The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has identified a large number of reported incidents of Waymo AVs passing stopped schools buses with the school bus's red lights flashing and/or the stop arm extended. On December 10, 2025, Waymo filed recall 25E084 to address the safety risk associated with driving past such stopped school buses.
Recall 25E084 addresses a software issue which may cause the Waymo vehicle to pass a stopped school bus when the school bus’s red lights are flashing and/or stop arm is extended, so that the Waymo vehicle appropriately will remain stationary.
The recall report indicated that the remedy for this defect, a software update, was completed for all affected vehicles on November 17, 2025. Of the total reported incidents identified during PE25013, a majority of the incidents occurred after the November 17, 2025 remedy date.
ODI is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to assess the adequacy of the remedy for Recall 25E084 and to identify the cause(s) of the conditions leading to the post-remedy reports.
","subject":"Effectiveness of recall remedy for Waymo AVs passing stopped school buses","investigationNumber":"006","nhtsaId":"RQ26006"},{"id":1989490,"openDate":"2026-11-06T21:16:58Z","artemisId":102625,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-11-06T21:16:58Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 8 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) and 4 Early Warning Reporting “Death and Injury” reports alleging burn injuries following side airbag deployment in model years 2021-2026 Ford Explorer vehicles. Consumers have described that during a crash involving deployment of the seat-mounted side airbag, they sustained burn injuries. Burn injuries have been reported for both drivers and front passengers and were typically diagnosed as second or third-degree burns requiring medical treatment. Some of the VOQs report injuries to law enforcement officers following side airbag deployments in Ford Explorer Police Interceptors.
ODI has opened this PE to evaluate the scope, frequency, and potential safety-related consequences of the alleged defect. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Burn Injuries From Side Airbag Deployment","investigationNumber":"008","nhtsaId":"PE26008"},{"id":1987027,"openDate":"2026-10-30T16:27:11Z","artemisId":102187,"investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-30T16:27:11Z","description":"In response to thermal events, various manufacturers filed NHTSA recalls for loose hardware inside the propulsion battery packs, naming BorgWarner, and their acquired company Akasol, as the supplier.
On February 5, 2025, Volvo Trucks North America (Volvo Trucks) filed recall 25V055 covering certain 2023-2025 VNRE vehicles. On March 25, 2025, Volvo expanded the recall to increase the population from 13 to 77 vehicles. On April 3, 2025, Volvo expanded the recall to increase the population to 142 vehicles. On July 22, 2025, Volvo further expanded the recall to increase the population to 174 vehicles.
On March 11, 2025, Cummins Inc. (Cummins) filed recall 25E018 to cover battery packs used in Blue Bird buses. After four population amendments in five months, the number of affected battery packs had increased from 19 to 107.
On March 25, 2025, Nova Bus (US) Inc. (Nova Bus) filed recall 25V184 covering four 2022-2023 Nova Bus LFS transit buses. On April 3, 2025, Nova Bus expanded the recall to 10 vehicles. On May 14, 2025, the recall population increased to 16 vehicles. Finally, on July 22, 2025, Nova Bus expanded the recall to 24 vehicles.
On March 25, 2025, Mack Trucks, Inc. (Mack) filed recall 25V185 initially for seven 2022-2025 Mack LRBE trucks. The population increased to 10 on April 3, 2025 and then to 17 vehicles on July 22, 2025.
On April 1, 2025, Gillig, LLC (Gillig) filed recall 25V203 for 15 2023-2024 Low Floor transit buses. On May 23, 2025, Gillig expanded this recall to 27 vehicles.
On May 29, 2025, based on the above filings, BorgWarner (Akasol) filed recall 25E035. After amendments, the final population was 543 battery packs.
Based on the repeated expansions, often based on additional failures in the field outside the scope of what had been recalled, as well as other reports of post-recall remedy failures, ODI is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to understand how the recalls were scoped and assess the remedy effectiveness of the recalls.
","subject":"Scope and remedy effectiveness of recalls 25E018, 25E035, 25V055, 25V184, 25V185, and 25V203.","investigationNumber":"005","nhtsaId":"RQ26005"},{"id":1985426,"openDate":"2026-10-23T20:57:47Z","artemisId":102523,"investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-23T20:57:47Z","description":"In September 2024, Ford Motor Company filed a safety recall (NHTSA recall 24V684) covering certain MY 2022-2024 Ford Maverick vehicles equipped with a Connected Touch Radio (CTR). For these vehicles, the rear-view camera may freeze while the vehicle is in reverse. A frozen image can provide false information for the driver, increasing the risk of a crash. As a remedy, dealers will update the CTR software in affected vehicles.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 5 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) alleging frozen rear-view camera images following the remedy of recall 24V684 in a subset population of Maverick and Maverick Hybrid vehicles equipped with the CTR. The complaints report a frozen rear-view camera image while in reverse. Further, ODI is aware of a redacted number of related failures reported to ODI by Ford.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to evaluate the remedy effectiveness and scope of recall 24V684 to fully assess the potential safety-related problems. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Frozen Rear-view Camera Image","investigationNumber":"004","nhtsaId":"RQ26004"},{"id":1985425,"openDate":"2026-10-23T20:49:05Z","artemisId":102486,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-23T20:49:05Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on July 28, 2026, requesting a defect investigation to “determine if a structural failure of the landing gear support system is related to or within the scope of Recall 24V637, determine if the scope of 24V637 should be expanded, and to determine if Recall 18E059 presents a related weld-fatigue failure as the landing gear failure”.
The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11741673.
A defect petition has been opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition.
","subject":"Evaluate landing gear collapse on 2017 Great Dane refrigerated trailers with Jost landing gear.","investigationNumber":"012","nhtsaId":"DP26012"},{"id":1985424,"openDate":"2026-10-23T20:47:59Z","artemisId":102453,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-23T20:47:59Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on June 13, 2026, requesting an investigation into camshaft and lifter failures in Ford 7.3L gasoline engines used in 2021-2022 Ford E-350 and 2021 Ford F59 and F-750 vehicles.
The Petitioner alleges that insufficient oil lubrication at low idle (~6 psi) causes severe wear on lifter rollers and camshaft lobes, leading to catastrophic engine failure and sudden loss of motive power while driving at highway speeds with little to no warning. The petition further alleges that Ford Motor Company was aware of the root cause and released a software calibration patch raising idle speed to ~1,000 RPM, but failed to initiate a public safety recall or notify vehicle owners.
The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11764421.
This defect petition has been opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition.
","subject":"Camshaft and Lifter Failure in Ford 7.3L Gasoline Engines","investigationNumber":"011","nhtsaId":"DP26011"},{"id":1982041,"openDate":"2026-10-09T20:13:37Z","artemisId":102557,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-09T20:13:37Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a DP on September 23, 2026, requesting an investigation into model year (MY) 2026 Tesla Robotaxis (Model Y and Cybercab) with the Automated Driving System (ADS) engaged. The Petitioner alleges that the ADS exceeds posted speed limits in active school zones.
Along with the request, the Petitioner provided 3 links to video footage as supporting evidence.
A DP has been opened to evaluate the allegations and determine whether to grant or deny the petition.
The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number: 11766676.
","subject":"Exceeds posted speed limits in active school zones","investigationNumber":"010","nhtsaId":"DP26010"},{"id":1982042,"openDate":"2026-10-09T20:07:25Z","artemisId":102558,"investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-09T20:07:25Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 118 complaints alleging detachment of the upper grille deflector on 2022-2024 model year (MY) GMC Sierra vehicles. 21 of these 118 complaints allege that the upper grille deflector detached after Recall 25V-060 was performed. The complaints allege that the upper grille deflector detaches while driving. In some cases, leading to a cracked windshield or surrounding vehicles needing to conduct evasive maneuvers.
On February 6, 2025, GM submitted Recall 25V-060 addressing upper grille deflector detachment for 2022MY GMC Sierra vehicles manufactured with a chrome grille deflector. 2022MY GMC Sierra vehicles which were not manufactured with a chrome grille deflector and 2023-2024MY GMC Sierra vehicles were not included in the recall.
ODI is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to assess the adequacy of the scope and remedy for Recall 25V-060.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Upper Grille Deflector Detachment","investigationNumber":"003","nhtsaId":"RQ26003"},{"id":1977138,"openDate":"2026-09-21T23:31:03Z","artemisId":102489,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-21T23:31:03Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (\"ODI\") has identified crashes involving vehicles equipped with devices manufactured by comma.ai (“comma”) occurring under similar circumstances. ODI received notice of five (5) crashes in which vehicles with comma devices installed reportedly struck stopped or slowly moving vehicles within the same travel lane. ODI has confirmed that the systems were powered on or engaged in multiple crashes. Preliminary data reviewed by ODI suggests that the comma system may not have adequately detected or responded to the in-lane vehicles. Two crashes resulted in a total of three (3) fatalities. Four of the five crashes contributed to various non-fatal injuries, including serious injuries, to eleven (11) other individuals.
The comma devices are after-market accessory systems intended to augment a vehicle’s driving automation capabilities. The devices are sold with wire harnesses that connect to existing vehicle systems and use the device’s cameras alongside stock vehicle sensors as a basis to provide sustained automated control of speed and vehicle heading with options for other enhanced features enabled by software loaded onto the devices. The devices are sold directly to consumers, and the company’s provided setup instructions are intended for consumer installation. The company advertises on its website that, with its “step-by-step guide,” a consumer can “[g]et set up in your car in 15 minutes.” According to the website, the devices provide “hands free driving for the car you already have,” and the software (openpilot) that comma develops to operate on the devices is described as “an open source advanced driver assistance system that works on 325+ car models” and “[c]an drive for hours without intervention.” The company’s website states that “openpilot requires the driver to be alert, pay attention, and be ready to take over at all times.”
