The Office of Defects Investigation (\"ODI\") has identified crashes involving vehicles equipped with devices manufactured by comma.ai (\u201ccomma\u201d) occurring under similar circumstances. ODI received notice of five (5) crashes in which vehicles with comma devices installed reportedly struck stopped or slowly moving vehicles within the same travel lane. ODI has confirmed that the systems were powered on or engaged in multiple crashes. Preliminary data reviewed by ODI suggests that the comma system may not have adequately detected or responded to the in-lane vehicles. Two crashes resulted in a total of three (3) fatalities. Four of the five crashes contributed to various non-fatal injuries, including serious injuries, to eleven (11) other individuals.
The comma devices are after-market accessory systems intended to augment a vehicle\u2019s driving automation capabilities. The devices are sold with wire harnesses that connect to existing vehicle systems and use the device\u2019s cameras alongside stock vehicle sensors as a basis to provide sustained automated control of speed and vehicle heading with options for other enhanced features enabled by software loaded onto the devices. The devices are sold directly to consumers, and the company\u2019s provided setup instructions are intended for consumer installation. The company advertises on its website that, with its \u201cstep-by-step guide,\u201d a consumer can \u201c[g]et set up in your car in 15 minutes.\u201d According to the website, the devices provide \u201chands free driving for the car you already have,\u201d and the software (openpilot) that comma develops to operate on the devices is described as \u201can open source advanced driver assistance system that works on 325+ car models\u201d and \u201c[c]an drive for hours without intervention.\u201d The company\u2019s website states that \u201copenpilot requires the driver to be alert, pay attention, and be ready to take over at all times.\u201d
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate further any incidents involving the comma devices and openpilot, particularly crashes involving slower or stopped vehicles or hazards in lane. The investigation will obtain data to verify system status for each incident and evaluate system performance and safeguards that are intended to ensure safe operation of vehicles equipped with comma devices. Additionally, to the extent that modified software based on openpilot (i.e., a \u201cfork\u201d) is involved in a crash or other incident, ODI will evaluate the incident and consider the shared components between openpilot and the fork.
The SGO incidents cited in the Opening Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting
30351-15888
30351-14668
30351-11961
30351-1807
62-14853
","investigationNumber":"007","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-21T19:31:03Z","nhtsaId":"PE26007","openDate":"2026-09-21T19:31:03Z","status":"O","subject":"Crashes involving comma.ai driving automation products"},{"id":1975305,"artemisId":102488,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (\"ODI\") has identified several incident reports submitted by Avride Inc. (\"Avride\") in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (\"SGO\") with potentially incomplete or inaccurate information. Certain of these reports indicate that, at the time of submission, Avride was not aware of any injuries resulting from the crashes, and some state that police reports of the crashes were available. ODI obtained copies of these police reports, as well as copies of police reports for other crashes Avride reported under the SGO for which Avride did not list police reports as an available source of data. The police reports indicate potential injuries were sustained by occupants of Avride vehicles and/or occupants of other vehicles involved in the crash.
ODI also identified SGO reports stating that an injury was reported or alleged, but subsequent updated reports indicate that no injuries were alleged.
NHTSA is opening this Audit Query (\"AQ\"), a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate reporting accuracy and completeness. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted reflect complete and accurate data based on available information.
The SGO incidents cited in the Opening Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting:
31101-13612
31101-13761
31101-14509
31101-14813
31101-15099
31101-15189
","investigationNumber":"003","investigationType":"AQ","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-14T18:41:05Z","nhtsaId":"AQ26003","openDate":"2026-09-14T18:41:05Z","status":"O","subject":"Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements"},{"id":1975306,"artemisId":102490,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received on September 1, 2026 a defect petition dated August 5, 2026, requesting an investigation into an alleged defect in BMW rear differential assemblies.
The petitioner alleges Model year (MY) 2022 BMW 540i vehicles are experiencing a sudden mechanical failure that severs the drive connection between the driveshaft and the rear wheels.
This defect petition has been opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition. BMW filed Safety Recall 26V525 on August 12, 2026.
The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11761650.
On September 3, 2026, Tesla began commercial deployment with a small number of its Cybercab vehicles in Austin, Texas. Tesla notified the Agency that it certified those Cybercab vehicles as compliant with all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). Tesla also notified the Agency that it plans to gradually expand commercial deployment of the Cybercab to include additional vehicles and locations. The vehicles lack permanently attached, conventional manual controls, such as a brake pedal, gas pedal, steering wheel, and mirrors. NHTSA is opening this AQ to examine the process and technical data on which Tesla relied when certifying the Cybercab and related issues. Among other things, NHTSA will consider the extent to which Tesla\u2019s certification depended on determinations that certain FMVSS are inapplicable to the Cybercab.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"AQ","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-03T19:42:50Z","nhtsaId":"AQ26002","openDate":"2026-09-03T19:42:50Z","status":"O","subject":"Tesla Cybercab FMVSS Certification"},{"id":1972899,"artemisId":102418,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on August 5, 2026, requesting a defect investigation into the 2.0 Liter EcoBoost engine on model year 2015-2018 Ford Edge vehicles. The petition alleges that engine coolant intrusion results in a significant loss of engine power, accompanied by an \"Engine Coolant Over Temperature\" warning message. The petition further alleges that after the vehicle has sat and cooled down, the engine runs roughly and generates a check engine light for a cylinder misfire.
This defect petition is being opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11754989.
","investigationNumber":"008","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-03T19:03:04Z","nhtsaId":"DP26008","openDate":"2026-09-03T19:03:04Z","status":"O","subject":"Loss of Motive Power"},{"id":1968992,"artemisId":102319,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on July 20, 2026, which was dated July 7, 2026, requesting a defect investigation into the intermittent loss of braking on Model Year (MY) 2024 Ford Maverick Hybrid vehicles. The petition alleges intermittent loss of antilock and regenerative braking associated with certain fault codes that led to a collision event. The petitioner highlights that the condition persisted through four repair attempts and over 50 days out of service. Furthermore, the petition alleges that MY 2024 was improperly excluded from related Ford brake-control software recalls.
This defect petition has been opened to evaluate whether to grant or deny the petition. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11751762.
","investigationNumber":"007","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-24T13:54:15Z","nhtsaId":"DP26007","openDate":"2026-08-24T13:54:15Z","status":"O","subject":"2024 Ford Maverick Hybrid Intermittent Loss of Braking"},{"id":1968472,"artemisId":102419,"description":"On April 11, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE24011 after receiving complaints concerning a loss of brake assist in 2023 MY Cadillac Lyriq vehicles. These complaints allege a hard brake pedal, followed by a \u201cBrake System Failure\u201d message at start up or while driving.
GM shared records regarding several internal investigations for loss of brake assist due to alleged spindle fractures in the eBoost system. GM has stated that in the event of a spindle fracture, anti-lock brakes (ABS), stability control, and traction control remain functional until the vehicle comes to a complete stop. At this point, ABS, brake assist, stability control, and traction control functions are lost. The loss of these functions causes the vehicle to set one of three Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) based on failed performance criteria for the Electronic Brake Control Module (EBCM). These DTCs, in turn, activate several driver alerts: an audible chime, a visual \u201cService Brake System\u201d message in the display, and multiple illuminated Malfunction Indicator Lights (MILs) for the ABS, Traction Control, and Brakes informing the driver of loss of functionality. The vehicle speed will also be limited to 70 KPH (43 MPH).
Since opening PE24011, ODI has continued to receive reports of loss of brake assist. Some of these reports describe symptoms inconsistent with GM\u2019s description of a spindle failure. These reports allege an immediate loss of brake assist functionality as opposed to the loss occurring after the vehicle comes to a complete stop. The sudden loss of brake assist during a braking event could result in extended braking distance, which increases the risk of a crash or injury. ODI believes further analysis is necessary to assess the potential for failures in GM\u2019s eBoost system to resulting in safety-related outcomes.
At this time, ODI is aware of the following vehicles that are equipped with this eBoost system: 2023-2026 MY Cadillac Lyriq, Chevrolet Colorado, and GMC Canyon; 2024-2026 MY Buick Enclave, Envision; Chevrolet Blazer EV, Equinox EV, Traverse; Cruise Origin; and GMC Acadia; 2025-2026 MY Cadillac Celestiq and Optiq. ODI is also aware of 2024-2026 MY Acura ZDX and 2024-2026 MY Honda Prologue vehicles that were built with this system. The Acura and Honda vehicles were manufactured by GM in a joint venture with Honda, and will be included in the Engineering Analysis as peer vehicles.
ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis to further assess the safety-related consequences of a failed eBoost system. In addition, ODI is expanding the scope of the investigation to encompass all GM vehicles that share this eBoost system.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"006","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-21T15:39:36Z","nhtsaId":"EA26006","openDate":"2026-08-21T15:39:36Z","status":"O","subject":"Electronic Brake Module Component Failure"},{"id":1968196,"artemisId":102452,"description":"On January 16, 2026, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Recall Query RQ26001. This investigation was opened to assess the remedy effectiveness of Recall 25V-274. ODI has received complaints alleging engine failure in vehicles after the recall remedy had been completed, whether that remedy involved an oil viscosity change or a complete engine replacement.
General Motors (GM) issued Recall 25V-274 to address concerns of engine failure in the L87 engines produced between March 1, 2021 and May 31, 2024. GM cited the root cause as a supplier manufacturing and quality issue. GM\u2019s recall remedy for Recall 25V-274 consisted of two different repairs, either an oil viscosity change or an engine replacement, based on the results of the remedy inspection procedure. ODI continues to receive reports of engine failures after the completion of the recall remedy.
To date, ODI has received 499 complaints alleging post-remedy engine failure in vehicles subject to Recall 25V-274, 473 of which involved an oil viscosity change and 26 a complete engine replacement. Additionally, ODI has received 191 reports of L87 engine failures in engines produced after the production period cited in Recall 25V-274. GM reported receiving 6,953 complaints of post-remedy engine failure.
ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis to continue investigating complaints of post-remedy engine failure. ODI is expanding the scope of this Investigation to include engines produced after the production period cited in the recall.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"005","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-20T16:22:03Z","nhtsaId":"EA26005","openDate":"2026-08-20T16:22:03Z","status":"O","subject":"Loss of motive power due to engine failure post recall remedy"},{"id":1968195,"artemisId":102385,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a Petition dated July 20, 2026. The Petition requests an investigation of road debris / rocks damaging the heat exchangers in model year (MY) 2024-2026 Toyota Grand Highlander vehicles. The Petition contends that the Grand Highlander\u2019s front-end grill has large, open apertures and no protective screen between the grill and the vehicle\u2019s heat exchangers. The Petition further alleges that as a result, during normal driving, the damage to heat exchangers results in coolant leakage and sudden loss of propulsion.
The Petitioner cites thirteen (13) complaints received by ODI alleging this failure, which, when added to the petitioner\u2019s own complaint, bring the total under consideration at this time to fourteen (14). ODI will evaluate these complaints to determine if they are related to the failure cited in the Petition and conduct a technical review under 49 CFR Part 552.
This Defect Petition is being opened to evaluate whether to grant or deny the petition. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11754975.
","investigationNumber":"006","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-20T16:15:48Z","nhtsaId":"DP26006","openDate":"2026-08-20T16:15:48Z","status":"O","subject":"Road debris/rocks damaging the heat exchangers"},{"id":1963094,"artemisId":102352,"description":"On December 18, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE25020 to investigate instances of timing belt failure in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford Fiesta and MY 2015-2018 Ford Focus vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford), equipped with a 1.0L engine and manual transmission (subject vehicles). Additionally, MY 2018-2021 Ford EcoSport and MY 2016-2018 Focus vehicles with a 1.0L engine and automatic transmission were analyzed as peer vehicles because they utilize a wet timing belt comprised of similar material as the timing belt in the subject vehicles.
