a child near an elementary school earlier that day. Waymo provided its required report under SGO 2021-01 on January 28, 2026.
NHTSA is aware that the incident occurred within two blocks of a Santa Monica, CA elementary school during normal school drop off hours; that there were other children, a crossing guard, and several double-parked vehicles in the vicinity; and that the child ran across the street from behind a double parked SUV towards the school and was struck by the Waymo AV. Waymo reported that the child sustained minor injuries.
At the time of the incident, the Waymo AV was operated by Waymo\u2019s 5th Generation Automated Driving System (ADS). No safety operator was present in the vehicle.
ODI has opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate whether the Waymo AV exercised appropriate caution given, among other things, its proximity to the elementary school during drop off hours, and the presence of young pedestrians and other potential vulnerable road users. ODI expects that its investigation will examine the ADS\u2019s intended behavior in school zones and neighboring areas, especially during normal school pick up/drop off times, including but not limited to its adherence to posted speed limits. ODI will also investigate Waymo's post-impact response.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-01-29T00:20:41Z","nhtsaId":"PE26001","openDate":"2026-01-29T00:20:41Z","status":"O","subject":"Waymo AV striking a child in the area of a school."}]}