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate further any incidents involving the comma devices and openpilot, particularly crashes involving slower or stopped vehicles or hazards in lane. The investigation will obtain data to verify system status for each incident and evaluate system performance and safeguards that are intended to ensure safe operation of vehicles equipped with comma devices. Additionally, to the extent that modified software based on openpilot (i.e., a “fork”) is involved in a crash or other incident, ODI will evaluate the incident and consider the shared components between openpilot and the fork.
The SGO incidents cited in the Opening Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting
30351-15888
30351-14668
30351-11961
30351-1807
62-14853
","subject":"Crashes involving comma.ai driving automation products","investigationNumber":"007","nhtsaId":"PE26007"},{"id":1975305,"openDate":"2026-09-14T22:41:05Z","artemisId":102488,"investigationType":"AQ","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-14T22:41:05Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (\"ODI\") has identified several incident reports submitted by Avride Inc. (\"Avride\") in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (\"SGO\") with potentially incomplete or inaccurate information. Certain of these reports indicate that, at the time of submission, Avride was not aware of any injuries resulting from the crashes, and some state that police reports of the crashes were available. ODI obtained copies of these police reports, as well as copies of police reports for other crashes Avride reported under the SGO for which Avride did not list police reports as an available source of data. The police reports indicate potential injuries were sustained by occupants of Avride vehicles and/or occupants of other vehicles involved in the crash.
ODI also identified SGO reports stating that an injury was reported or alleged, but subsequent updated reports indicate that no injuries were alleged.
NHTSA is opening this Audit Query (\"AQ\"), a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate reporting accuracy and completeness. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted reflect complete and accurate data based on available information.
The SGO incidents cited in the Opening Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting:
31101-13612
31101-13761
31101-14509
31101-14813
31101-15099
31101-15189
","subject":"Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements","investigationNumber":"003","nhtsaId":"AQ26003"},{"id":1975306,"openDate":"2026-09-14T18:33:02Z","artemisId":102490,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-26T12:06:54Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on September 1, 2026 (dated August 5, 2026), requesting an investigation into an alleged defect in BMW rear differential assemblies. The petitioner alleges Model Year (MY) 2022 BMW 540i vehicles are experiencing a sudden mechanical failure that severs the drive connection between the driveshaft and the rear wheels.
On August 12, 2026, BMW filed Safety Recall 26V525, which addresses the same condition raised in the petition. and covers certain 2022-2026 840i, 840i xDrive, 2021-2023 540i, 540i xDrive, M550i xDrive, and 2024-2026 750e xDrive vehicles. This safety recall addresses potential wear in the connection between the rear driveshaft and rear differential, which could cause the connection to fail. The Vehicle Identification Number included in the petition falls within BMW’s recall scope and subject to BMW’s reimbursement program.
Because Safety Recall 26V525 fully addresses the concerns raised in the petition, further investigation is unnecessary. Therefore, ODI is denying this Defect Petition and closing this action. The agency will continue to monitor the remedy and reserves the right to take any action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Driveshaft to rear differential connection failure","investigationNumber":"009","nhtsaId":"DP26009","closeDate":"2026-10-26T12:06:54Z"},{"id":1972899,"openDate":"2026-09-03T23:03:04Z","artemisId":102418,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-03T23:03:04Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on August 5, 2026, requesting a defect investigation into the 2.0 Liter EcoBoost engine on model year 2015-2018 Ford Edge vehicles. The petition alleges that engine coolant intrusion results in a significant loss of engine power, accompanied by an \"Engine Coolant Over Temperature\" warning message. The petition further alleges that after the vehicle has sat and cooled down, the engine runs roughly and generates a check engine light for a cylinder misfire.
This defect petition is being opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11754989.
","subject":"Loss of Motive Power","investigationNumber":"008","nhtsaId":"DP26008"},{"id":1972253,"openDate":"2026-09-03T19:42:50Z","artemisId":102487,"investigationType":"AQ","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-03T19:42:50Z","description":"On September 3, 2026, Tesla began commercial deployment with a small number of its Cybercab vehicles in Austin, Texas. Tesla notified the Agency that it certified those Cybercab vehicles as compliant with all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). Tesla also notified the Agency that it plans to gradually expand commercial deployment of the Cybercab to include additional vehicles and locations. The vehicles lack permanently attached, conventional manual controls, such as a brake pedal, gas pedal, steering wheel, and mirrors. NHTSA is opening this AQ to examine the process and technical data on which Tesla relied when certifying the Cybercab and related issues. Among other things, NHTSA will consider the extent to which Tesla’s certification depended on determinations that certain FMVSS are inapplicable to the Cybercab.
","subject":"Tesla Cybercab FMVSS Certification","investigationNumber":"002","nhtsaId":"AQ26002"},{"id":1968992,"openDate":"2026-08-24T17:54:15Z","artemisId":102319,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-24T17:54:15Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on July 20, 2026, which was dated July 7, 2026, requesting a defect investigation into the intermittent loss of braking on Model Year (MY) 2024 Ford Maverick Hybrid vehicles. The petition alleges intermittent loss of antilock and regenerative braking associated with certain fault codes that led to a collision event. The petitioner highlights that the condition persisted through four repair attempts and over 50 days out of service. Furthermore, the petition alleges that MY 2024 was improperly excluded from related Ford brake-control software recalls.
This defect petition has been opened to evaluate whether to grant or deny the petition. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11751762.
","subject":"2024 Ford Maverick Hybrid Intermittent Loss of Braking","investigationNumber":"007","nhtsaId":"DP26007"},{"id":1968472,"openDate":"2026-08-21T19:39:36Z","artemisId":102419,"investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-21T19:39:36Z","description":"On April 11, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE24011 after receiving complaints concerning a loss of brake assist in 2023 MY Cadillac Lyriq vehicles. These complaints allege a hard brake pedal, followed by a “Brake System Failure” message at start up or while driving.
GM shared records regarding several internal investigations for loss of brake assist due to alleged spindle fractures in the eBoost system. GM has stated that in the event of a spindle fracture, anti-lock brakes (ABS), stability control, and traction control remain functional until the vehicle comes to a complete stop. At this point, ABS, brake assist, stability control, and traction control functions are lost. The loss of these functions causes the vehicle to set one of three Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) based on failed performance criteria for the Electronic Brake Control Module (EBCM). These DTCs, in turn, activate several driver alerts: an audible chime, a visual “Service Brake System” message in the display, and multiple illuminated Malfunction Indicator Lights (MILs) for the ABS, Traction Control, and Brakes informing the driver of loss of functionality. The vehicle speed will also be limited to 70 KPH (43 MPH).
Since opening PE24011, ODI has continued to receive reports of loss of brake assist. Some of these reports describe symptoms inconsistent with GM’s description of a spindle failure. These reports allege an immediate loss of brake assist functionality as opposed to the loss occurring after the vehicle comes to a complete stop. The sudden loss of brake assist during a braking event could result in extended braking distance, which increases the risk of a crash or injury. ODI believes further analysis is necessary to assess the potential for failures in GM’s eBoost system to resulting in safety-related outcomes.
At this time, ODI is aware of the following vehicles that are equipped with this eBoost system: 2023-2026 MY Cadillac Lyriq, Chevrolet Colorado, and GMC Canyon; 2024-2026 MY Buick Enclave, Envision; Chevrolet Blazer EV, Equinox EV, Traverse; Cruise Origin; and GMC Acadia; 2025-2026 MY Cadillac Celestiq and Optiq. ODI is also aware of 2024-2026 MY Acura ZDX and 2024-2026 MY Honda Prologue vehicles that were built with this system. The Acura and Honda vehicles were manufactured by GM in a joint venture with Honda, and will be included in the Engineering Analysis as peer vehicles.
ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis to further assess the safety-related consequences of a failed eBoost system. In addition, ODI is expanding the scope of the investigation to encompass all GM vehicles that share this eBoost system.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Electronic Brake Module Component Failure","investigationNumber":"006","nhtsaId":"EA26006"},{"id":1968196,"openDate":"2026-08-20T20:22:03Z","artemisId":102452,"investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-20T20:22:03Z","description":"On January 16, 2026, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Recall Query RQ26001. This investigation was opened to assess the remedy effectiveness of Recall 25V-274. ODI has received complaints alleging engine failure in vehicles after the recall remedy had been completed, whether that remedy involved an oil viscosity change or a complete engine replacement.
General Motors (GM) issued Recall 25V-274 to address concerns of engine failure in the L87 engines produced between March 1, 2021 and May 31, 2024. GM cited the root cause as a supplier manufacturing and quality issue. GM’s recall remedy for Recall 25V-274 consisted of two different repairs, either an oil viscosity change or an engine replacement, based on the results of the remedy inspection procedure. ODI continues to receive reports of engine failures after the completion of the recall remedy.
To date, ODI has received 499 complaints alleging post-remedy engine failure in vehicles subject to Recall 25V-274, 473 of which involved an oil viscosity change and 26 a complete engine replacement. Additionally, ODI has received 191 reports of L87 engine failures in engines produced after the production period cited in Recall 25V-274. GM reported receiving 6,953 complaints of post-remedy engine failure.
ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis to continue investigating complaints of post-remedy engine failure. ODI is expanding the scope of this Investigation to include engines produced after the production period cited in the recall.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Loss of motive power due to engine failure post recall remedy","investigationNumber":"005","nhtsaId":"EA26005"},{"id":1968195,"openDate":"2026-08-20T20:15:48Z","artemisId":102385,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-20T20:15:48Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a Petition dated July 20, 2026. The Petition requests an investigation of road debris / rocks damaging the heat exchangers in model year (MY) 2024-2026 Toyota Grand Highlander vehicles. The Petition contends that the Grand Highlander’s front-end grill has large, open apertures and no protective screen between the grill and the vehicle’s heat exchangers. The Petition further alleges that as a result, during normal driving, the damage to heat exchangers results in coolant leakage and sudden loss of propulsion.