Through the PE, ODI investigated a potential failure/degradation of the timing belt that may affect oil pump function resulting in a lack of engine lubrication and potential loss of motive power. The complaints commonly allege a low engine oil pressure warning lamp immediately preceding a complete loss or reduction of motive power while the vehicle is in motion. Some complaints allege that a sudden loss of motive power or engine seizure occurred without warning or prior detectable symptoms. ODI\u2019s analysis supports that this failure can occur without sufficient and advanced warning to the driver that a loss of motive power/engine seizure is imminent.
ODI found that the timing belt material may degrade and create debris that clogs the mesh oil pump pick-up screen, resulting in reduced oil pressure in the engine. As additional debris accumulates on the screen, this can progress to a loss of motive power while driving due to a lack of engine lubrication. The failure data provided in response to this investigation revealed an average failure mileage of approximately 70,000 miles, and that 98% of the failures occurred prior to the 150,000 mile timing belt replacement interval per the vehicles\u2019 maintenance schedule. Based on evidence collected via consumer surveys and an engine teardown, failures have occurred despite evidence of proper and routine oil maintenance. The oil pump pick-up screen is not serviceable, so debris accumulation cannot be inspected or manually removed without removing the engine from the vehicle.
On June 2, 2026, Ford informed ODI of a non-safety customer satisfaction program for global vehicles with the 1.0L Fox Classic Timing Belt. This program will notify customers globally of a revised maintenance interval for the timing belt, reducing the original 150,000 mile interval down to 100,000 miles/6 years. This customer satisfaction program will also offer reimbursement to eligible customers who previously paid to have their engine repaired or replaced due to a timing belt related issue.
Based on NHTSA\u2019s analysis of the data, failure rates, information provided by Ford, preliminary engine teardown analysis, and precedent recalls regarding loss of engine oil pressure with the presence of driver facing warnings, ODI believes there is an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis to perform component-level and vehicle testing. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identi\ufb01cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"004","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-07-31T15:16:41Z","nhtsaId":"EA26004","openDate":"2026-07-31T15:16:41Z","status":"O","subject":"Timing Belt Failure"},{"id":1962775,"artemisId":102253,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control.
In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur. Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow.
Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"006","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-07-29T14:59:28Z","nhtsaId":"PE26006","openDate":"2026-07-29T14:59:28Z","status":"O","subject":"Lower Lateral Link detachment"},{"id":1958734,"artemisId":102220,"closeDate":"2026-09-24T19:24:38Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has completed its review of a Petition dated May 30, 2026. The Petition requested an investigation into inadvertent air bag deployment in model year (MY) 2011-2017 Honda Odyssey vehicles. The Petition contended that air bags can deploy absent a sufficiently severe event to trigger a deployment, such as an impact, rollover event, or G-force threshold breach. The Petition further alleged that the Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) and Supplemental Restraint System (SRS) conflict and inaccurate data is being recorded for the air bag system.
An air bag is a supplemental vehicle occupant restraint system that deploys a cushion designed to inflate in milliseconds during a collision. The cushion prevents vehicle occupants from striking hard interior surfaces and, in some cases, exterior surfaces. Air bags are designed to work in conjunction with seat belts, the primary occupant restraint system. Seat belts restrain occupants keeping them in place for the air bag to provide proper protection and to mitigate injury from air bag deployment.
An air bag system consists of an air bag cushion, an inflator module, an air bag Electronic Control Unit (ECU), and impact sensors. When a crash begins, impact sensors located on the vehicle exterior begin to measure impact severity. If a crash is severe enough, the sensors send a signal to the system\u2019s ECU, which then signals the inflator to fill the air bag.
ODI reviewed 9 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs), one Early Warning Reporting (EWR) Death & Injury (D&I) report, and several TREAD (Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation) Field Reports alleging inadvertent air bag deployment in the Subject Vehicles. Several complaints allege that the inadvertent deployment of air bags occurred while traveling over potholes, road debris, or during minor curb strikes. All the complaints allege that there was no warning prior to the inadvertent deployment.
In general, different types of air bags are designed for different types of impacts. For instance, frontal air bags are generally designed to deploy during frontal impacts; side curtain air bags are generally designed to deploy both during rollovers and impacts to the sides of the vehicle; and side thorax air bags are generally designed to deploy during impacts to the sides of the vehicle. While these are broad categories of crash scenarios, the specific conditions under which deployment is intended are multifaceted and dependent on complex algorithms. Differences in particular variables can make a deployment an intended part of the design in one scenario and not in another similar scenario.
Although the reports described above all contain allegations of inadvertent deployment, the conditions under which those reported deployments occurred differ widely. The reports ranged different types of air bags, different combinations of air bags, and different driving scenarios preceding the deployment. Based on the data available to ODI, there is no clear pattern or factor to prompt the alleged inadvertent deployments. Thus, ODI\u2019s review did not identify a trend of a vehicle defect regarding any type of air bag in the Subject Vehicles. Moreover, ODI did not identify any reports of inadvertent air bag deployment that resulted in a loss of vehicle control. ODI is likewise not aware of any crashes or severe injuries involving the Subject Vehicles that resulted from inadvertent deployment of the air bags.
ODI recognizes that inadvertent air bag deployments can create dangerous safety hazards. For instance, an inadvertent deployment can surprise a driver, leading to a loss of vehicle control; or if an inadvertent deployment occurs when an occupant is out of position, the force of the deployment may injure the occupant. Inadvertent deployments have been the basis for past NHTSA recalls and investigations. Here, the Petition cites one such recall: Recall 26V-227, which concerns inadvertent deployment of the side curtain and thoracic air bags in MY 2018 to 2022 Honda Odyssey vehicles (the \u201cRecalled Vehicles\u201d) due to the air bag ECU containing incorrect deployment parameters. Although this recall involved Honda Odyssey vehicles in adjacent model years to the Odyssey vehicles that are the subject of this Petition, ODI understands certain key differences to exist between the two groups of Odyssey models. Honda introduced a new generation of the Odyssey line in 2018. This new generation involved a large-scale redesign and a new vehicle platform compared to the previous model years. As a result, the vehicles covered by the Petition differ from the recalled vehicles in many characteristics, including physical dimensions, engines, transmissions, and air bag ECU algorithms. Given these differences, ODI\u2019s review has not identified evidence that the reports of inadvertent deployment in the Odyssey models covered by the Petition correlate to Recall 26V-227.
After thoroughly assessing the material submitted by the Petitioner, consumer complaint information in NHTSA\u2019s databases, and other relevant information already in possession of the Agency, NHTSA has not found sufficient evidence to indicate that a trend of inadvertent air bag deployments as alleged by the Petitioner is likely to present a safety related defect that would warrant a formal investigation. After full consideration of the available information the Petition is denied. A denial report will be posted in the Federal Register. The closing of the Petition does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety related defect does not exist, and the agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. The Petition can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11744118.
","investigationNumber":"005","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-24T19:24:38Z","nhtsaId":"DP26005","openDate":"2026-07-13T19:52:54Z","status":"C","subject":"Inadvertent Deployment of Air Bags"},{"id":1957078,"artemisId":102221,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is aware of reports alleging unexpected handle detachment on 2020-2024 Doona + Car Seat & Stroller (Doona Car Seat) model car seats. If the handle unexpectedly detaches from the car seat, the car seat could be dropped when placing it in or out of the vehicle, potentially injuring the child.
ODI will inform the Consumer Product Safety Commission of this investigation at the time of opening as this product is of shared interest.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to assess the scope, root cause, and risk associated with handle detachments in 2020-2024 Doona Car Seats.
NHTSA is opening this Audit Query (AQ) to investigate NU Car Rentals (NU Car) for compliance with the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. The Safety Act requires that a rental company shall not rent a vehicle subject to a safety recall unless the recall remedy has been performed. 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 30120(i).
NHTSA is in receipt of information that indicates NU Car rented at least two vehicles to consumers without having performed required recall repairs. The Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) related to this investigation can be found on nhtsa.gov by searching for ID number 11730449 and 11504655. Accordingly, we are opening this audit query to seek additional information concerning this issue.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"AQ","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-06-09T12:36:55Z","nhtsaId":"AQ26001","openDate":"2026-06-09T12:36:55Z","status":"O","subject":"NU Car rental of vehicles with open recalls"},{"id":1947191,"artemisId":102188,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received two Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting left rear toe link separation in certain Model Year (MY) 2023-2024 Rivian R1S vehicles. Both VOQs report component separation while driving, causing the vehicles to swerve across multiple lanes of traffic. One incident resulted in a collision with an adjacent vehicle and roadside barrier. In both separations, the bolt that maintains the integrity of the toe link fractured. Evidence collected from the complaint vehicles included repair histories, onboard video, imagery of the damaged components, and a police accident report.
The two vehicles with reported separation have different vehicle histories. One vehicle received prior service and the other was involved in a previous collision. In both instances, the vehicles operated for multiple months and thousands of miles of usage with no apparent problems between the previous service or the previous collision and the failures that prompted this investigation.
Rivian recognized the subject toe link joint\u2019s sensitivity to service procedures in March of 2025 in its updated service procedures. In January 2026 through recall 26V-003, Rivian extended the improved repair procedure to vehicles that received toe link service prior to the March 2025 improvement.
ODI is opening a Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to (1) assess the sensitivity of the rear toe link joint to foreseeable road and service conditions, (2) compare the physical failure evidence from the two VOQs to identify apparent similarities and potential differences, (3) evaluate Rivian\u2019s current toe link repair procedure, and (4) assess the in-field subject population\u2019s toe links conditions.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received several reports of crashes involving automated vehicles (AVs) equipped with the Avride automated driving system (ADS) engaged at the time of the crash. The crashes occurred in Dallas, Texas and Austin, Texas. Each of the crashes involved the competence of the ADS with respect to performing at least one of the following driving behaviors: changing lanes, responding to other vehicles present in or entering the lane ahead, and responding to stationary objects partially obstructing the lane ahead.
ODI has performed a preliminary review of videos of each crash. The videos show instances of the AVs changing lanes into the path of or directly into other vehicles traveling in an adjacent lane and in close proximity to an AV; failing to slow or stop for slow-moving or stopped vehicles in the lane and path ahead; failing to slow for or avoid vehicles entering the lane and path ahead; and striking stationary objects partially obstructing the lane and path ahead. These crashes have resulted in property damage and one alleged minor injury. During each of these crashes, the AVs were operating with the ADS performing the dynamic driving task while under the supervision of an in-vehicle operator in the driver's seat. Furthermore, ODI understands that Avride is operating some of its AVs on the Uber ride-hailing platform and has offered passenger service to the public since December 3, 2025 in Dallas where many of the reported crashes have occurred. The ADS performance in these crashes may indicate inappropriate assertiveness and insufficient competence to execute these driving behaviors in a safe manner and may also constitute traffic safety violations.
ODI has opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate the performance of the Avride ADS in order to determine the scope, nature and severity of the potential problems and to assess the potential safety risks to passengers and other road users. This will include an assessment of technical and operational contributing factors and safeguards already in place, as well as any mitigating actions taken subsequent to a crash. If additional evidence received during this investigation implicates the competence of the Avride ADS with respect to other driving behaviors, these may be considered as part of this investigation as well.
The SGO reports cited in this Opening Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting.