The Petitioner cites thirteen (13) complaints received by ODI alleging this failure, which, when added to the petitioner’s own complaint, bring the total under consideration at this time to fourteen (14). ODI will evaluate these complaints to determine if they are related to the failure cited in the Petition and conduct a technical review under 49 CFR Part 552.
This Defect Petition is being opened to evaluate whether to grant or deny the petition. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11754975.
","subject":"Road debris/rocks damaging the heat exchangers","investigationNumber":"006","nhtsaId":"DP26006"},{"id":1963094,"openDate":"2026-07-31T19:16:41Z","artemisId":102352,"investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-07-31T19:16:41Z","description":"On December 18, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE25020 to investigate instances of timing belt failure in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford Fiesta and MY 2015-2018 Ford Focus vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford), equipped with a 1.0L engine and manual transmission (subject vehicles). Additionally, MY 2018-2021 Ford EcoSport and MY 2016-2018 Focus vehicles with a 1.0L engine and automatic transmission were analyzed as peer vehicles because they utilize a wet timing belt comprised of similar material as the timing belt in the subject vehicles.
Through the PE, ODI investigated a potential failure/degradation of the timing belt that may affect oil pump function resulting in a lack of engine lubrication and potential loss of motive power. The complaints commonly allege a low engine oil pressure warning lamp immediately preceding a complete loss or reduction of motive power while the vehicle is in motion. Some complaints allege that a sudden loss of motive power or engine seizure occurred without warning or prior detectable symptoms. ODI’s analysis supports that this failure can occur without sufficient and advanced warning to the driver that a loss of motive power/engine seizure is imminent.
ODI found that the timing belt material may degrade and create debris that clogs the mesh oil pump pick-up screen, resulting in reduced oil pressure in the engine. As additional debris accumulates on the screen, this can progress to a loss of motive power while driving due to a lack of engine lubrication. The failure data provided in response to this investigation revealed an average failure mileage of approximately 70,000 miles, and that 98% of the failures occurred prior to the 150,000 mile timing belt replacement interval per the vehicles’ maintenance schedule. Based on evidence collected via consumer surveys and an engine teardown, failures have occurred despite evidence of proper and routine oil maintenance. The oil pump pick-up screen is not serviceable, so debris accumulation cannot be inspected or manually removed without removing the engine from the vehicle.
On June 2, 2026, Ford informed ODI of a non-safety customer satisfaction program for global vehicles with the 1.0L Fox Classic Timing Belt. This program will notify customers globally of a revised maintenance interval for the timing belt, reducing the original 150,000 mile interval down to 100,000 miles/6 years. This customer satisfaction program will also offer reimbursement to eligible customers who previously paid to have their engine repaired or replaced due to a timing belt related issue.
Based on NHTSA’s analysis of the data, failure rates, information provided by Ford, preliminary engine teardown analysis, and precedent recalls regarding loss of engine oil pressure with the presence of driver facing warnings, ODI believes there is an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis to perform component-level and vehicle testing. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Timing Belt Failure","investigationNumber":"004","nhtsaId":"EA26004"},{"id":1962775,"openDate":"2026-07-29T18:59:28Z","artemisId":102253,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-07-29T18:59:28Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control.
In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur. Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow.
Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Lower Lateral Link detachment","investigationNumber":"006","nhtsaId":"PE26006"},{"id":1958734,"openDate":"2026-07-13T23:52:54Z","artemisId":102220,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-24T23:24:38Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has completed its review of a Petition dated May 30, 2026. The Petition requested an investigation into inadvertent air bag deployment in model year (MY) 2011-2017 Honda Odyssey vehicles. The Petition contended that air bags can deploy absent a sufficiently severe event to trigger a deployment, such as an impact, rollover event, or G-force threshold breach. The Petition further alleged that the Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) and Supplemental Restraint System (SRS) conflict and inaccurate data is being recorded for the air bag system.
An air bag is a supplemental vehicle occupant restraint system that deploys a cushion designed to inflate in milliseconds during a collision. The cushion prevents vehicle occupants from striking hard interior surfaces and, in some cases, exterior surfaces. Air bags are designed to work in conjunction with seat belts, the primary occupant restraint system. Seat belts restrain occupants keeping them in place for the air bag to provide proper protection and to mitigate injury from air bag deployment.
An air bag system consists of an air bag cushion, an inflator module, an air bag Electronic Control Unit (ECU), and impact sensors. When a crash begins, impact sensors located on the vehicle exterior begin to measure impact severity. If a crash is severe enough, the sensors send a signal to the system’s ECU, which then signals the inflator to fill the air bag.
ODI reviewed 9 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs), one Early Warning Reporting (EWR) Death & Injury (D&I) report, and several TREAD (Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation) Field Reports alleging inadvertent air bag deployment in the Subject Vehicles. Several complaints allege that the inadvertent deployment of air bags occurred while traveling over potholes, road debris, or during minor curb strikes. All the complaints allege that there was no warning prior to the inadvertent deployment.
In general, different types of air bags are designed for different types of impacts. For instance, frontal air bags are generally designed to deploy during frontal impacts; side curtain air bags are generally designed to deploy both during rollovers and impacts to the sides of the vehicle; and side thorax air bags are generally designed to deploy during impacts to the sides of the vehicle. While these are broad categories of crash scenarios, the specific conditions under which deployment is intended are multifaceted and dependent on complex algorithms. Differences in particular variables can make a deployment an intended part of the design in one scenario and not in another similar scenario.
Although the reports described above all contain allegations of inadvertent deployment, the conditions under which those reported deployments occurred differ widely. The reports ranged different types of air bags, different combinations of air bags, and different driving scenarios preceding the deployment. Based on the data available to ODI, there is no clear pattern or factor to prompt the alleged inadvertent deployments. Thus, ODI’s review did not identify a trend of a vehicle defect regarding any type of air bag in the Subject Vehicles. Moreover, ODI did not identify any reports of inadvertent air bag deployment that resulted in a loss of vehicle control. ODI is likewise not aware of any crashes or severe injuries involving the Subject Vehicles that resulted from inadvertent deployment of the air bags.
ODI recognizes that inadvertent air bag deployments can create dangerous safety hazards. For instance, an inadvertent deployment can surprise a driver, leading to a loss of vehicle control; or if an inadvertent deployment occurs when an occupant is out of position, the force of the deployment may injure the occupant. Inadvertent deployments have been the basis for past NHTSA recalls and investigations. Here, the Petition cites one such recall: Recall 26V-227, which concerns inadvertent deployment of the side curtain and thoracic air bags in MY 2018 to 2022 Honda Odyssey vehicles (the “Recalled Vehicles”) due to the air bag ECU containing incorrect deployment parameters. Although this recall involved Honda Odyssey vehicles in adjacent model years to the Odyssey vehicles that are the subject of this Petition, ODI understands certain key differences to exist between the two groups of Odyssey models. Honda introduced a new generation of the Odyssey line in 2018. This new generation involved a large-scale redesign and a new vehicle platform compared to the previous model years. As a result, the vehicles covered by the Petition differ from the recalled vehicles in many characteristics, including physical dimensions, engines, transmissions, and air bag ECU algorithms. Given these differences, ODI’s review has not identified evidence that the reports of inadvertent deployment in the Odyssey models covered by the Petition correlate to Recall 26V-227.
After thoroughly assessing the material submitted by the Petitioner, consumer complaint information in NHTSA’s databases, and other relevant information already in possession of the Agency, NHTSA has not found sufficient evidence to indicate that a trend of inadvertent air bag deployments as alleged by the Petitioner is likely to present a safety related defect that would warrant a formal investigation. After full consideration of the available information the Petition is denied. A denial report will be posted in the Federal Register. The closing of the Petition does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety related defect does not exist, and the agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. The Petition can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11744118.
","subject":"Inadvertent Deployment of Air Bags","investigationNumber":"005","nhtsaId":"DP26005","closeDate":"2026-09-24T23:24:38Z"},{"id":1957078,"openDate":"2026-07-06T22:37:08Z","artemisId":102221,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-07-06T22:37:08Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is aware of reports alleging unexpected handle detachment on 2020-2024 Doona + Car Seat & Stroller (Doona Car Seat) model car seats. If the handle unexpectedly detaches from the car seat, the car seat could be dropped when placing it in or out of the vehicle, potentially injuring the child.
ODI will inform the Consumer Product Safety Commission of this investigation at the time of opening as this product is of shared interest.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to assess the scope, root cause, and risk associated with handle detachments in 2020-2024 Doona Car Seats.
NHTSA is opening this Audit Query (AQ) to investigate NU Car Rentals (NU Car) for compliance with the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. The Safety Act requires that a rental company shall not rent a vehicle subject to a safety recall unless the recall remedy has been performed. 49 U.S.C. § 30120(i).
NHTSA is in receipt of information that indicates NU Car rented at least two vehicles to consumers without having performed required recall repairs. The Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) related to this investigation can be found on nhtsa.gov by searching for ID number 11730449 and 11504655. Accordingly, we are opening this audit query to seek additional information concerning this issue.
","subject":"NU Car rental of vehicles with open recalls","investigationNumber":"001","nhtsaId":"AQ26001"},{"id":1947191,"openDate":"2026-05-26T23:45:25Z","artemisId":102188,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-05-26T23:45:25Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received two Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting left rear toe link separation in certain Model Year (MY) 2023-2024 Rivian R1S vehicles. Both VOQs report component separation while driving, causing the vehicles to swerve across multiple lanes of traffic. One incident resulted in a collision with an adjacent vehicle and roadside barrier. In both separations, the bolt that maintains the integrity of the toe link fractured. Evidence collected from the complaint vehicles included repair histories, onboard video, imagery of the damaged components, and a police accident report.
The two vehicles with reported separation have different vehicle histories. One vehicle received prior service and the other was involved in a previous collision. In both instances, the vehicles operated for multiple months and thousands of miles of usage with no apparent problems between the previous service or the previous collision and the failures that prompted this investigation.
Rivian recognized the subject toe link joint’s sensitivity to service procedures in March of 2025 in its updated service procedures. In January 2026 through recall 26V-003, Rivian extended the improved repair procedure to vehicles that received toe link service prior to the March 2025 improvement.
ODI is opening a Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to (1) assess the sensitivity of the rear toe link joint to foreseeable road and service conditions, (2) compare the physical failure evidence from the two VOQs to identify apparent similarities and potential differences, (3) evaluate Rivian’s current toe link repair procedure, and (4) assess the in-field subject population’s toe links conditions.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received several reports of crashes involving automated vehicles (AVs) equipped with the Avride automated driving system (ADS) engaged at the time of the crash. The crashes occurred in Dallas, Texas and Austin, Texas. Each of the crashes involved the competence of the ADS with respect to performing at least one of the following driving behaviors: changing lanes, responding to other vehicles present in or entering the lane ahead, and responding to stationary objects partially obstructing the lane ahead.
ODI has performed a preliminary review of videos of each crash. The videos show instances of the AVs changing lanes into the path of or directly into other vehicles traveling in an adjacent lane and in close proximity to an AV; failing to slow or stop for slow-moving or stopped vehicles in the lane and path ahead; failing to slow for or avoid vehicles entering the lane and path ahead; and striking stationary objects partially obstructing the lane and path ahead. These crashes have resulted in property damage and one alleged minor injury. During each of these crashes, the AVs were operating with the ADS performing the dynamic driving task while under the supervision of an in-vehicle operator in the driver's seat. Furthermore, ODI understands that Avride is operating some of its AVs on the Uber ride-hailing platform and has offered passenger service to the public since December 3, 2025 in Dallas where many of the reported crashes have occurred. The ADS performance in these crashes may indicate inappropriate assertiveness and insufficient competence to execute these driving behaviors in a safe manner and may also constitute traffic safety violations.
ODI has opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate the performance of the Avride ADS in order to determine the scope, nature and severity of the potential problems and to assess the potential safety risks to passengers and other road users. This will include an assessment of technical and operational contributing factors and safeguards already in place, as well as any mitigating actions taken subsequent to a crash. If additional evidence received during this investigation implicates the competence of the Avride ADS with respect to other driving behaviors, these may be considered as part of this investigation as well.
The SGO reports cited in this Opening Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting.
31101-13612-1
31101-13612-2
31101-13612-3
31101-13616-1
31101-13621-1
31101-13624-1
31101-13625-1
31101-14066-1
31101-14070-1
31101-14148-1
31101-14150-1
31101-14166-1
31101-14200-1
31101-14235-1
31101-14286-1
31101-14328-1
31101-14509-1
31101-14653-1
","subject":"Automated Driving System (ADS) conflict avoidance, driving behavior competence and assertiveness","investigationNumber":"003","nhtsaId":"PE26003"},{"id":1939119,"openDate":"2026-04-24T17:22:49Z","artemisId":102121,"investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-04-24T17:22:49Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is upgrading its Preliminary Evaluation (PE25006) of front steering knuckle fractures on model year (MY) 2014 through 2017 Range Rover Sport vehicles to an Engineering Analysis. ODI opened PE25006 on June 27, 2025, after receiving 12 Vehicle Owner's Questionnaire (VOQ) reports of the front aluminum steering knuckles fracturing in these vehicles. The reports describe the fractures occurring at the joint where the steering knuckle attaches to the upper control arm ball joint in one or both steering knuckles. Fracture of the front suspension knuckle can lead to detachment of the upper suspension arm. Detachment of the upper suspension arm results in the driver’s inability to control the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
ODI reviewed information supplied by Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) in response to Information Request letters as well as reviewed the data with JLR on numerous occasions. ODI further reviewed relevant data on a peer vehicle with a significantly similar steering knuckle design, the MY 2014 through 2017 Range Rover. Much of the information is contradictory and requires a deeper analysis that is available in an Engineering Analysis.
On August 5, 2025, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) filed safety recall 25V514. This recall covers certain MY 2014 and all MY 2015-2017 Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles. The remedy for recall 25V514 addresses knuckles with and without a visible fracture. Knuckles that have developed a visible fracture will be replaced with a new knuckle of a substantially similar design. Knuckles with no fracture visibly present will have a brace attached to the upper portion of the front steering knuckle. JLR states that the purpose of the brace is to prevent the component from completely separating should a fracture develop.
NHTSA continues to receive allegations of fractures occurring in the front steering knuckles of Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles. Two of the most recent VOQs received by ODI involve front steering knuckle fractures occurring on MY 2020 and MY 2021 Range Rover L405 vehicles. ODI will continue to investigate the component design and assess the potential safety risk as part of this Engineering Analysis and evaluate the recall remedies for Recall 25V514. Further, the scope of this Engineering Analysis will be expanded to include MY 2018-2022 Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles as they have a substantially similar component design.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Front Steering Knuckle Fractures","investigationNumber":"003","nhtsaId":"EA26003"},{"id":1937033,"openDate":"2026-04-09T21:55:37Z","artemisId":102048,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-23T22:39:34Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on December 22, 2025, requesting a defect investigation into the hydraulic control unit (HCU) for the Anti-lock Braking System (ABS) on the MY 2010 Ford Fusion Hybrid. The petition alleges that an illuminated ABS MIL is associated with a failure of the ABS HCU, resulting in ABS malfunction, loss of traction and electronic stability control functions, and reduced braking performance, particularly on slippery road surfaces.
ODI conducted an analysis of complaints submitted to ODI for the subject vehicle population along with data submitted by Ford. The Petitioner alleged that the condition in the subject vehicles was comparable to the defect addressed by NHTSA recall No. 19V904, which covered certain MY 2006-2010 Ford Fusion, Mercury Milan, and Lincoln MKZ vehicles. The population of this recall consisted of the non-hybrid variants of these models. The recall addressed a defect where the ABS valves in the HCU could remain stuck open due to a chemical reaction with aged DOT 3 brake fluid, potentially causing extended brake pedal travel and increasing the risk of a crash. DOT 3 brake fluid is a conventional, glycol-ether-based hydraulic fluid used to transfer force from the brake pedal to a vehicle's brakes. No visual or audible warning was presented to the driver in this scenario.
The MY 2010 Ford Fusion Hybrid is equipped with a different brake apply system in which the traditional hydraulic (friction) brakes are blended with the hybrid regenerative brake system. In this system, the brake master cylinder is electrically activated and provides force feedback through the brake pedal to the driver. Unlike the recalled models, Petitioner’s 2010 Ford Fusion Hybrid would not experience the same defect, as a stuck-open normally closed valve within its ABS HCU does not result in increased brake pedal travel. This condition is further supported by the relative complaint rates in the two populations: ODI found the complaint rate of the recalled MY 2010 Fusion vehicles was six times higher than that of the subject MY 2010 Fusion Hybrid vehicles, which supports a significant difference in the design and performance of the brake system and components.
As the Petitioner stated, most of the subject hybrid vehicle VOQs cited an illuminated ABS MIL. The vehicles in 19V904 did not present the driver with an illuminated MIL or associated diagnostic trouble code (DTC). Since the MY 2010 Ford Fusion Hybrid presented with a brake MIL, the failure mode differs from that of the non-hybrid population, which did not trigger an illuminated warning light. Additionally, given the age of the subject vehicles (MY 2010), the low complaint volume is consistent with expected wear and tear rather than an actionable safety defect trend.
For the above reasons, ODI is denying this Defect Petition as it has not found an unreasonable risk to highway safety. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Anti-lock brake system (ABS) Malfunction Indicator Lamp (MIL) illuminated","investigationNumber":"004","nhtsaId":"DP26004","closeDate":"2026-10-23T22:39:34Z"},{"id":1932391,"openDate":"2026-03-30T16:02:12Z","artemisId":102083,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-09T20:20:58Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has completed its review of a petition dated February 5, 2026, requesting an investigation into model year (MY) 2006 Nissan Frontier vehicles. The petition alleged that the vehicles pose an imminent fire hazard due to a powerful and persistent odor of raw gasoline emanating from the vehicle, indicating a breach in fuel system integrity. The petition also alleged that the vehicles can experience sudden engine stalling during startup and operation, creating an unreasonable risk of collision or loss of vehicle control. The petition further asserted these symptoms are identical to conditions addressed in previous NHTSA recalls (Recalls 10V-075, 07V-435, and 10V-517) arguing that the issues persist in the 2006 MY Nissan fleet despite these past actions and asserting that a safety defect is not subject to expiration.
The subject vehicle is a model year 2006 vehicle that has been in service for approximately 20 years. Standard automotive components including fuel hoses, rubber seals, gaskets, electrical relays, and engine sensors have a finite useful lifecycle and are subject to environmental exposure, operational stress, and natural degradation over extended time frames. ODI routinely distinguishes between a manufacturing or design defect and normal lifecycle wear-out, such as in Denial of DP18002, 87 FR16823, finding underbody component issues late in vehicle life to be indicative of normal wear and tear failures. Isolated component failures on high-age vehicles do not, in themselves, establish the presence of an actionable safety defect across a vehicle fleet.
ODI conducted a technical review of available information, which included consumer complaint information, related recall information, and other relevant data in possession of the agency. After review, ODI determined the cited recall campaigns do not provide compelling support for the petition’s allegations. Recall 07V-435 pertained exclusively to model year 1997-2001 Nissan Pathfinder and Infiniti QX4 vehicles to address corrosion of the lower fuel filler tube bracket in specific salt-belt states and did not involve the MY 2006 Nissan Frontier platform. Merely experiencing a general symptom such as a fuel odor on a 20-year-old vehicle does not establish a link to a localized corrosion issue on an entirely different vehicle generation produced years prior, and the Agency is not aware of a trend of fire complaints on subject vehicles with over 20 years of exposure. Recall 10V-075 addressed a fuel sender float arm contacting an internal tank embossment causing the fuel gauge on certain MY 2006 and 2008 Frontier vehicles to inaccurately display fuel level when empty. That campaign was directed strictly at instrument gauge accuracy and engine stalling from fuel exhaustion, not a physical fuel leak or breach of fuel system integrity. Recall 10V-17 addressed silicon oxide accumulation on Engine Control Module relay contacts within the Intelligent Power Distribution Module on select MY 2005-2006 vehicles. After approximately 20 years of operational service and environmental exposure, engine stalling can be caused by a wide range of normal, age-related maintenance conditions, and the presence of engine stalling on a 20-year-old vehicle does not, by itself, indicate the presence of the original manufacturing defect addressed in Recall 10V-517.