31101-13612-1
31101-13612-2
31101-13612-3
31101-13616-1
31101-13621-1
31101-13624-1
31101-13625-1
31101-14066-1
31101-14070-1
31101-14148-1
31101-14150-1
31101-14166-1
31101-14200-1
31101-14235-1
31101-14286-1
31101-14328-1
31101-14509-1
31101-14653-1
","investigationNumber":"003","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-05-06T19:28:08Z","nhtsaId":"PE26003","openDate":"2026-05-06T19:28:08Z","status":"O","subject":"Automated Driving System (ADS) conflict avoidance, driving behavior competence and assertiveness"},{"id":1939119,"artemisId":102121,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is upgrading its Preliminary Evaluation (PE25006) of front steering knuckle fractures on model year (MY) 2014 through 2017 Range Rover Sport vehicles to an Engineering Analysis. ODI opened PE25006 on June 27, 2025, after receiving 12 Vehicle Owner's Questionnaire (VOQ) reports of the front aluminum steering knuckles fracturing in these vehicles. The reports describe the fractures occurring at the joint where the steering knuckle attaches to the upper control arm ball joint in one or both steering knuckles. Fracture of the front suspension knuckle can lead to detachment of the upper suspension arm. Detachment of the upper suspension arm results in the driver\u2019s inability to control the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
ODI reviewed information supplied by Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) in response to Information Request letters as well as reviewed the data with JLR on numerous occasions. ODI further reviewed relevant data on a peer vehicle with a significantly similar steering knuckle design, the MY 2014 through 2017 Range Rover. Much of the information is contradictory and requires a deeper analysis that is available in an Engineering Analysis.
On August 5, 2025, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) filed safety recall 25V514. This recall covers certain MY 2014 and all MY 2015-2017 Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles. The remedy for recall 25V514 addresses knuckles with and without a visible fracture. Knuckles that have developed a visible fracture will be replaced with a new knuckle of a substantially similar design. Knuckles with no fracture visibly present will have a brace attached to the upper portion of the front steering knuckle. JLR states that the purpose of the brace is to prevent the component from completely separating should a fracture develop.
NHTSA continues to receive allegations of fractures occurring in the front steering knuckles of Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles. Two of the most recent VOQs received by ODI involve front steering knuckle fractures occurring on MY 2020 and MY 2021 Range Rover L405 vehicles. ODI will continue to investigate the component design and assess the potential safety risk as part of this Engineering Analysis and evaluate the recall remedies for Recall 25V514. Further, the scope of this Engineering Analysis will be expanded to include MY 2018-2022 Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles as they have a substantially similar component design.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"003","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-04-24T13:22:49Z","nhtsaId":"EA26003","openDate":"2026-04-24T13:22:49Z","status":"O","subject":"Front Steering Knuckle Fractures"},{"id":1937033,"artemisId":102048,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on December 22, 2025, requesting a defect investigation into the hydraulic control unit (HCU) for the Anti-lock Braking System (ABS) on the MY 2010 Ford Fusion Hybrid. The petition alleges that an illuminated ABS MIL is associated with a failure of the ABS HCU, resulting in ABS malfunction, loss of traction and electronic stability control functions, and reduced braking performance, particularly on slippery road surfaces.
A defect petition has been opened to evaluate the issue and determine whether to grant or deny the petition. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11647929.
","investigationNumber":"004","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-04-09T17:55:37Z","nhtsaId":"DP26004","openDate":"2026-04-09T17:55:37Z","status":"O","subject":"Anti-lock brake system (ABS) Malfunction Indicator Lamp (MIL) illuminated"},{"id":1932391,"artemisId":102083,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a Petition dated February 5, 2026, requesting an investigation into model year (MY) 2006 Nissan Frontier vehicles. The Petitioner alleges that the vehicle poses an imminent fire hazard due to \u201c[a] powerful and persistent odor of raw gasoline\u201d that he says \u201cemanates from the vehicle\u201d and \u201cindicat[es] a breach in fuel system integrity.\u201d He further alleges that the vehicles can experience sudden engine stalling \u201cduring startup and operation,\u201d which he believes could cause collisions or loss of vehicle control.
The Petitioner further alleges these symptoms are identical to conditions addressed in previous NHTSA recalls (10V-517, 07V-435, and 10V-075) and that the issues persist in the 2006 MY Nissan fleet despite these past actions.
ODI is opening this Defect Petition to evaluate the Petitioner\u2019s allegations and determine whether to grant or deny the Petition. The Petition can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under NHTSA Number 11718552.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla\u2019s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system\u2019s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla\u2019s assessment of their safety impact.
Tesla\u2019s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system.
ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla\u2019s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period.
Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla\u2019s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla\u2019s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path.
In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system\u2019s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788.
The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-03-18T21:03:16Z","nhtsaId":"EA26002","openDate":"2026-03-18T21:03:16Z","status":"O","subject":"FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions"},{"id":1926540,"artemisId":102082,"closeDate":"2026-08-04T17:55:56Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has completed its review of a Petition dated January 9, 2026, requesting an investigation into the loss of the optional all-wheel drive capability in model year (MY) 2021-2023 Acura TLX and MY 2022-2023 Acura MDX vehicles. The Petition alleges failures in the interfacing splines between the front wheel drive transaxle and the rear wheel drive power take off unit. Failure of these splines prevents the transfer of drive power to the rear axle, making the vehicle front wheel drive only. The Petition further alleges that this failure reduces vehicle directional control.
Most traditional AWD systems utilize mechanical and passive measures. These systems have the tendency to distribute torque along the path of least resistance, such as a wheel that has lost contact with the ground or is on a low friction surface such as ice. To compensate for this, many manufacturers use the brake system to redirect torque to the wheels with more traction. However, in this style of AWD system, a failed drive shaft or similar disconnection prior to the brakes often results in drive power being lost to the disconnected component. The consequence of this loss is the inability to maintain speed with surrounding traffic which increases the risks of collisions and injuries to the vehicle occupants.
The Subject Vehicles are built upon a platform that was designed primarily as Front Wheel Drive (FWD). The SH-AWD system functions more as a performance enhancement feature rather than a stability feature. Even if the SH-AWD is nonoperational, the vehicles retain full mobility via FWD. In addition, the Vehicle Stability Assist (VSA) remains functional, ensuring directional stability through traditional engine and brake-based traction control. Although the condition raised by the Petitioner may degrade the vehicle\u2019s performance characteristics, there is insufficient information to indicate a potential unreasonable safety risk.
ODI reviewed 62 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) and several EWR Field Reports alleging the loss of SH-AWD and its impact on the driving dynamics of the subject vehicles. During its analysis, ODI determined that the failure is localized to the mechanical interface between the FWD transaxle and the PTU. Specifically, the failure is the shearing or stripping of the interfacing splined shafts between the FWD transaxle and the PTU, resulting in a permanent loss of torque transfer to the rear of the vehicle. Upon reviewing the technical details of SH-AWD, ODI has found that this failure does not result in any loss of motive power or lead to a loss of vehicle control.
Several complaints indicated that the operators were unaware of the mechanical fault until encountering a low friction surface or the condition was identified by a technician during routine maintenance. The SH-AWD system lacks any form of direct feedback for monitoring real time torque transfer to the rear wheels. Therefore, the system will continue to display information indicating power is being supplied to the rear wheels even when power is actually only supplied to the front wheels.
ODI\u2019s review did not identify sufficient evidence to indicate that the misinformation has presented a safety issue in the field. ODI did not identify any reports of loss of motive power or vehicle control that could be attributed to the loss of SH-AWD. ODI is not aware of any crashes involving the Subject Vehicles that resulted from the loss of SH-AWD.
After thoroughly assessing the material submitted by the Petitioner, consumer complaint information in NHTSA\u2019s databases, and other relevant information already in possession of the Agency, NHTSA has not found sufficient evidence to indicate that the loss of AWD as alleged by the Petitioner is likely to present a safety related defect that would warrant a formal investigation. After full consideration of the available information, and in view of NHTSA\u2019s enforcement priorities, the Petition is denied. A denial report will be posted in the Federal Register. The closing of the petition does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety related defect does not exist, and the agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. The Petition can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11712885.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-04T17:55:56Z","nhtsaId":"DP26001","openDate":"2026-03-06T13:39:31Z","status":"C","subject":"All wheel drive allegation"},{"id":1927357,"artemisId":102007,"closeDate":"2026-08-13T18:51:53Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on November 21, 2025, requesting a defect investigation to \u201cdetermine whether the absence of a redundant mechanical wheel-fastener locking mechanism constitutes a safety-related defect in motor vehicles and motor-vehicle equipment\u201d in the heavy-vehicle sector. On March 4, 2026, NHTSA opened Defect Petition DP26002 to evaluate the petitioner's request. The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11703245.
The petitioner focused on all vehicles utilizing the 10-285.75 mm bolt wheels, also known as 10 Hole 22.5\" Hub Pilot Wheels, as the subject of the petition. ODI conducted a comprehensive search of Vehicle Owner Questionnaire's (VOQ) and Early Warning Reporting (EWR) data for vehicles equipped with the subject wheels. Furthermore, ODI reviewed six months of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's Motor Carrier Management Information System violation data for commercial vehicles cited for loose/missing wheel fasteners. After a review of this data, ODI has found insufficient evidence to support the petitioner's claim that a safety-related defect exists. The data indicates that instances of loose or missing fasteners typically occur at higher mileages following fleet maintenance activities, rather than as a result of an inherent vehicle manufacturing or design defect. Furthermore, commercial motor vehicle operators are required to conduct daily pre-trip inspections to detect and mitigate loose fasteners before operation. In the absence of a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard requiring wheels to have a redundant locking system and given the lack of evidence establishing a systemic safety defect, ODI is denying this Defect Petition. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the agency from taking further action if warranted or making a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-13T18:51:53Z","nhtsaId":"DP26002","openDate":"2026-03-04T16:59:09Z","status":"C","subject":"Redundant wheel fastener locking mechanism"},{"id":1925054,"artemisId":102046,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 19 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) alleging an intermittent or complete failure of the power steering assist system in certain Model Year (MY) 2022-2023 RAM ProMaster 1500, 2500, and 3500 vehicles. Failure of the power steering assist system can result in increased steering effort required to control the vehicle. An increase in steering effort can potentially lead to a loss of directional control of the vehicle. Several received reports allege failures of the steering rack with specific reports citing water intrusion into the electrical connectors of the electric power steering control module.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope and root cause of potential defects in 2022-2023 RAM ProMaster steering systems. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On March 21, 2025, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE25002) to investigate instances of unexpected transmission downshifting without driver input in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford F-150 vehicles (subject vehicles) manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). The complaints allege that, without warning or driver input, the subject vehicles experienced a sudden and rapid deceleration often accompanied by temporary rear wheel lockup, seizure, or skidding, resulting in a loss of vehicle control that increases the risk of crash and injury to all motorists, including those not within the subject vehicles. The MY 2015 and MY 2016 F-150 vehicles were equipped with the \u201c6R80\u201d transmission, while the MY 2017 vehicles were equipped with either the \u201c6R80\u201d transmission or the \u201c10R80\u201d transmission. This investigation was limited to MY 2015-2017 Ford F-150 with the \u201c6R80\u201d transmission.
ODI identified 329 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) related to this investigation and sixty percent of these consumers were interviewed to confirm the details of their allegations. Consumers reported that their vehicles\u2019 transmission suddenly downshifted to a lower gear, often to 1st or 2nd gear, without driver input or advance warning. Consumers described the downshift events to be regular and repeated occurrences, with some consumers stating that they no longer drive the vehicle due to safety concerns. Forty-three percent of consumers reported experiencing at least one wheel lockup event, during which the rear tires locked, screeched, or skidded during the transmission downshift. ODI also found that 114 of the 329 consumers reported having their vehicle\u2019s molded lead frame or valve body assembly (which comes with a molded lead frame) replaced, 80 of which were confirmed through consumer submitted repair invoices.
In its response to ODI\u2019s Information Request, Ford provided an assessment of potential root cause of failure for the subject vehicles and how this failure is different from the failure associated with MY 2011-2014 Ford F-150 vehicles that was addressed by four safety recalls (16V-248, 19V-075, 19V-433, and 24V-444). Ford has identified that the defect in the recalled vehicle population involved lead frame supplier production issues resulting in signal loss from the Output Shaft Speed (OSS) sensor. Ford has identified that the alleged defect in the subject vehicle population involved degradation of electrical connections within the lead frame due to thermal cycling and vibration over extended time in service resulting in signal loss from the Transmission Range Sensor (TRS).
Signal loss from the TRS can result in an unintended shift to neutral, unintended upshift, or unintended downshift which are regulated by a gear \u201cshift map\u201d based on the vehicle\u2019s speed at the time of signal loss. According to Ford\u2019s \u201cshift map\u201d, at speeds between 35-64 mph, the maximum allowable downshift would be to 2nd gear (i.e. a 6th to 2nd gear downshift event) which Ford has designated to represent the worst-case scenario for subject vehicles. Ford has also acknowledged that the worst-case scenario may also involve temporary wheel lockup. However, Ford has stated that the failure mechanism in the MY 2011-2014 F-150 vehicles\u2014previously addressed through recalls\u2014primarily involved OSS sensor signal loss that could result in 6th to 1st gear downshift events. This OSS-related failure mode is distinct from the TRS-related signal loss identified in the subject vehicle population.
ODI has identified an additional potential safety defect associated with the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Preliminary testing performed by NHTSA\u2019s Vehicle Research Test Center (VRTC) showed that when the TRS experiences an intermittent signal loss, one possible outcome is a change in vehicle direction. Specifically, if a vehicle is operating in reverse up an incline when the TRS signal loss occurs, then the vehicle may shift into neutral causing the vehicle to change directions and roll forward.
ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis (EA) to, among other things, perform component-level testing and vehicle testing, as well as review additional technical information to better understand the alleged defect that has been identified. To review the reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identi\ufb01cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-01-30T21:49:02Z","nhtsaId":"EA26001","openDate":"2026-01-30T21:49:02Z","status":"O","subject":"Unintended Transmission Downshift and Rear Wheel Lock-up"},{"id":1915944,"artemisId":102049,"description":"On January 23, 2026, Waymo LCC (Waymo) reported to the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) that a Waymo Automated Vehicle (AV) had struck a child near an elementary school earlier that day. Waymo provided its required report under SGO 2021-01 on January 28, 2026.
NHTSA is aware that the incident occurred within two blocks of a Santa Monica, CA elementary school during normal school drop off hours; that there were other children, a crossing guard, and several double-parked vehicles in the vicinity; and that the child ran across the street from behind a double parked SUV towards the school and was struck by the Waymo AV. Waymo reported that the child sustained minor injuries.
At the time of the incident, the Waymo AV was operated by Waymo\u2019s 5th Generation Automated Driving System (ADS). No safety operator was present in the vehicle.
ODI has opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate whether the Waymo AV exercised appropriate caution given, among other things, its proximity to the elementary school during drop off hours, and the presence of young pedestrians and other potential vulnerable road users. ODI expects that its investigation will examine the ADS\u2019s intended behavior in school zones and neighboring areas, especially during normal school pick up/drop off times, including but not limited to its adherence to posted speed limits. ODI will also investigate Waymo's post-impact response.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-01-29T00:20:41Z","nhtsaId":"PE26001","openDate":"2026-01-29T00:20:41Z","status":"O","subject":"Waymo AV striking a child in the area of a school."},{"id":1915615,"artemisId":102045,"description":"
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 26 complaints and several Early Warning Reporting (EWR) Field Reports alleging intermittent and brief increases in steering effort (described as \u201csticky steering\u201d) during the drive cycle in model year (MY) 2024 CX-90 vehicles manufactured by Mazda North American Operations (Mazda) subject to Recall 24V2022. In each complaint, the vehicle had the recall remedy completed prior to the reported incident.
Recall 24V022 addresses a sudden and unexpected change of steering effort while driving caused by excessive worm gear friction force.
After receiving the recall 24V022 remedy, consumers report sudden increases of steering effort while driving. Sudden and unexpected change of steering effort while driving may increase the risk of a crash.
ODI is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to assess the adequacy of the remedy for Recall 24V022 and to identify the cause(s) of the conditions leading to the post-remedy reports. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-01-26T18:28:38Z","nhtsaId":"RQ26002","openDate":"2026-01-26T18:28:38Z","status":"O","subject":"Momentary increase in steering effort after recall remedy"},{"id":1913281,"artemisId":102044,"closeDate":"2026-08-20T16:24:55Z","description":"On January 16, 2026, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Recall Query RQ26001. This investigation was opened to assess the remedy effectiveness of Recall 25V-274. ODI has received complaints alleging engine failure in vehicles after the recall remedy had been completed, whether that remedy involved an oil viscosity change or a complete engine replacement.
General Motors (GM) issued Recall 25V-274 to address concerns of engine failure in the L87 engines produced between March 1, 2021 and May 31, 2024. GM cited the root cause as a supplier manufacturing and quality issue. GM\u2019s recall remedy for Recall 25V-274 consisted of two different repairs, either an oil viscosity change or an engine replacement, based on the results of the remedy inspection procedure. ODI continues to receive reports of engine failures after the completion of the recall remedy.
To date, ODI has received 499 complaints alleging post-remedy engine failure in vehicles subject to Recall 25V-274, 473 of which involved an oil viscosity change and 26 a complete engine replacement. GM reported receiving 6,953 complaints of post-remedy engine failure.
ODI will close this RQ and continue to investigate complaints of post-remedy engine failure for Recall 25V-274 as part of an Engineering Analysis (EA26005).
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"26","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-20T16:24:55Z","nhtsaId":"RQ26001","openDate":"2026-01-16T20:32:17Z","status":"C","subject":"Loss of motive power due to engine failure post recall remedy"},{"id":1907796,"artemisId":102040,"closeDate":"2026-07-22T19:11:35Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has completed its review of a defect petition received on November 24, 2025, requesting an investigation into the emergency mechanical door release in 2022 Model Year (MY) Tesla Model 3. The petition alleges that the controls for the emergency mechanical door release are not accessible and clearly identifiable and thus fail to comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 206.
A vehicle equipped with electric door handles without an accessible mechanical door release creates a risk to safety when the electric door handle becomes inoperative due to loss of power and occupants are unable to easily locate the mechanical door release to exit the vehicle in case of an emergency. A concealed or hard to locate emergency door release could prevent an operator or occupant from exiting the vehicle in the event of an emergency, such as a crash or fire. The potential risk for entrapment can result in a severe injury or death of the operator and other occupants of the vehicle.
As of March 13, 2026, out of the population of 179,031 subject vehicles, NHTSA has identified one (1) consumer complaint, in NHTSA\u2019s databases alleging that the mechanical door release is concealed and unlabeled, resulting in a risk of entrapment in the event of an emergency, as cited in the Petition. The complaint is for the same Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) as the subject vehicle of the Petition. The allegation describes a front impact collision, where the vehicle lost electrical power, and the electric door mechanism stopped working.
The 2022 MY Model 3 has a mechanical release for the front doors, located in front of the window switch on the door's interior and consists of a lever that can be pulled up to open the door. The subject vehicle does not have a mechanical release for the back doors.
The owner\u2019s manual for the 2022 MY Tesla Model 3 includes a section labeled \u201cIn Case of Emergency\u201d that details how to open doors from the interior when the vehicle has no electrical power. The owner\u2019s manual refers to the mechanical release as a \u201cmanual door release.\u201d The owner\u2019s manual instructs the operator to \u201cpull up the manual door release located in front of the window switches.\u201d The owner\u2019s manual includes an illustration showing the mechanical door release lever and its location on the door. The illustration depicts an image of the door with the window switch and lever, including a blue arrow pointing to the location of the lever to demonstrate the upward movement required to operate the lever. The lever shown in the illustration does not contain a label to identify it. Although they vary in design and location, mechanical releases for the front doors are available on all Tesla models. The location and operation of the mechanical release is described in the owner\u2019s manual for each Tesla model. Further, the owner\u2019s manual cautions the operator that the mechanical door release should only be used when the subject vehicle has no power or if otherwise necessary. If the subject vehicle has power, the button located at the top of the interior door handle should be used to open the doors.
The Petition also stated the lack of an accessible mechanical emergency door release is a violation of the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 206 (49 CFR \u00a7 571.206). FMVSS 206 specifies performance requirements for vehicle door locks, latches, hinges, and attachment components to prevent passenger ejection during crashes. It applies to passenger cars, trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,000 lbs.) or less, focusing on maintaining latch engagement under inertial loads and structural integrity. No requirements exist in the standard that address the Petitioner\u2019s concern regarding the labeling and location of an emergency mechanical door release in passenger cars.
On November 4, 2025, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Rulemaking received a petition to initiate the issuance of a new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) to mandate a robust and obvious door egress system in all motor vehicles. The request has been granted, and the Agency will accordingly commence a rulemaking proceeding. See 49 CFR \u00a7 552.9. A decision as to the issuance of a rule will be made on the basis of all available information developed in the course of the rulemaking proceeding, in accordance with statutory criteria. Id.
The Agency has thoroughly assessed the material submitted by the Petitioner, consumer complaint information in NHTSA\u2019s databases, and other relevant information already in possession of the Agency. NHTSA does not believe that the issues presented by the Petitioner indicate the likelihood of a safety related defect that would warrant a defect investigation, and the issue is best addressed through the rulemaking process. After full consideration of the available information and the commencement of the related rulemaking proceeding, the Petition is denied. Further specifics can be found in the Federal Register Notice.
The ODI report cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11701894 and the Defect Petition can be viewed under ODI Number 11698174.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-07-22T19:11:35Z","nhtsaId":"DP25002","openDate":"2025-12-23T14:53:07Z","status":"C","subject":"Emergency egress controls are not readily accessible and clearly identifiable."},{"id":1907063,"artemisId":102041,"closeDate":"2026-07-31T15:22:59Z","description":"On December 18, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE25020 to investigate instances of timing belt failure in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford Fiesta and MY 2015-2018 Ford Focus vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford), equipped with a 1.0L engine and manual transmission (subject vehicles). Additionally, MY 2018-2021 Ford EcoSport and MY 2016-2018 Focus vehicles with a 1.0L engine and automatic transmission were analyzed as peer vehicles because they utilize a wet timing belt comprised of similar material as the timing belt in the subject vehicles.
Through the PE, ODI investigated a potential failure/degradation of the timing belt that may affect oil pump function resulting in a lack of engine lubrication and potential loss of motive power. The complaints commonly allege a low engine oil pressure warning lamp immediately preceding a complete loss or reduction of motive power while the vehicle is in motion. Some complaints allege that a sudden loss of motive power or engine seizure occurred without warning or prior detectable symptoms. ODI\u2019s analysis supports that this failure can occur without sufficient and advanced warning to the driver that a loss of motive power/engine seizure is imminent.
ODI found that the timing belt material may degrade and create debris that clogs the mesh oil pump pick-up screen, resulting in reduced oil pressure in the engine. As additional debris accumulates on the screen, this can progress to a loss of motive power while driving due to a lack of engine lubrication. The failure data provided in response to this investigation revealed an average failure mileage of approximately 70,000 miles, and that 98% of the failures occurred prior to the 150,000 mile timing belt replacement interval per the vehicles\u2019 maintenance schedule. Based on evidence collected via consumer surveys and an engine teardown, failures have occurred despite evidence of proper and routine oil maintenance. The oil pump pick-up screen is not serviceable, so debris accumulation cannot be inspected or manually removed without removing the engine from the vehicle.