Associating general, late-life vehicle symptoms with historic recall campaigns on multi-decade-old vehicles does not satisfy the requirement to present specific data establishing a defect trend that poses an unreasonable risk to safety. Furthermore, NHTSA’s oversight of recall execution ensures that campaign parameters (such as affected VIN ranges and build dates) are chosen based on specific defect determinations; therefore, individual component degradation on high-age vehicles outside these parameters is more likely to represent routine wear and tear rather than an unaddressed safety defect trend. NHTSA does not believe that the issues presented indicate the likely existence of a safety-related defect that would warrant a formal investigation. After full consideration of the available information, and of NHTSA’s enforcement priorities, the petition is denied. NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact.
Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system.
ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period.
Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path.
In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788.
The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
","subject":"FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions","investigationNumber":"002","nhtsaId":"EA26002"},{"id":1926540,"openDate":"2026-03-06T18:39:31Z","artemisId":102082,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-04T21:55:56Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has completed its review of a Petition dated January 9, 2026, requesting an investigation into the loss of the optional all-wheel drive capability in model year (MY) 2021-2023 Acura TLX and MY 2022-2023 Acura MDX vehicles. The Petition alleges failures in the interfacing splines between the front wheel drive transaxle and the rear wheel drive power take off unit. Failure of these splines prevents the transfer of drive power to the rear axle, making the vehicle front wheel drive only. The Petition further alleges that this failure reduces vehicle directional control.
Most traditional AWD systems utilize mechanical and passive measures. These systems have the tendency to distribute torque along the path of least resistance, such as a wheel that has lost contact with the ground or is on a low friction surface such as ice. To compensate for this, many manufacturers use the brake system to redirect torque to the wheels with more traction. However, in this style of AWD system, a failed drive shaft or similar disconnection prior to the brakes often results in drive power being lost to the disconnected component. The consequence of this loss is the inability to maintain speed with surrounding traffic which increases the risks of collisions and injuries to the vehicle occupants.
The Subject Vehicles are built upon a platform that was designed primarily as Front Wheel Drive (FWD). The SH-AWD system functions more as a performance enhancement feature rather than a stability feature. Even if the SH-AWD is nonoperational, the vehicles retain full mobility via FWD. In addition, the Vehicle Stability Assist (VSA) remains functional, ensuring directional stability through traditional engine and brake-based traction control. Although the condition raised by the Petitioner may degrade the vehicle’s performance characteristics, there is insufficient information to indicate a potential unreasonable safety risk.
ODI reviewed 62 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) and several EWR Field Reports alleging the loss of SH-AWD and its impact on the driving dynamics of the subject vehicles. During its analysis, ODI determined that the failure is localized to the mechanical interface between the FWD transaxle and the PTU. Specifically, the failure is the shearing or stripping of the interfacing splined shafts between the FWD transaxle and the PTU, resulting in a permanent loss of torque transfer to the rear of the vehicle. Upon reviewing the technical details of SH-AWD, ODI has found that this failure does not result in any loss of motive power or lead to a loss of vehicle control.
Several complaints indicated that the operators were unaware of the mechanical fault until encountering a low friction surface or the condition was identified by a technician during routine maintenance. The SH-AWD system lacks any form of direct feedback for monitoring real time torque transfer to the rear wheels. Therefore, the system will continue to display information indicating power is being supplied to the rear wheels even when power is actually only supplied to the front wheels.
ODI’s review did not identify sufficient evidence to indicate that the misinformation has presented a safety issue in the field. ODI did not identify any reports of loss of motive power or vehicle control that could be attributed to the loss of SH-AWD. ODI is not aware of any crashes involving the Subject Vehicles that resulted from the loss of SH-AWD.
After thoroughly assessing the material submitted by the Petitioner, consumer complaint information in NHTSA’s databases, and other relevant information already in possession of the Agency, NHTSA has not found sufficient evidence to indicate that the loss of AWD as alleged by the Petitioner is likely to present a safety related defect that would warrant a formal investigation. After full consideration of the available information, and in view of NHTSA’s enforcement priorities, the Petition is denied. A denial report will be posted in the Federal Register. The closing of the petition does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety related defect does not exist, and the agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. The Petition can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11712885.
","subject":"All wheel drive allegation","investigationNumber":"001","nhtsaId":"DP26001","closeDate":"2026-08-04T21:55:56Z"},{"id":1927357,"openDate":"2026-03-04T16:59:09Z","artemisId":102007,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-13T18:51:53Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on November 21, 2025, requesting a defect investigation to “determine whether the absence of a redundant mechanical wheel-fastener locking mechanism constitutes a safety-related defect in motor vehicles and motor-vehicle equipment” in the heavy-vehicle sector. On March 4, 2026, NHTSA opened Defect Petition DP26002 to evaluate the petitioner's request. The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11703245.
The petitioner focused on all vehicles utilizing the 10-285.75 mm bolt wheels, also known as 10 Hole 22.5\" Hub Pilot Wheels, as the subject of the petition. ODI conducted a comprehensive search of Vehicle Owner Questionnaire's (VOQ) and Early Warning Reporting (EWR) data for vehicles equipped with the subject wheels. Furthermore, ODI reviewed six months of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's Motor Carrier Management Information System violation data for commercial vehicles cited for loose/missing wheel fasteners. After a review of this data, ODI has found insufficient evidence to support the petitioner's claim that a safety-related defect exists. The data indicates that instances of loose or missing fasteners typically occur at higher mileages following fleet maintenance activities, rather than as a result of an inherent vehicle manufacturing or design defect. Furthermore, commercial motor vehicle operators are required to conduct daily pre-trip inspections to detect and mitigate loose fasteners before operation. In the absence of a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard requiring wheels to have a redundant locking system and given the lack of evidence establishing a systemic safety defect, ODI is denying this Defect Petition. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the agency from taking further action if warranted or making a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Redundant wheel fastener locking mechanism","investigationNumber":"002","nhtsaId":"DP26002","closeDate":"2026-08-13T18:51:53Z"},{"id":1925054,"openDate":"2026-03-02T18:28:57Z","artemisId":102046,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-03-02T18:28:57Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 19 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) alleging an intermittent or complete failure of the power steering assist system in certain Model Year (MY) 2022-2023 RAM ProMaster 1500, 2500, and 3500 vehicles. Failure of the power steering assist system can result in increased steering effort required to control the vehicle. An increase in steering effort can potentially lead to a loss of directional control of the vehicle. Several received reports allege failures of the steering rack with specific reports citing water intrusion into the electrical connectors of the electric power steering control module.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope and root cause of potential defects in 2022-2023 RAM ProMaster steering systems. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On March 21, 2025, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE25002) to investigate instances of unexpected transmission downshifting without driver input in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford F-150 vehicles (subject vehicles) manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). The complaints allege that, without warning or driver input, the subject vehicles experienced a sudden and rapid deceleration often accompanied by temporary rear wheel lockup, seizure, or skidding, resulting in a loss of vehicle control that increases the risk of crash and injury to all motorists, including those not within the subject vehicles. The MY 2015 and MY 2016 F-150 vehicles were equipped with the “6R80” transmission, while the MY 2017 vehicles were equipped with either the “6R80” transmission or the “10R80” transmission. This investigation was limited to MY 2015-2017 Ford F-150 with the “6R80” transmission.
ODI identified 329 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) related to this investigation and sixty percent of these consumers were interviewed to confirm the details of their allegations. Consumers reported that their vehicles’ transmission suddenly downshifted to a lower gear, often to 1st or 2nd gear, without driver input or advance warning. Consumers described the downshift events to be regular and repeated occurrences, with some consumers stating that they no longer drive the vehicle due to safety concerns. Forty-three percent of consumers reported experiencing at least one wheel lockup event, during which the rear tires locked, screeched, or skidded during the transmission downshift. ODI also found that 114 of the 329 consumers reported having their vehicle’s molded lead frame or valve body assembly (which comes with a molded lead frame) replaced, 80 of which were confirmed through consumer submitted repair invoices.
In its response to ODI’s Information Request, Ford provided an assessment of potential root cause of failure for the subject vehicles and how this failure is different from the failure associated with MY 2011-2014 Ford F-150 vehicles that was addressed by four safety recalls (16V-248, 19V-075, 19V-433, and 24V-444). Ford has identified that the defect in the recalled vehicle population involved lead frame supplier production issues resulting in signal loss from the Output Shaft Speed (OSS) sensor. Ford has identified that the alleged defect in the subject vehicle population involved degradation of electrical connections within the lead frame due to thermal cycling and vibration over extended time in service resulting in signal loss from the Transmission Range Sensor (TRS).
Signal loss from the TRS can result in an unintended shift to neutral, unintended upshift, or unintended downshift which are regulated by a gear “shift map” based on the vehicle’s speed at the time of signal loss. According to Ford’s “shift map”, at speeds between 35-64 mph, the maximum allowable downshift would be to 2nd gear (i.e. a 6th to 2nd gear downshift event) which Ford has designated to represent the worst-case scenario for subject vehicles. Ford has also acknowledged that the worst-case scenario may also involve temporary wheel lockup. However, Ford has stated that the failure mechanism in the MY 2011-2014 F-150 vehicles—previously addressed through recalls—primarily involved OSS sensor signal loss that could result in 6th to 1st gear downshift events. This OSS-related failure mode is distinct from the TRS-related signal loss identified in the subject vehicle population.