On June 2, 2026, Ford informed ODI of a non-safety customer satisfaction program for global vehicles with the 1.0L Fox Classic Timing Belt. This program will notify customers globally of a revised maintenance interval for the timing belt, reducing the original 150,000 mile interval down to 100,000 miles/6 years. This customer satisfaction program will also offer reimbursement to eligible customers who previously paid to have their engine repaired or replaced due to a timing belt related issue.
Based on NHTSA\u2019s analysis of the data, failure rates, information provided by Ford, preliminary engine teardown analysis, and precedent recalls regarding loss of engine oil pressure with the presence of driver facing warnings, ODI believes there is an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. Therefore, this Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA26004). During this Engineering Analysis, the agency plans to perform component-level and vehicle testing. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identi\ufb01cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"020","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-07-31T15:22:59Z","nhtsaId":"PE25020","openDate":"2025-12-18T20:21:31Z","status":"C","subject":"Timing Belt Failure"},{"id":1905567,"artemisId":102004,"description":"On June 8, 2023, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles US, LLC (FCA) filed Safety Recall 23V-413 affecting certain 2022\u20132023 Jeep Grand Cherokee and 2021\u20132023 Jeep Grand Cherokee L vehicles to address rear coil springs that may not have been properly installed during vehicle production. An improperly installed rear coil spring may detach while the vehicle is in motion, creating a road hazard that can increase the risk of a crash for following motorists and may result in injury to other road users.
Since the filing of Recall 23V-413, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has received twenty (20) unique consumer complaints alleging rear coil spring detachments occurring after the recall remedy was performed. These reports raise concerns regarding the effectiveness of the recall remedy and suggest the possibility of additional factors not addressed by the original recall campaign.
Accordingly, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to assess the adequacy of FCA\u2019s remedy procedure under Recall 23V-413 and to evaluate the root cause(s) of post-remedy coil spring detachments. ODI will review complaint data, field reports, and FCA\u2019s technical analysis to determine whether further action is warranted.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, visit NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 1 complaint stating that a rear row seat belt became detached in a model year (MY) 2024 Land Rover Defender. Photos of the seat belt received with the complaint show that the stitching of the webbing of the seat belt appears to have not been properly formed.
An improperly stitched seat belt can become detached during a collision. Detachment of the seat belt increases the risk and severity of injury in a collision. This is especially concerning for children and children in child seats.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI report cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"019","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-12-11T19:15:35Z","nhtsaId":"PE25019","openDate":"2025-12-11T19:15:35Z","status":"O","subject":"Rear Seat Belt Stitching Failure and Detachment"},{"id":1895173,"artemisId":101997,"closeDate":"2026-06-25T18:22:00Z","description":"On October 28, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened PE25018 to investigate complaints of inadvertent deployment of the side curtain and/or side thorax air bags. These complaints concern model year (MY) 2018-2022 Honda Odyssey vehicles manufactured by American Honda Motor Co. (Honda).
Honda issued recall 26V227 on April 9, 2026, to address concerns of inadvertent side air bag deployment. In the recall filing, the company stated that \u201c[a]s of April 2, 2026, Honda has had 130 warranty claims, 25 reports of an injury, and no reports of death related to this issue from January 24, 2017 \u2013 April 2, 2026.\u201d Honda states that the Supplemental Restraint System (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) contains incorrect deployment parameters for the side thorax and side curtain air bags, which may cause inadvertent deployment when the vehicle encounters strong road impacts, such as driving over potholes, speed bumps, or road debris. Honda stated that the SRS control logic for the second and third rows of seating contained an insufficient deployment threshold margin, allowing signal inputs to be misinterpreted as side impacts and causing inadvertent deployment of the side thorax and side curtain air bags. Recall 26V227 states that dealers will reprogram or replace the SRS ECU with improved air bag deployment parameters. Consumers received notice of this recall in late May 2026.
In view of the recall being conducted by Honda, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation (PE). The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"018","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-06-25T18:22:00Z","nhtsaId":"PE25018","openDate":"2025-10-28T20:38:09Z","status":"C","subject":"Inadvertent Deployment of Side Air Bags"},{"id":1895175,"artemisId":102001,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 6 complaints, and multiple Early Warning Reporting (EWR) field reports alleging inaccurate rear seat belt warning status. These allegations concern both false positive and false negative statuses in model year (MY) 2023-2024 Honda Pilot vehicles manufactured by American Honda Motor Co. (Honda).
The complaints state that the rear passenger seat belt warning system is displaying inaccurate information to the driver for both second and third row seating positions. This can lead to the driver dismissing warnings regarding rear seat belt status. The inaccurate information can also cause the driver to believe rear occupants are buckled when they are not. This reliance on false information presents concerns for the safety of children and child seats located in the rear rows, especially in the third row where the buckled status is more difficult for the driver to visually confirm.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"017","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-28T20:34:43Z","nhtsaId":"PE25017","openDate":"2025-10-28T20:34:43Z","status":"O","subject":"Inaccurate Rear Passenger Seat Belt Warning Status"},{"id":1895174,"artemisId":101998,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 48 Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) reports and some Early Warning Reporting (EWR) field reports alleging intermittent loss of motive power in Model Year (MY) 2020\u20132022 Honda CR-V Hybrid vehicles. These incidents are alleged to occur without warning at highway speeds and are accompanied by a flashing check engine light immediately before the loss of motive power occurs. Motive power can be restored by turning the ignition off and back on. However, this action also clears the check engine light and any fault codes that were set. The fault\u2019s intermittent nature, combined with the lack of fault codes, often results in many visits to repair facilities yielding no repairs. Honda indicated it was unaware of any related complaint or repair trends.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to determine the scope and severity of the alleged fault and to fully assess the possible safety consequences. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"016","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-28T20:31:43Z","nhtsaId":"PE25016","openDate":"2025-10-28T20:31:43Z","status":"O","subject":"Loss of Motive Power"},{"id":1894238,"artemisId":101963,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 1,157 reports of engine bearing failure failures in the L87 6.2L engine produced by General Motors (GM). Of the 1,157 reports received, 173 are outside of the scope of recall 25V-274. These engines are installed in Model Years (MY) 2019\u20132024 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 and GMC Sierra 1500, and 2021-2024MY Chevrolet Suburban and Tahoe, GMC Yukon/Yukon XL, and Cadillac Escalade/Escalade ESV vehicles.
The subject engine failures were investigated as part of a Preliminary Evaluation (PE25001). GM determined that these engine failures were due to multiple supplier manufacturing and quality issues. GM issued recall 25V-274 to address the supplier manufacturing and quality issues produced between March 1, 2021, and May 31, 2024. Based on the issuance of recall 25V-274, NHTSA has closed PE25001.
ODI continues to receive a significant number of reports of engine failure in vehicles outside the scope of 25V-274. This presents a potential safety risk that warrants further investigation. ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis (EA) to further evaluate the scope and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues of vehicles built outside the recall scope.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"007","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-23T18:16:30Z","nhtsaId":"EA25007","openDate":"2025-10-23T18:16:30Z","status":"O","subject":"Loss of motive power due to engine failure"},{"id":1894237,"artemisId":101928,"closeDate":"2026-05-21T16:31:34Z","description":"On October 23, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE25015 after receiving complaints concerning a loss of brake assist in 2019-2020 MY Acura ILX vehicles. These complainants alleged master cylinder failures resulting in soft pedal feel or the brake pedal intermittently going to the floor. These failures could result in extended braking distance increasing the risk of a crash.
Honda found that residual plasticizer in the brake reservoir hose could contaminate the brake fluid. This contaminated brake fluid was then absorbed by the secondary cup seal, causing it to swell. Engine heat during operation could further expand the swollen seal, allowing brake fluid to pass. Brake fluid bypassing the master cylinder cup seals can reduce brake-pedal firmness and increase stopping distance.
On April 08, 2026, Honda filed Recall 25V-859, recalling all 2016-2020 MY Acura ILX vehicles produced from October 9, 2014, to January 29, 2020. Under the recall, the dealer will replace the brake master cylinder with redesigned inner cup seals made of a different material, providing improved sealing capability.
In view of Honda filing Recall 25V-859 addressing the subject of this investigation, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"015","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-05-21T16:31:34Z","nhtsaId":"PE25015","openDate":"2025-10-23T18:07:09Z","status":"C","subject":"Loss of braking force"},{"id":1893988,"artemisId":101848,"description":"On May 26, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23010) to assess reports of false positive activation of the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system in model year (MY) 2017-2022 Daimler Trucks North America (DTNA) vehicles. The reports alleged that activation of the AEB system occurred while driving with no apparent obstruction in the vehicle's forward path, resulting in sudden vehicle deceleration.
DTNA indicated that it received of a total of 315 reports that may relate to the alleged defect in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles. DTNA stated that the vast majority of false positive activation of the subject systems occur in very limited durations and result in a five mile per hour deceleration.
ODI considered four AEB systems offered by DTNA: Detroit Assurance 2.0, Detroit Assurance 4.0, Detroit Assurance 5.0, and Wabco OnGuard. ODI\u2019s analysis shows that of the Detroit Assurance versions, all are failing at similar rates. The OnGuard AEB systems equipped on the same model and model year vehicles have experienced a significantly lower claim rate.
To date, ODI has received a total of 32 consumer complaints of inadvertent activation of AEB in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles. In total, ODI reviewed 347 unique (i.e., non-duplicative Vehicle Identification Numbers) reports that may relate to the alleged defect, which include 24 reports involving a crash, 13 reports involving an alleged injury and one report with a fatality.
PE23010 has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis to further assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety related consequences of the inadvertent AEB activations in MY 2017-2022 DTNA vehicles.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"006","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-23T13:10:09Z","nhtsaId":"EA25006","openDate":"2025-10-23T13:10:09Z","status":"O","subject":"Automatic Emergency Braking Errors"},{"id":1893989,"artemisId":101964,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) is opening a Preliminary Evaluation on 2020 Model Year Jeep Gladiators and Wranglers involving a malfunctioning Instrument Panel Clusters (IPC) resulting in the loss of important vehicle metrics and other status information. ODI has received 89 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) alleging a complete or partial loss of the IPC display while driving. The subject vehicles' IPC display includes the speedometer, fuel gauge, engine temperature, turn signal indicators, warning light, and other gauges that are normally illuminated while the vehicle is in operation. Loss of the fuel gauge while driving may lead to an inability to determine the fuel level and result in a loss of motive power, and the loss of other safety-related information may impede a driver\u2019s ability to take action to prevent a safety risk. Furthermore, an IPC that is suddenly not visible to the driver may divert the driver\u2019s attention from the driving task, potentially causing a vehicle crash.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to evaluate the scope, severity and frequency of the alleged IPC malfunctions and to assess potential safety-related consequences.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov
","investigationNumber":"014","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-23T12:49:32Z","nhtsaId":"PE25014","openDate":"2025-10-23T12:49:32Z","status":"O","subject":"Instrument Panel Cluster (IPC) Failure"},{"id":1893718,"artemisId":102000,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has become aware of eight vehicle crashes in which a rupture of a Jilin Province Detiannuo Automobile Safety System Co., Ltd. (DTN) air bag inflator occurred during the deployment of the driver side air bag. All eight drivers in these crashes sustained serious or fatal injuries that appear linked to the ruptures. Six of those drivers sustained fatal injuries and two sustained severe injuries. In all eight incidents, the subject inflators had been installed as replacement equipment after the vehicle was involved in a previous crash. Information gathered during NHTSA\u2019s initial analysis of these incidents indicates that the inflators were potentially imported illegally into the United States. In conjunction with this safety investigation, NHTSA is also working with appropriate authorities to address any illegal activities associated with the importation of these inflators. As a result of the significant safety concerns relating to these inflators, as well as extensive information already obtained by ODI relating to their field ruptures, ODI is moving directly to the Engineering Analysis (EA) stage of its investigative process rather than first opening a Preliminary Evaluation.
NHTSA has taken a variety of actions to address the risks posed by the importation of substandard or counterfeit air bag components. However, until recently, these risks appeared spread across a variety of components and manufacturers. As part of ODI\u2019s continuous monitoring of this issue, the agency has obtained information to suggest that at least eight incidents involve ruptures of inflators manufactured by DTN. In parallel with this dedicated investigation into DTN inflators, ODI will continue to monitor reports of field incidents to evaluate risks from other substandard imported air bag components.
In 2012, ODI first became aware of substandard or counterfeit air bag modules sold through online marketplaces, such as auction sites. NHTSA obtained examples of these air bag modules and conducted testing. None of the inflators equipped in these modules were manufactured by DTN. This testing revealed that the inflators consistently malfunctioned during deployments, such as by failing to deploy the air bag or expelling metal shrapnel due to a rupture. This led NHTSA to release a consumer advisory in October 2012 to alert the public and repair professionals to the potential dangers of substandard or counterfeit air bag modules. ODI also worked with major vehicle manufacturers, who released advisories and notifications concerning the use of such air bag modules. Since then, NHTSA has continuously monitored for reports of malfunctioning air bags that may be associated with substandard or counterfeit components. These monitoring efforts have been supported by the increased visibility the advisories have brought to the issue, and by several standing general orders in place as part of separate investigations into Takata and ARC inflators, which require certain manufacturers to report any alleged or suspected inflator field ruptures to NHTSA.
Until 2017, ODI was not aware of any field incidents involving an abnormal deployment of an imported substandard or counterfeit air bag module. In September 2017, ODI became aware of a crash involving a model year (MY) 2009 Honda Civic where the air bag ruptured during deployment, killing the driver. After inspecting the vehicle and air bag parts, ODI determined that the air bag inflator was not original equipment and that the air bag module was likely a substandard import. Insufficient information existed to determine the manufacturer of the inflator in this incident, however, it does not appear to resemble those manufactured by DTN.
On June 16, 2023, ODI received a Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ #11527380) alleging that the rupture of a driver side air bag caused fatal injuries to the driver of a MY 2020 Chevrolet Malibu. ODI\u2019s assessment of the rupture indicated that the air bag inflator was not original equipment but was instead manufactured by DTN, a Chinese company (also known as Yoshibayashi Toku theanol Automotive Safety Systems Co. Ltd.).
From June 2023 to July 2024, ODI became aware of four additional ruptures involving substandard air bag modules equipped on Chevrolet Malibu vehicles. At the time, insufficient information existed for these crashes to determine who manufactured the ruptured inflators. As a result, NHTSA released a consumer advisory on July 10, 2024, alerting car buyers and owners to be aware of cheap, substandard replacement air bag inflators that can cause death or serious injury in a crash. The advisory urged consumers who own or are considering the purchase of a used vehicle to learn the vehicle\u2019s history and ensure the vehicle has genuine air bag inflators.
In March 2025, NHTSA learned about another rupture involving a suspected substandard, aftermarket inflator that was equipped in a MY 2017 Hyundai Sonata. The driver of this vehicle sustained fatal injuries that appeared related to the rupture. In August 2025, NHTSA received a similar report of a fatal air bag rupture in a MY 2019 Hyundai Sonata. Most recently, in October 2025, ODI received a report of a fatal air bag rupture in a MY 2020 Chevrolet Malibu. Photographs of the air bag components in these three crashes indicated that the ruptures all involved inflators manufactured by DTN. Further investigation of the inflator fragments in three of the prior incidents confirmed that they also involved DTN inflators. Photographs of the components involved in one of the other incidents also strongly suggest that the ruptured inflator was manufactured by DTN.
This opening resume exceeded space limitations and is continued in an attachment uploaded to the investigation.
","investigationNumber":"005","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-21T19:39:59Z","nhtsaId":"EA25005","openDate":"2025-10-21T19:39:59Z","status":"O","subject":"DTN Air Bag Inflator Rupture"},{"id":1892749,"artemisId":101999,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) identified a media report involving a Waymo AV that failed to remain stopped when approaching a school bus that was stopped with its red lights flashing, stop arm deployed, and crossing control arm deployed. In the incident, the Waymo AV approached the right side of the stopped school bus from a perpendicular side street. The AV initially stopped, but then drove around the front of the bus by briefly turning right to avoid running into the bus\u2019s right front end, then turning left to pass in front of the bus, and then turning further left and driving down the roadway past the entire left side of the bus. During this maneuver, the Waymo AV passed the bus\u2019s extended crossing control arm near disembarking students (on the bus\u2019s right side) and passed the extended stop arm on the bus\u2019s left side.
At the time of the incident, the Waymo AV was operated by Waymo\u2019s 5th Generation Automated Driving System (ADS). No safety operator was present in the vehicle. Waymo\u2019s ADS surpassed 100 million miles of driving in July of 2025. Operations involving Waymo\u2019s ADS currently accumulate approximately two million miles per week. Based on NHTSA\u2019s engagement with Waymo on this incident and the accumulation of operational miles, the likelihood of other prior similar incidents is high.
ODI has opened a Preliminary Evaluation to investigate the performance of the Waymo ADS around stopped school buses, how the system is designed to comply with school bus traffic safety laws, and the system\u2019s ability to follow those traffic safety laws. During this investigation, NHTSA will seek to identify the scope of the issue presented by this incident and identify any other similar incidents.
","investigationNumber":"013","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-17T18:31:03Z","nhtsaId":"PE25013","openDate":"2025-10-17T18:31:03Z","status":"O","subject":"Waymo AV drives around a stopped school bus"},{"id":1890586,"artemisId":101914,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (\u201cODI\u201d) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute tra\ufb03c safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as \"FSD (Supervised)\" and \"FSD (Beta).\" Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable tra\ufb03c laws. ODI\u2019s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver\u2019s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed.
ODI has identi\ufb01ed a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated tra\ufb03c safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The \ufb01rst type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red tra\ufb03c signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of tra\ufb03c.
With respect to the \ufb01rst type of scenario, ODI has identi\ufb01ed 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red tra\ufb03c signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct tra\ufb03c signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red tra\ufb03c signal.
ODI has identi\ufb01ed six Standing General Order (\"SGO\") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red tra\ufb03c signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection.
With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identi\ufb01ed 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identi\ufb01ed 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene.
ODI\u2019s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals.
This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA\u2019s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting.
13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1
Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
","investigationNumber":"012","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-07T16:18:32Z","nhtsaId":"PE25012","openDate":"2025-10-07T16:18:32Z","status":"O","subject":"Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving (\"FSD\") is engaged"},{"id":1886579,"artemisId":101930,"closeDate":"2026-02-25T19:54:59Z","description":"On September 22, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE) 25011 to investigate and assess allegations of seat belt performance concerns in certain Model Year (MY) 2022-2023 Rivian Electric Delivery Van (EDV). ODI has received fourteen (14) Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) reporting potential failures of the driver\u2019s front outboard seat belt anchorage system. The anchorage utilizes a steel-braided cable linked to the seat frame, which supports the seat belt webbing that secures the occupant in the event of a crash. The VOQ describe instances in which the steel-braided cable frayed, unraveled, or completely severed, potentially leaving the occupant inadequately restrained during vehicle operation. A partial or complete separation of the seat belt pretensioner anchor cable can significantly degrade occupant restraint performance in a crash. A damaged cable may also prevent the pretensioner from removing belt slack at the onset of a vehicle crash impact, which could reduce airbag effectiveness and increase the risk of injury.
ODI\u2019s investigation sought to determine whether the seat belt assembly\u2019s integrity, design, durability, mounting position, installation method, or manufacturing deficiencies could have contributed to the reported condition.
Following the opening of the investigation, Rivian Automotive, LLC (Rivian) determined that the seat belt pretensioner anchor cable contained a safety defect in the subject vehicle population and filed a Part 573 Defect Information Report.
Recall 25V-816 is intended to address MY 2022-2025 Rivian EDV vehicles. Rivian has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update and will inspect and replace the driver\u2019s seat belt pretensioner assembly as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters are expected to be mailed on January 19, 2026.
This recall action seems to resolve the concerns reported by customers. The recall scope includes MY 2024-2025 vehicles in addition to MY 2022-2023 vehicles identified in this investigation. Accordingly, ODI is closing Investigation PE25011. The agency will continue to monitor field performance, complaint trends, and recall completion rates to assess the adequacy of the remedy. ODI reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future developments.
To review the ODI reports cited in this Closing Resume, go to NHTSA.gov and search the associated ODI Report Identification Numbers.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received nine Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting an inability to open doors on Model Year (MY) 2021 Tesla Model Y vehicles. The most commonly reported scenarios involved parents exiting the vehicle after a drive cycle in order to remove a child from the back seat or placing a child in the back seat before starting a drive cycle. In those events, the parents were unable to reopen a door to regain access to the vehicle. Four of these VOQs reported resorting to breaking a window to regain entry into the vehicle. Although Tesla vehicles have manual door releases inside of the cabin, in these situations, a child may not be able to access or operate the releases even if the vehicle\u2019s driver is aware of them. As a result, in these instances, an occupant who remains inside a vehicle in this condition may be unable to be rapidly retrieved by persons outside of the vehicle. Entrapment in a vehicle is particularly concerning in emergency situations, such as when children are entrapped in a hot vehicle. For awareness, NHTSA has a Child Heatstroke Campaign that highlights the dangers to children entrapped in hot vehicles.
Based on ODI\u2019s preliminary review, this condition appears to occur when the electronic door locks receive insufficient voltage from the vehicle. Available repair invoices report replacement of the vehicle\u2019s low voltage battery after the incident. However, no VOQs reported seeing a low voltage battery warning prior to the exterior door handles becoming inoperative. The Tesla Owner\u2019s Manual \u201cJump Starting\u201d and \u201cOpening the Hood with No Power\u201d sections describe a multi-step process for restoring power to the electronic door locks in order to enable their operation from outside of the vehicle. This process requires applying 12 volts DC from a separate power source to two different points accessible from the vehicle\u2019s exterior. The subject incidents suggest that this process may not be readily available to owners or well known. For instances where an occupant is able to access and operate interior door handles, the Tesla Owner\u2019s Manual \u201cOpening Doors with No Power\u201d section identifies the manual door releases inside of the vehicle\u2019s cabin.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope and severity of this condition, including the risks that arise from the conditions reported in the VOQs. This investigation will also assess the approach used by Tesla to supply power to the door locks and the reliability of the applicable power supplies. At this time, NHTSA\u2019s investigation is focused on the operability of the electronic door locks from outside of the vehicle as that circumstance is the only one in which there is no manual way to open the door. The agency will continue to monitor any reports of entrapment involving opening doors from inside of the vehicle, and ODI will take further action as needed. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume and the ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. |
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition on August 22, 2025, requesting a defect investigation into an alleged defect of the \u201cunderbody shields\u201d on model year (MY) 2020 Ford Explorer vehicles. The petition alleges premature degradation and detachment of the plastic underbody shields, potentially leading to road debris. The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI number 11682326.
A search of the subject vehicle population was undertaken using complaints submitted to ODI. No related complaints were found in NHTSA\u2019s database for the subject vehicle population. Subsequently, ODI conducted a broader search for related complaints and field reports involving MY 2020-2025 Ford Explorer and Lincoln Aviator models, as these vehicles utilize substantially similar underbody shields. No complaints or reports were found citing any allegations pertaining to any of the underbody shields. ODI also reviewed manufacturer information and data and did not identify a trend related to the Petitioner\u2019s allegations.