ODI has identified an additional potential safety defect associated with the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Preliminary testing performed by NHTSA’s Vehicle Research Test Center (VRTC) showed that when the TRS experiences an intermittent signal loss, one possible outcome is a change in vehicle direction. Specifically, if a vehicle is operating in reverse up an incline when the TRS signal loss occurs, then the vehicle may shift into neutral causing the vehicle to change directions and roll forward.
ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis (EA) to, among other things, perform component-level testing and vehicle testing, as well as review additional technical information to better understand the alleged defect that has been identified. To review the reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Unintended Transmission Downshift and Rear Wheel Lock-up","investigationNumber":"001","nhtsaId":"EA26001"},{"id":1915944,"openDate":"2026-01-29T05:20:41Z","artemisId":102049,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-01-29T05:20:41Z","description":"On January 23, 2026, Waymo LCC (Waymo) reported to the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) that a Waymo Automated Vehicle (AV) had struck a child near an elementary school earlier that day. Waymo provided its required report under SGO 2021-01 on January 28, 2026.
NHTSA is aware that the incident occurred within two blocks of a Santa Monica, CA elementary school during normal school drop off hours; that there were other children, a crossing guard, and several double-parked vehicles in the vicinity; and that the child ran across the street from behind a double parked SUV towards the school and was struck by the Waymo AV. Waymo reported that the child sustained minor injuries.
At the time of the incident, the Waymo AV was operated by Waymo’s 5th Generation Automated Driving System (ADS). No safety operator was present in the vehicle.
ODI has opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate whether the Waymo AV exercised appropriate caution given, among other things, its proximity to the elementary school during drop off hours, and the presence of young pedestrians and other potential vulnerable road users. ODI expects that its investigation will examine the ADS’s intended behavior in school zones and neighboring areas, especially during normal school pick up/drop off times, including but not limited to its adherence to posted speed limits. ODI will also investigate Waymo's post-impact response.
","subject":"Waymo AV striking a child in the area of a school.","investigationNumber":"001","nhtsaId":"PE26001"},{"id":1915615,"openDate":"2026-01-26T23:28:38Z","artemisId":102045,"investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"26","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2026-01-26T23:28:38Z","description":"
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 26 complaints and several Early Warning Reporting (EWR) Field Reports alleging intermittent and brief increases in steering effort (described as “sticky steering”) during the drive cycle in model year (MY) 2024 CX-90 vehicles manufactured by Mazda North American Operations (Mazda) subject to Recall 24V2022. In each complaint, the vehicle had the recall remedy completed prior to the reported incident.
Recall 24V022 addresses a sudden and unexpected change of steering effort while driving caused by excessive worm gear friction force.
After receiving the recall 24V022 remedy, consumers report sudden increases of steering effort while driving. Sudden and unexpected change of steering effort while driving may increase the risk of a crash.
ODI is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to assess the adequacy of the remedy for Recall 24V022 and to identify the cause(s) of the conditions leading to the post-remedy reports. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Momentary increase in steering effort after recall remedy","investigationNumber":"002","nhtsaId":"RQ26002"},{"id":1913281,"openDate":"2026-01-17T01:32:17Z","artemisId":102044,"investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"26","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-20T20:24:55Z","description":"On January 16, 2026, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Recall Query RQ26001. This investigation was opened to assess the remedy effectiveness of Recall 25V-274. ODI has received complaints alleging engine failure in vehicles after the recall remedy had been completed, whether that remedy involved an oil viscosity change or a complete engine replacement.
General Motors (GM) issued Recall 25V-274 to address concerns of engine failure in the L87 engines produced between March 1, 2021 and May 31, 2024. GM cited the root cause as a supplier manufacturing and quality issue. GM’s recall remedy for Recall 25V-274 consisted of two different repairs, either an oil viscosity change or an engine replacement, based on the results of the remedy inspection procedure. ODI continues to receive reports of engine failures after the completion of the recall remedy.
To date, ODI has received 499 complaints alleging post-remedy engine failure in vehicles subject to Recall 25V-274, 473 of which involved an oil viscosity change and 26 a complete engine replacement. GM reported receiving 6,953 complaints of post-remedy engine failure.
ODI will close this RQ and continue to investigate complaints of post-remedy engine failure for Recall 25V-274 as part of an Engineering Analysis (EA26005).
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Loss of motive power due to engine failure post recall remedy","investigationNumber":"001","nhtsaId":"RQ26001","closeDate":"2026-08-20T20:24:55Z"},{"id":1907796,"openDate":"2025-12-23T19:53:07Z","artemisId":102040,"investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"25","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-07-22T23:11:35Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has completed its review of a defect petition received on November 24, 2025, requesting an investigation into the emergency mechanical door release in 2022 Model Year (MY) Tesla Model 3. The petition alleges that the controls for the emergency mechanical door release are not accessible and clearly identifiable and thus fail to comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 206.
A vehicle equipped with electric door handles without an accessible mechanical door release creates a risk to safety when the electric door handle becomes inoperative due to loss of power and occupants are unable to easily locate the mechanical door release to exit the vehicle in case of an emergency. A concealed or hard to locate emergency door release could prevent an operator or occupant from exiting the vehicle in the event of an emergency, such as a crash or fire. The potential risk for entrapment can result in a severe injury or death of the operator and other occupants of the vehicle.
As of March 13, 2026, out of the population of 179,031 subject vehicles, NHTSA has identified one (1) consumer complaint, in NHTSA’s databases alleging that the mechanical door release is concealed and unlabeled, resulting in a risk of entrapment in the event of an emergency, as cited in the Petition. The complaint is for the same Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) as the subject vehicle of the Petition. The allegation describes a front impact collision, where the vehicle lost electrical power, and the electric door mechanism stopped working.
The 2022 MY Model 3 has a mechanical release for the front doors, located in front of the window switch on the door's interior and consists of a lever that can be pulled up to open the door. The subject vehicle does not have a mechanical release for the back doors.
The owner’s manual for the 2022 MY Tesla Model 3 includes a section labeled “In Case of Emergency” that details how to open doors from the interior when the vehicle has no electrical power. The owner’s manual refers to the mechanical release as a “manual door release.” The owner’s manual instructs the operator to “pull up the manual door release located in front of the window switches.” The owner’s manual includes an illustration showing the mechanical door release lever and its location on the door. The illustration depicts an image of the door with the window switch and lever, including a blue arrow pointing to the location of the lever to demonstrate the upward movement required to operate the lever. The lever shown in the illustration does not contain a label to identify it. Although they vary in design and location, mechanical releases for the front doors are available on all Tesla models. The location and operation of the mechanical release is described in the owner’s manual for each Tesla model. Further, the owner’s manual cautions the operator that the mechanical door release should only be used when the subject vehicle has no power or if otherwise necessary. If the subject vehicle has power, the button located at the top of the interior door handle should be used to open the doors.
The Petition also stated the lack of an accessible mechanical emergency door release is a violation of the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 206 (49 CFR § 571.206). FMVSS 206 specifies performance requirements for vehicle door locks, latches, hinges, and attachment components to prevent passenger ejection during crashes. It applies to passenger cars, trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,000 lbs.) or less, focusing on maintaining latch engagement under inertial loads and structural integrity. No requirements exist in the standard that address the Petitioner’s concern regarding the labeling and location of an emergency mechanical door release in passenger cars.
On November 4, 2025, NHTSA’s Office of Rulemaking received a petition to initiate the issuance of a new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) to mandate a robust and obvious door egress system in all motor vehicles. The request has been granted, and the Agency will accordingly commence a rulemaking proceeding. See 49 CFR § 552.9. A decision as to the issuance of a rule will be made on the basis of all available information developed in the course of the rulemaking proceeding, in accordance with statutory criteria. Id.
The Agency has thoroughly assessed the material submitted by the Petitioner, consumer complaint information in NHTSA’s databases, and other relevant information already in possession of the Agency. NHTSA does not believe that the issues presented by the Petitioner indicate the likelihood of a safety related defect that would warrant a defect investigation, and the issue is best addressed through the rulemaking process. After full consideration of the available information and the commencement of the related rulemaking proceeding, the Petition is denied. Further specifics can be found in the Federal Register Notice.
The ODI report cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11701894 and the Defect Petition can be viewed under ODI Number 11698174.
","subject":"Emergency egress controls are not readily accessible and clearly identifiable.","investigationNumber":"002","nhtsaId":"DP25002","closeDate":"2026-07-22T23:11:35Z"},{"id":1907063,"openDate":"2025-12-19T01:21:31Z","artemisId":102041,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-07-31T19:22:59Z","description":"On December 18, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE25020 to investigate instances of timing belt failure in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford Fiesta and MY 2015-2018 Ford Focus vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford), equipped with a 1.0L engine and manual transmission (subject vehicles). Additionally, MY 2018-2021 Ford EcoSport and MY 2016-2018 Focus vehicles with a 1.0L engine and automatic transmission were analyzed as peer vehicles because they utilize a wet timing belt comprised of similar material as the timing belt in the subject vehicles.
Through the PE, ODI investigated a potential failure/degradation of the timing belt that may affect oil pump function resulting in a lack of engine lubrication and potential loss of motive power. The complaints commonly allege a low engine oil pressure warning lamp immediately preceding a complete loss or reduction of motive power while the vehicle is in motion. Some complaints allege that a sudden loss of motive power or engine seizure occurred without warning or prior detectable symptoms. ODI’s analysis supports that this failure can occur without sufficient and advanced warning to the driver that a loss of motive power/engine seizure is imminent.