Based on the absence of consumer complaints and reports, ODI has not identified a material risk of a complete detachment or a projectile hazard related to this condition. The petitioner's description of detectable symptoms - including noise and vibration that progressively worsen and visible sagging of the shields underneath the vehicle - indicates a failure mode that provides drivers with ample notice to seek service before a potential detachment.
In view of the insufficient evidence of a vehicle-based defect pertaining to the underbody shields of the subject vehicle, ODI is denying this Defect Petition. A Federal Register Notice (FRN) further detailing NHTSA\u2019s reasons for denial of the petition will be published. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the report cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-04-09T17:38:11Z","nhtsaId":"DP25001","openDate":"2025-09-05T18:39:17Z","status":"C","subject":"Underbody shields detachment"},{"id":1882391,"artemisId":101926,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of alleged defects related to the electric power steering (EPS) system in model year (MY) 2017\u20132018 Chrysler Pacifica vehicles. ODI has received 94 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting a condition in which the steering system exhibits a sticking sensation during gradual turns, particularly when the steering wheel is positioned near the 11 o'clock or 1 o'clock position. Complainants allege that during these events, increased steering effort is required to return the wheel to center. In many cases, this is followed by a sudden reactivation of EPS assistance, which may result in an oversteer condition. This behavior could increase the risk of a crash, especially at higher speeds.
ODI has identified multiple VOQs describing similar symptoms. This investigation will assess the frequency, root cause, and potential safety-related consequences of the alleged EPS malfunction. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"009","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-09-05T14:56:58Z","nhtsaId":"PE25009","openDate":"2025-09-05T14:56:58Z","status":"O","subject":"Intermittent Loss of Electric Power Steering"},{"id":1878423,"artemisId":101924,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 414 reports of connecting rod bearing failures in the 3.5L V6 engine used in the following vehicles: Model Years (MY) 2018-2020 Acura TLX, MY2016-2020 Acura MDX, MY2016-2020 Honda Pilot, MY2018-2020 Honda Odyssey, and MY2017-2019 Honda Ridgeline. The subject engine failures were analyzed as part of a Recall Query (RQ24013). It was determined that these engine failures are outside the scope of Honda Recall 23V-751. Further, evidence gathered in conjunction with RQ24013 does not suggest this failure is caused by the same crankshaft manufacturing defect that is addressed by Honda in Recall 23V-751. Based on analysis of data from RQ24013, NHTSA has closed that investigation.
The significant number of reports of engine failure in vehicles outside the scope of RQ24013 presents a potential safety risk that warrants further investigation. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to further evaluate the scope and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"008","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-08-20T14:04:21Z","nhtsaId":"PE25008","openDate":"2025-08-20T14:04:21Z","status":"O","subject":"Engine failure"},{"id":1878091,"artemisId":101916,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (\u201cODI\u201d) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (\u201cTesla\u201d) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the \u201cSGO\u201d), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis.
Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla\u2019s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data.
The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs:
13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1
13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1
13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1
13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1
13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1
13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1
13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1
13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1
13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1
13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1
13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1
13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1
13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1
13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1
13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1
13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1
13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1
13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1
13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1
13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1
13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1
13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"AQ","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-08-20T01:09:04Z","nhtsaId":"AQ25002","openDate":"2025-08-20T01:09:04Z","status":"O","subject":"Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements"},{"id":1875216,"artemisId":101925,"closeDate":"2026-08-05T13:29:25Z","description":"On August 7, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE25007 to investigate instances of B-pillar trim detachment in model year (MY) 2019 Ford Flex vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company. During the investigation, MY 2011-2018 Ford Flex vehicles were analyzed as peer vehicles, and subsequently incorporated into the subject population because they use B-pillar trim pieces that are substantially similar to those used on the MY 2019 Ford Flex vehicles.
In July 2025, prior to the opening of PE25007, ODI and Ford met to discuss B-pillar trim detachment in Ford Flex vehicles. Ford reported that its warranty analysis indicated that Flex B-pillar trim had a low detachment rate and that Ford did not believe this condition posed an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. In July 2025, Ford closed its internal investigation. Because ODI\u2019s analysis of complaint data indicated a high failure rate and an increasing failure trend, PE25007 was subsequently opened.
In responding to the information request for PE25007, Ford reassessed the warranty search criteria used in its July 2025 internal investigation. The reassessment found the detachment rate to be substantially higher than what Ford had originally determined. Consequently, in October 2025, Ford issued recall 25V732 based on the reassessed and accurate high failure rate. This recall instructed dealers to inspect the driver and front passenger B-pillar trim pieces and repair/replace if necessary. The vehicles included in this recall were MY 2017-2019 Ford Flex with production dates between February 17, 2017 and December 2, 2019.
In January 2026, Ford issued 25V732 Amendment 1, which updated the remedy to remove the inspection criteria and instead proactively secure the driver and front passenger B-pillar trim with adhesive. The scope of vehicles included in the recall was unchanged by Amendment 1.
ODI\u2019s analysis of 25V732 found that both the scope and remedy were insufficient and that an unreasonable safety risk remained despite the recall. MY 2016 Ford Flex was excluded from the recall scope and the rear B-pillar trims on both the driver and passenger side were excluded from the recall. The failure rates of both MY 2016 Ford Flex and rear B-pillar trim pieces were found to be higher than the failure rates in similar trim detachment recalls issued by both Ford and other vehicle manufacturers.
Starting in January 2026, ODI and Ford had multiple meetings to discuss Ford\u2019s PE25007 response data and ODI\u2019s concern about the 25V732 scope and remedy.
In June 2026, Ford issued 25V732 Amendment 2. This amendment expanded the scope of the recall to add MY 2016-2017 Ford Flex vehicles produced before February 17, 2017. Additionally, this amendment updated the remedy to include removal of and reapplication or replacement of both rear driver and rear passenger B-pillar trim pieces in addition to front driver and front passenger B-pillar trim pieces. This updated remedy applies to all MY 2016-2019 vehicles. Ford expects to complete the mailing of remedy owner notification letters by March 26, 2027. Also, Ford informed ODI that prior model year (MY 2011-2015) vehicles were referred to Ford\u2019s Customer Satisfaction forum for consideration of an extended warranty program.
In view of recall 25V732 and its associated amendments, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation (PE). The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"007","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-05T13:29:25Z","nhtsaId":"PE25007","openDate":"2025-08-07T18:37:25Z","status":"C","subject":"B-Pillar Trim Detachment"},{"id":1874841,"artemisId":101913,"closeDate":"2025-12-18T20:05:32Z","description":"On August 6, 2025, the Office of Defect Investigation (ODI) opened Audit Query (AQ) 25001 to assess the implementation of Kia America, Inc.\u2019s (Kia) remedy program for Safety Recall 25V099, involving incorrectly manufactured piston oil rings which may damage the engine causing a loss of motive power or fire. This AQ was opened in response to consumer complaints alleging of an ineffective remedy, inconsistent inspection results to determine whether an engine replacement was needed, and the unavailability of recall remedies.
On August 11, 2025, an Information Request (IR) was issued to Kia requesting: 1) why the inspection test was revised from requiring a \u2018cold\u2019 engine to a \u2018warm\u2019 engine; 2) why the recall remedy was suspended from April 30, 2025 to May 7, 2025; 3) how Kia notified customers of the recall remedy suspension and the need to re-test engines that failed the \u2018cold\u2019 engine test; 4) the number of post-recall remedy complaints alleging engine or other engine related failures; and 5) the warranty coverage Kia is offering to vehicles that passed either inspection tests.
On September 10, 2025, Kia responded to NHTSA\u2019s IR:
Kia reported the change in temperature from \u2018cold\u2019 to \u2018warm\u2019 engine testing was done to increase accuracy. The inspection test uses diagnostic tools that detects abnormal engine vibrations to identify damaged engines. From the initial launch of the Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) on April 4, 2025 through April 28, 2025, \u2018cold\u2019 engine testing resulted in a higher-than-expected failure rate when compared to the pre-recall warranty claim rate. This discrepancy led Kia to re-evaluate its inspection test and found that performing the inspection on a \u2018cold\u2019 engine can result in imprecise test results due to normal cold-start vibrations. Kia revised the inspection to \u2018warm\u2019 engine testing to minimize vibration interference. Kia sampled the field and performed a comparative analysis between \u2018cold\u2019 and \u2018warm\u2019 engine testing, and validated that \u2018warm\u2019 engine testing was more accurate in identifying damaged engines.
Kia also reported the suspension of the recall remedy was due to a software error in the diagnostic tool, which was introduced in concert with the April 29, 2025 launch of the TSB that revised the inspection from \u2018cold\u2019 to \u2018warm\u2019 engine testing. The software error resulted in all inspection tests reporting false positives for a damaged engine. On April 30, 2025, Kia suspended the remedy until May 7, 2025, which was when the software error was corrected with the release of the latest TSB and software update. The recall remedy remains available to eligible customers.
Kia reported owners were not mailed letters concerning the suspension to the recall remedy. Kia reasoned since it resolved the issue faster than it would have taken to draft and mail letters, Kia did not want to create unnecessary customer confusion involving an issue that would have already been addressed upon receipt of a letter. Kia also determined that mailing letters about re-testing engines was unnecessary since those vehicles were already at the dealer awaiting engine replacement. In most instances, Kia Customer Care agents would respond to customer inquiries related to the recall, including remedy availability, dealer issues, and questions about differing test results.
Kia provided ODI a review of engine related consumer complaints received on post recall-remedied vehicles. Kia did not find any common patterns or trends related to those complaints following completion of the recall, as the complaints included issues that were unrelated to the subject defect. To aid in the diagnosis of whether a complaint is related to the recall, the remedy includes the installation of a software program, the Piston-ring Noise Sensing System (PNSS), that monitors the engine for unusual noise patterns (an indicator of potential damage to the piston oil rings), and alerts the customer by flashing the check engine light and setting Diagnostic Trouble Code (DTC) P1327.
Kia confirmed that it is not offering any specific warranty coverage for this recall. Instead, Kia has instructed dealers to replace the engine, at no cost to the customer, with no time or mileage limitation, following the installation of the PNSS software and the presence of DTC P1327. On September 4, 2025, Kia issued Subsequent Repair Action (SRA) # SC336YZ, which provided engine diagnosis and replacement instructions for vehicles with a potentially related complaint following completion of the recall. Under this SRA, customers whose vehicles set DTC P1327 will have their engine replaced. If DTC P1327 is not set and it is unclear whether the issue is related to the recall, dealers are instructed to contact Kia's Technical Assistance Center to ensure the issue is appropriately handled. Kia notes that any issues determined to be unrelated to the recall are subject to the 10-year / 100,000-mile Powertrain warranty for original purchasers and a 5-year / 60,000-mile Limited Basic Warranty for subsequent purchasers.
In summary, Kia identified the insufficiencies of its initial inspection test that led to a pause to its recall campaign, explained why it did not mail letters to affected customers about the paused campaign or revised inspection test, reviewed existing consumer complaints that did not identify any potential trends related to the recall, and identified its warranty coverage for any vehicles exhibiting qualifying engine symptoms. After review of Kia\u2019s response to the IR, ODI has determined that no further action from Kia is necessary at this time, and ODI will close this AQ investigation accordingly. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"AQ","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-12-18T20:05:32Z","nhtsaId":"AQ25001","openDate":"2025-08-06T18:12:17Z","status":"C","subject":"Kia 25V099 Piston Oil Ring Recall Effectiveness"},{"id":1867236,"artemisId":101920,"closeDate":"2026-08-28T18:54:11Z","description":"On July 9, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Recall Query (RQ) 25004 to investigate and review the effectiveness of the remedy for Recall 25V-280. Polestar initiated Recall 25V-280 to address shortcomings in the remedy for Recall 24V-477, which intended to address rear camera outage conditions. Consumer complaint traffic reporting rear-view camera outages after receiving the remedy for 25V-280 prompted the RQ opening.