ODI found that the timing belt material may degrade and create debris that clogs the mesh oil pump pick-up screen, resulting in reduced oil pressure in the engine. As additional debris accumulates on the screen, this can progress to a loss of motive power while driving due to a lack of engine lubrication. The failure data provided in response to this investigation revealed an average failure mileage of approximately 70,000 miles, and that 98% of the failures occurred prior to the 150,000 mile timing belt replacement interval per the vehicles’ maintenance schedule. Based on evidence collected via consumer surveys and an engine teardown, failures have occurred despite evidence of proper and routine oil maintenance. The oil pump pick-up screen is not serviceable, so debris accumulation cannot be inspected or manually removed without removing the engine from the vehicle.
On June 2, 2026, Ford informed ODI of a non-safety customer satisfaction program for global vehicles with the 1.0L Fox Classic Timing Belt. This program will notify customers globally of a revised maintenance interval for the timing belt, reducing the original 150,000 mile interval down to 100,000 miles/6 years. This customer satisfaction program will also offer reimbursement to eligible customers who previously paid to have their engine repaired or replaced due to a timing belt related issue.
Based on NHTSA’s analysis of the data, failure rates, information provided by Ford, preliminary engine teardown analysis, and precedent recalls regarding loss of engine oil pressure with the presence of driver facing warnings, ODI believes there is an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. Therefore, this Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA26004). During this Engineering Analysis, the agency plans to perform component-level and vehicle testing. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Timing Belt Failure","investigationNumber":"020","nhtsaId":"PE25020","closeDate":"2026-07-31T19:22:59Z"},{"id":1905567,"openDate":"2025-12-12T00:22:30Z","artemisId":102004,"investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"25","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2025-12-12T00:22:30Z","description":"On June 8, 2023, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles US, LLC (FCA) filed Safety Recall 23V-413 affecting certain 2022–2023 Jeep Grand Cherokee and 2021–2023 Jeep Grand Cherokee L vehicles to address rear coil springs that may not have been properly installed during vehicle production. An improperly installed rear coil spring may detach while the vehicle is in motion, creating a road hazard that can increase the risk of a crash for following motorists and may result in injury to other road users.
Since the filing of Recall 23V-413, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has received twenty (20) unique consumer complaints alleging rear coil spring detachments occurring after the recall remedy was performed. These reports raise concerns regarding the effectiveness of the recall remedy and suggest the possibility of additional factors not addressed by the original recall campaign.
Accordingly, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to assess the adequacy of FCA’s remedy procedure under Recall 23V-413 and to evaluate the root cause(s) of post-remedy coil spring detachments. ODI will review complaint data, field reports, and FCA’s technical analysis to determine whether further action is warranted.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, visit NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 1 complaint stating that a rear row seat belt became detached in a model year (MY) 2024 Land Rover Defender. Photos of the seat belt received with the complaint show that the stitching of the webbing of the seat belt appears to have not been properly formed.
An improperly stitched seat belt can become detached during a collision. Detachment of the seat belt increases the risk and severity of injury in a collision. This is especially concerning for children and children in child seats.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI report cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Rear Seat Belt Stitching Failure and Detachment","investigationNumber":"019","nhtsaId":"PE25019"},{"id":1895173,"openDate":"2025-10-29T00:38:09Z","artemisId":101997,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-06-25T22:22:00Z","description":"On October 28, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened PE25018 to investigate complaints of inadvertent deployment of the side curtain and/or side thorax air bags. These complaints concern model year (MY) 2018-2022 Honda Odyssey vehicles manufactured by American Honda Motor Co. (Honda).
Honda issued recall 26V227 on April 9, 2026, to address concerns of inadvertent side air bag deployment. In the recall filing, the company stated that “[a]s of April 2, 2026, Honda has had 130 warranty claims, 25 reports of an injury, and no reports of death related to this issue from January 24, 2017 – April 2, 2026.” Honda states that the Supplemental Restraint System (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) contains incorrect deployment parameters for the side thorax and side curtain air bags, which may cause inadvertent deployment when the vehicle encounters strong road impacts, such as driving over potholes, speed bumps, or road debris. Honda stated that the SRS control logic for the second and third rows of seating contained an insufficient deployment threshold margin, allowing signal inputs to be misinterpreted as side impacts and causing inadvertent deployment of the side thorax and side curtain air bags. Recall 26V227 states that dealers will reprogram or replace the SRS ECU with improved air bag deployment parameters. Consumers received notice of this recall in late May 2026.
In view of the recall being conducted by Honda, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation (PE). The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Inadvertent Deployment of Side Air Bags","investigationNumber":"018","nhtsaId":"PE25018","closeDate":"2026-06-25T22:22:00Z"},{"id":1895175,"openDate":"2025-10-29T00:34:43Z","artemisId":102001,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-10-23T22:46:25Z","description":"On October 28, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened PE25-017 to investigate allegations of inaccurate rear seat belt warning status indicators. These allegations concern both false positive and false negative status indications in model year (MY) 2023-2024 Honda Pilot vehicles manufactured by American Honda Motor Co. (Honda). A false negative occurs when the occupant’s seat belt is latched and the warning light illuminates, indicating the occupant is not belted. A false positive occurs when the occupant’s seat belt is not latched yet no warning is provided to the driver of this unlatched condition.
ODI’s data analysis revealed that nearly all complaints involved false negative alerts. Regardless of the type of failure, there is no effect on the performance of the rear seat belts or on occupant protection during collisions.
ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Inaccurate Rear Passenger Seat Belt Warning Status","investigationNumber":"017","nhtsaId":"PE25017","closeDate":"2026-10-23T22:46:25Z"},{"id":1895174,"openDate":"2025-10-29T00:31:43Z","artemisId":101998,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-29T00:31:43Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 48 Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) reports and some Early Warning Reporting (EWR) field reports alleging intermittent loss of motive power in Model Year (MY) 2020–2022 Honda CR-V Hybrid vehicles. These incidents are alleged to occur without warning at highway speeds and are accompanied by a flashing check engine light immediately before the loss of motive power occurs. Motive power can be restored by turning the ignition off and back on. However, this action also clears the check engine light and any fault codes that were set. The fault’s intermittent nature, combined with the lack of fault codes, often results in many visits to repair facilities yielding no repairs. Honda indicated it was unaware of any related complaint or repair trends.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to determine the scope and severity of the alleged fault and to fully assess the possible safety consequences. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Loss of Motive Power","investigationNumber":"016","nhtsaId":"PE25016"},{"id":1894238,"openDate":"2025-10-23T22:16:30Z","artemisId":101963,"investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-23T22:16:30Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 1,157 reports of engine bearing failure failures in the L87 6.2L engine produced by General Motors (GM). Of the 1,157 reports received, 173 are outside of the scope of recall 25V-274. These engines are installed in Model Years (MY) 2019–2024 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 and GMC Sierra 1500, and 2021-2024MY Chevrolet Suburban and Tahoe, GMC Yukon/Yukon XL, and Cadillac Escalade/Escalade ESV vehicles.
The subject engine failures were investigated as part of a Preliminary Evaluation (PE25001). GM determined that these engine failures were due to multiple supplier manufacturing and quality issues. GM issued recall 25V-274 to address the supplier manufacturing and quality issues produced between March 1, 2021, and May 31, 2024. Based on the issuance of recall 25V-274, NHTSA has closed PE25001.
ODI continues to receive a significant number of reports of engine failure in vehicles outside the scope of 25V-274. This presents a potential safety risk that warrants further investigation. ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis (EA) to further evaluate the scope and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues of vehicles built outside the recall scope.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Loss of motive power due to engine failure","investigationNumber":"007","nhtsaId":"EA25007"},{"id":1894237,"openDate":"2025-10-23T22:07:09Z","artemisId":101928,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-05-21T20:31:34Z","description":"On October 23, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE25015 after receiving complaints concerning a loss of brake assist in 2019-2020 MY Acura ILX vehicles. These complainants alleged master cylinder failures resulting in soft pedal feel or the brake pedal intermittently going to the floor. These failures could result in extended braking distance increasing the risk of a crash.
Honda found that residual plasticizer in the brake reservoir hose could contaminate the brake fluid. This contaminated brake fluid was then absorbed by the secondary cup seal, causing it to swell. Engine heat during operation could further expand the swollen seal, allowing brake fluid to pass. Brake fluid bypassing the master cylinder cup seals can reduce brake-pedal firmness and increase stopping distance.
On April 08, 2026, Honda filed Recall 25V-859, recalling all 2016-2020 MY Acura ILX vehicles produced from October 9, 2014, to January 29, 2020. Under the recall, the dealer will replace the brake master cylinder with redesigned inner cup seals made of a different material, providing improved sealing capability.
In view of Honda filing Recall 25V-859 addressing the subject of this investigation, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Loss of braking force","investigationNumber":"015","nhtsaId":"PE25015","closeDate":"2026-05-21T20:31:34Z"},{"id":1893988,"openDate":"2025-10-23T17:10:09Z","artemisId":101848,"investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-23T17:10:09Z","description":"On May 26, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23010) to assess reports of false positive activation of the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system in model year (MY) 2017-2022 Daimler Trucks North America (DTNA) vehicles. The reports alleged that activation of the AEB system occurred while driving with no apparent obstruction in the vehicle's forward path, resulting in sudden vehicle deceleration.
DTNA indicated that it received of a total of 315 reports that may relate to the alleged defect in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles. DTNA stated that the vast majority of false positive activation of the subject systems occur in very limited durations and result in a five mile per hour deceleration.
ODI considered four AEB systems offered by DTNA: Detroit Assurance 2.0, Detroit Assurance 4.0, Detroit Assurance 5.0, and Wabco OnGuard. ODI’s analysis shows that of the Detroit Assurance versions, all are failing at similar rates. The OnGuard AEB systems equipped on the same model and model year vehicles have experienced a significantly lower claim rate.
To date, ODI has received a total of 32 consumer complaints of inadvertent activation of AEB in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles. In total, ODI reviewed 347 unique (i.e., non-duplicative Vehicle Identification Numbers) reports that may relate to the alleged defect, which include 24 reports involving a crash, 13 reports involving an alleged injury and one report with a fatality.
PE23010 has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis to further assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety related consequences of the inadvertent AEB activations in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","subject":"Automatic Emergency Braking Errors","investigationNumber":"006","nhtsaId":"EA25006"},{"id":1893989,"openDate":"2025-10-23T16:49:32Z","artemisId":101964,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-23T16:49:32Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) is opening a Preliminary Evaluation on 2020 Model Year Jeep Gladiators and Wranglers involving a malfunctioning Instrument Panel Clusters (IPC) resulting in the loss of important vehicle metrics and other status information. ODI has received 89 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) alleging a complete or partial loss of the IPC display while driving. The subject vehicles' IPC display includes the speedometer, fuel gauge, engine temperature, turn signal indicators, warning light, and other gauges that are normally illuminated while the vehicle is in operation. Loss of the fuel gauge while driving may lead to an inability to determine the fuel level and result in a loss of motive power, and the loss of other safety-related information may impede a driver’s ability to take action to prevent a safety risk. Furthermore, an IPC that is suddenly not visible to the driver may divert the driver’s attention from the driving task, potentially causing a vehicle crash.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to evaluate the scope, severity and frequency of the alleged IPC malfunctions and to assess potential safety-related consequences.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov
","subject":"Instrument Panel Cluster (IPC) Failure","investigationNumber":"014","nhtsaId":"PE25014"},{"id":1893718,"openDate":"2025-10-21T23:39:59Z","artemisId":102000,"investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-21T23:39:59Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has become aware of eight vehicle crashes in which a rupture of a Jilin Province Detiannuo Automobile Safety System Co., Ltd. (DTN) air bag inflator occurred during the deployment of the driver side air bag. All eight drivers in these crashes sustained serious or fatal injuries that appear linked to the ruptures. Six of those drivers sustained fatal injuries and two sustained severe injuries. In all eight incidents, the subject inflators had been installed as replacement equipment after the vehicle was involved in a previous crash. Information gathered during NHTSA’s initial analysis of these incidents indicates that the inflators were potentially imported illegally into the United States. In conjunction with this safety investigation, NHTSA is also working with appropriate authorities to address any illegal activities associated with the importation of these inflators. As a result of the significant safety concerns relating to these inflators, as well as extensive information already obtained by ODI relating to their field ruptures, ODI is moving directly to the Engineering Analysis (EA) stage of its investigative process rather than first opening a Preliminary Evaluation.
NHTSA has taken a variety of actions to address the risks posed by the importation of substandard or counterfeit air bag components. However, until recently, these risks appeared spread across a variety of components and manufacturers. As part of ODI’s continuous monitoring of this issue, the agency has obtained information to suggest that at least eight incidents involve ruptures of inflators manufactured by DTN. In parallel with this dedicated investigation into DTN inflators, ODI will continue to monitor reports of field incidents to evaluate risks from other substandard imported air bag components.
In 2012, ODI first became aware of substandard or counterfeit air bag modules sold through online marketplaces, such as auction sites. NHTSA obtained examples of these air bag modules and conducted testing. None of the inflators equipped in these modules were manufactured by DTN. This testing revealed that the inflators consistently malfunctioned during deployments, such as by failing to deploy the air bag or expelling metal shrapnel due to a rupture. This led NHTSA to release a consumer advisory in October 2012 to alert the public and repair professionals to the potential dangers of substandard or counterfeit air bag modules. ODI also worked with major vehicle manufacturers, who released advisories and notifications concerning the use of such air bag modules. Since then, NHTSA has continuously monitored for reports of malfunctioning air bags that may be associated with substandard or counterfeit components. These monitoring efforts have been supported by the increased visibility the advisories have brought to the issue, and by several standing general orders in place as part of separate investigations into Takata and ARC inflators, which require certain manufacturers to report any alleged or suspected inflator field ruptures to NHTSA.
Until 2017, ODI was not aware of any field incidents involving an abnormal deployment of an imported substandard or counterfeit air bag module. In September 2017, ODI became aware of a crash involving a model year (MY) 2009 Honda Civic where the air bag ruptured during deployment, killing the driver. After inspecting the vehicle and air bag parts, ODI determined that the air bag inflator was not original equipment and that the air bag module was likely a substandard import. Insufficient information existed to determine the manufacturer of the inflator in this incident, however, it does not appear to resemble those manufactured by DTN.
On June 16, 2023, ODI received a Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ #11527380) alleging that the rupture of a driver side air bag caused fatal injuries to the driver of a MY 2020 Chevrolet Malibu. ODI’s assessment of the rupture indicated that the air bag inflator was not original equipment but was instead manufactured by DTN, a Chinese company (also known as Yoshibayashi Toku theanol Automotive Safety Systems Co. Ltd.).
From June 2023 to July 2024, ODI became aware of four additional ruptures involving substandard air bag modules equipped on Chevrolet Malibu vehicles. At the time, insufficient information existed for these crashes to determine who manufactured the ruptured inflators. As a result, NHTSA released a consumer advisory on July 10, 2024, alerting car buyers and owners to be aware of cheap, substandard replacement air bag inflators that can cause death or serious injury in a crash. The advisory urged consumers who own or are considering the purchase of a used vehicle to learn the vehicle’s history and ensure the vehicle has genuine air bag inflators.
In March 2025, NHTSA learned about another rupture involving a suspected substandard, aftermarket inflator that was equipped in a MY 2017 Hyundai Sonata. The driver of this vehicle sustained fatal injuries that appeared related to the rupture. In August 2025, NHTSA received a similar report of a fatal air bag rupture in a MY 2019 Hyundai Sonata. Most recently, in October 2025, ODI received a report of a fatal air bag rupture in a MY 2020 Chevrolet Malibu. Photographs of the air bag components in these three crashes indicated that the ruptures all involved inflators manufactured by DTN. Further investigation of the inflator fragments in three of the prior incidents confirmed that they also involved DTN inflators. Photographs of the components involved in one of the other incidents also strongly suggest that the ruptured inflator was manufactured by DTN.
This opening resume exceeded space limitations and is continued in an attachment uploaded to the investigation.
","subject":"DTN Air Bag Inflator Rupture","investigationNumber":"005","nhtsaId":"EA25005"},{"id":1892749,"openDate":"2025-10-17T18:31:03Z","artemisId":101999,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-11-06T21:42:47Z","description":"On October 17, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE) 25013 to investigate the performance of the Waymo ADS around stopped school buses, how the system is designed to comply with school bus traffic safety laws, and the system’s ability to follow those traffic safety laws.
On December 10, 2025, Waymo filed recall 25E084 to address the safety risk associated with driving past a stopped school bus with its red lights flashing and/or the stop arm extended. The recall report indicated that the remedy for this defect, a software update, was completed for all affected vehicles on November 17, 2025.
The PE25013 investigation identified a large number of incidents where the Waymo AV passed a school bus with its red lights flashing and/or the stop arm extended. The majority of these incidents occurred after November 17, 2025, the date that the remedy associated with recall 25E084 reportedly was completed.
This calls into question the effectiveness of the recall remedy. Therefore, ODI is closing this PE and opening recall query (RQ) 26006 to investigate the effectiveness of the recall remedy.
","subject":"Waymo AVs drive around stopped school buses with lights flashing and stop arm extended","investigationNumber":"013","nhtsaId":"PE25013","closeDate":"2026-11-06T21:42:47Z"},{"id":1890586,"openDate":"2025-10-07T20:18:32Z","artemisId":101914,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","status":"O","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-07T20:18:32Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as \"FSD (Supervised)\" and \"FSD (Beta).\" Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed.
ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic.
With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal.
ODI has identified six Standing General Order (\"SGO\") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection.
With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene.
ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals.
This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting.
13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1
Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
","subject":"Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving (\"FSD\") is engaged","investigationNumber":"012","nhtsaId":"PE25012"},{"id":1886579,"openDate":"2025-09-23T00:26:43Z","artemisId":101930,"investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","status":"C","latestActivityDate":"2026-02-26T00:54:59Z","description":"On September 22, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE) 25011 to investigate and assess allegations of seat belt performance concerns in certain Model Year (MY) 2022-2023 Rivian Electric Delivery Van (EDV). ODI has received fourteen (14) Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) reporting potential failures of the driver’s front outboard seat belt anchorage system. The anchorage utilizes a steel-braided cable linked to the seat frame, which supports the seat belt webbing that secures the occupant in the event of a crash. The VOQ describe instances in which the steel-braided cable frayed, unraveled, or completely severed, potentially leaving the occupant inadequately restrained during vehicle operation. A partial or complete separation of the seat belt pretensioner anchor cable can significantly degrade occupant restraint performance in a crash. A damaged cable may also prevent the pretensioner from removing belt slack at the onset of a vehicle crash impact, which could reduce airbag effectiveness and increase the risk of injury.
ODI’s investigation sought to determine whether the seat belt assembly’s integrity, design, durability, mounting position, installation method, or manufacturing deficiencies could have contributed to the reported condition.
Following the opening of the investigation, Rivian Automotive, LLC (Rivian) determined that the seat belt pretensioner anchor cable contained a safety defect in the subject vehicle population and filed a Part 573 Defect Information Report.
Recall 25V-816 is intended to address MY 2022-2025 Rivian EDV vehicles. Rivian has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update and will inspect and replace the driver’s seat belt pretensioner assembly as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters are expected to be mailed on January 19, 2026.
This recall action seems to resolve the concerns reported by customers. The recall scope includes MY 2024-2025 vehicles in addition to MY 2022-2023 vehicles identified in this investigation. Accordingly, ODI is closing Investigation PE25011. The agency will continue to monitor field performance, complaint trends, and recall completion rates to assess the adequacy of the remedy. ODI reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future developments.
To review the ODI reports cited in this Closing Resume, go to NHTSA.gov and search the associated ODI Report Identification Numbers.