On July 7, 2024, Polestar initiated Recall 24V-477 to address issues with the rear-view camera display in certain Model Year (MY) 2021-2024 Polestar 2 vehicles. According to Polestar, this failure was due to a memory allocation error in the IHU. To address this error, the remedy, provided by an over-the-air (OTA) software update , shortened the retry times of the camera streams and removed the rendering of the map in the driver display during backing events to release the graphic memory for the rear-view camera.
On April 25, 2025, Polestar initiated Recall 25V-280 to address similar issues with the rear-view camera display in certain MY 2021-2025 Polestar 2 vehicles . The recall remedy consisted of an OTA software update intended to correct a synchronization error between the Parking Assist Camera (PAC) and the Infotainment Head Unit (IHU). The updated software would maintain the high-speed signal connection between the PAC and IHU, instead of toggling on and off by request.
ODI has received two hundred seventy-five (275) Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) alleging failure of the rear-view camera to display after receiving the remedy for Recall 25V-280. Consumers reported that the rear-view camera failed to display once the vehicle was initially placed in reverse, as well as losing the rear-view image while the vehicle was traveling in reverse . Failure to display the rearview image will reduce the driver\u2019s visibility in a backing event, increasing the risk of a crash.
On July 18, 2025, ODI sent Polestar an Information Request (IR) letter requesting data for vehicle production, field incidents, and any modifications related to the backup camera and its software. ODI also requested information pertaining to Polestar\u2019s internal assessments, problem resolutions, and their assessment of the alleged defect.
On September 15, 2025 , Polestar issued Recall 25V-615, which sought to remedy the failure of Recall 25V-280. Polestar acknowledged that the prior remedy was insufficient and that further engineering analysis would be required for final software development and validation. Polestar worked with its supplier (Volvo) and began validation of the new software in February 2026.
On April 20, 2026, Polestar released the remedy for Recall 25V-615 via an OTA software update. The update provided general stability improvements to the operating system, as well as bug fixes for the rear-view camera. Since the deployment of the 25V-615 remedy, ODI has received only 3 VOQs alleging a rear camera outage, yielding a complaint rate of 0.01% for Recall 25V-615.
ODI assessed the conditions that led to the 25V-280 remedy failures and the countermeasures deployed to prevent recurrence in vehicles that received the remedy for 25V-615. To measure its efficacy, ODI analyzed materials produced by Polestar in its responses to ODI\u2019s July 18, 2025, IR letter and additional materials Polestar furnished in response to email requests and a technical meeting in 2026. ODI also reviewed information Polestar provided in response to another IR letter NHTSA sent on March 25, 2026, requesting additional information related to the decision-making process for correcting the remedy failure of Recall 25V-280. On June 10, 2026, at the request of ODI, Polestar presented a technical briefing of the remedy for Recall 25V-615, which included both completion rates and remedy failure counts.
ODI has monitored the remedy for Recall 25V-615 since April 2026 and has observed the failure rate to remain low. ODI is closing this RQ following manufacturer action in the form of Recall 25V-615. The Agency will continue to monitor the remedy and reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 14 Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) reports and 6 EWR Death & Injury (D&I) reports describing post recall remedy failures of the brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI) system in certain Model Year (MY) 2013-2018 RAM pickup trucks. The subject vehicle models include 1500, 2500, 3500, 4500, and 5500 trucks equipped with a column mounted shift lever. The failures of the BTSI described in the VOQs occurred on vehicles that had all previously been repaired under recall 17V-821 or 18V-100. Both recalls address a potential condition which can cause the BTSI locking pin to become stuck allowing the transmission to be shifted out of Park without depressing the brake pedal and/or without having a key in the ignition. Shifting the transmission out of Park when not having the brake pedal depressed can result in a vehicle rollaway.
ODI is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to review the effectiveness of the 17V-821 and 18V-100 recall remedies, understand the root cause of additional vehicle rollaway incidents, and identify any other possible root cause that may affect the performance of the BTSI system. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"003","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-07-03T17:22:50Z","nhtsaId":"RQ25003","openDate":"2025-07-03T17:22:50Z","status":"O","subject":"Post Recall Remedy Brake Transmission Shift Interlock (BTSI) Failure"},{"id":1864532,"artemisId":101910,"closeDate":"2025-12-12T17:05:17Z","description":"On June 30, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened RQ25002 to investigate and review the effectiveness of Recall 19V-293. This recall was intended to address deterioration and detachment of shifter cable bushings by replacing them with an improved bushing that is less susceptible to deterioration from chemicals, oils, and solvents in MY2013-2016 Dodge Dart vehicles equipped with automatic transmissions and manufactured by Fiat Chrysler Automotive US LLC (FCA US). If the shifter cable becomes detached from the transmission, the transmission gear position may not match the driver\u2019s intended gear selection. This mismatch could result in unintended vehicle movement or rollaway when the driver believes the transmission is in PARK, increasing the risk of a crash and/or injury.
ODI has received sixty-three (63) Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) alleging worn or misadjusted shifter cables and/or shifter cable detachments in subject vehicles that had already received the remedy for Recall 19V-293. Complainants reported incidents of bushing deterioration and detachment, resulting in gear-selection mismatch despite the prior recall repair, raising concerns regarding the effectiveness and durability of the implemented remedy and the adequacy of the recall.
ODI\u2019s investigation sought to determine whether the remedy used in recall 19V-293 adequately addressed the cause of the failure and whether other vehicles using the same bushing design might be affected.
In response, FCA US and Dura Automotive Systems Inc. (Dura) determined that the repair for Recall 19V-293 did not sufficiently address the issue, and therefore, a safety defect exists in the subject vehicle population. As a result, FCA US and Dura initiated the following recall actions:
\u00b7 Recall 25V-674 (FCA US) is intended to address MY 2013\u20132016 Dodge Dart vehicles repaired under 19V-293 or otherwise equipped with suspect service parts. Remedy is under development.
\u00b7 Recall 25E-065 (Dura) is intended to address the defect at the equipment level by recalling affected gearshift control cable assemblies distributed as service components. Remedy is under development.
The recalls initiated by FCA US (25V-674), and Dura Automotive Systems Inc. (25E-065) were received prior to ODI sending an Information Request (IR) letter to FCA. These two recalls seem to resolve the concerns that prompted investigation RQ25002 by replacing the previously recalled and service-supplied shifter cable assembly with an improved design, currently under development. The vehicle scope concern identified in this query was addressed by the new recalls including all Model Year 2013\u20132016 Dodge Dart vehicles produced and equipped with the affected shifter cable assembly. Accordingly, ODI is closing Investigation RQ25002. The agency will continue to monitor field performance and recall completion data to evaluate the effectiveness of the new remedy. ODI reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
In November 2022, Proterra Operating Company, Inc. (Proterra) filed a safety recall (NHTSA recall 22V887) covering nineteen 2017-2019 Proterra Catalyst transit buses to address the potential of liquid accumulation in the 400-volt battery packs, increasing the risk of a fire. On December 16, 2022, Proterra mailed an interim owner notification letter stating that Proterra would physically inspect and analyze each recalled battery pack. In October 2023, Proterra amended their filing to now cover 300 vehicles, with a final remedy plan of updating the battery monitoring software. According to the final remedy documents from Proterra, should liquid be detected within the battery pack, the updated software would illuminate a warning light in the driver's dash display, prevent the batteries from being charged, and reduce the maximum speed of the buses. As of the most recent recall completion rate report, 109 of the 300 buses (36.3%) have received the software update.
In August 2023, Proterra declared bankruptcy, with its the three major business areas going to three separate companies. Phoenix Motorcars assumed liability for recall 22V887.
On June 5, 2025, a fire occurred at the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) decommissioning lot. Local officials stated that the fire initiated in a battery pack of one of the Proterra buses.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to evaluate the remedy effectiveness of recall 22V887 and to further understand the effects of nearly two-thirds of the affected population having not yet received the recall remedy.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-06-27T16:18:51Z","nhtsaId":"RQ25001","openDate":"2025-06-27T16:18:51Z","status":"O","subject":"Remedy Effectiveness of Recall 22V887"},{"id":1863700,"artemisId":101915,"closeDate":"2026-04-24T13:26:18Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is upgrading its Preliminary Evaluation (PE25006) of front steering knuckle fractures on model year (MY) 2014 through 2017 Range Rover Sport vehicles to an Engineering Analysis. ODI opened PE25006 on June 27, 2025, after receiving 12 Vehicle Owner's Questionnaire (VOQ) reports of the front aluminum steering knuckles fracturing in these vehicles. The reports describe the fractures occurring at the joint where the steering knuckle attaches to the upper control arm ball joint in one or both steering knuckles. Fracture of the front suspension knuckle can lead to detachment of the upper suspension arm. Detachment of the upper suspension arm results in the driver\u2019s inability to control the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
ODI reviewed information supplied by Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) in response to Information Request letters as well as reviewed the data with JLR on numerous occasions. ODI further reviewed relevant data on a peer vehicle with a significantly similar steering knuckle design, the MY 2014 through 2017 Range Rover. Much of the information is contradictory and requires a deeper analysis that is available in an Engineering Analysis.
On August 5, 2025, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) filed safety recall 25V514. This recall covers certain MY 2014 and all MY 2015-2017 Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles. The remedy for recall 25V514 addresses knuckles with and without a visible fracture. Knuckles that have developed a visible fracture will be replaced with a new knuckle of a substantially similar design. Knuckles with no fracture visibly present will have a brace fitted to the upper portion of the front steering knuckle. JLR states that the purpose of the brace is to prevent the component from completely separating should a fracture develop.
NHTSA continues to receive allegations of fractures occurring in the front steering knuckles of Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles. ODI will close PE25006 and continue to investigate the component design and assess the potential safety risk as part of an Engineering Analysis (EA26003) and evaluate the recall remedies for Recall 25V514. Further, the scope of this Engineering Analysis will be expanded to include MY 2018-2022 Range Rover and Range Rover Sport vehicles as they have a substantially similar component design.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"006","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-04-24T13:26:18Z","nhtsaId":"PE25006","openDate":"2025-06-27T16:16:07Z","status":"C","subject":"Front Steering Knuckle Fractures"},{"id":1859256,"artemisId":101912,"closeDate":"2026-09-03T18:59:47Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE25005 on June 13, 2025, to assess the scope, root cause, and potential defect in 2009 Model Year (MY) Nissan Cube vehicles equipped with Takata PSDI-X air bag inflators. At the time the investigation was opened, analysis by Nissan and Takata (now New Leaf LLC) indicated that a rupture occurred at a weld point between the inflator cap and housing in a 2009 MY Nissan Cube. Nissan ruled out the propellant degradation root cause characteristic of the larger, well known, Takata recall, and instead identified a welding root cause.
On April 9, 2026, Nissan North America, Inc. submitted a Part 573 Safety Recall Report to address the weld defect. Recall 26V230 includes the 28,388 2009 MY vehicles identified in the opening resume for this investigation and expands the population to include 2010 MY Nissan Cube vehicles for a total population of 47,928 vehicles produced between October 10, 2008, and September 25, 2010. Nissan identified the driver\u2019s front air bag inflator (Takata PSDI-X, Part Number 98560-7991C) produced by TK Services Inc. within a specific lot may contain an improper body weld seal to the inflator base. This improper weld can cause the air bag module to detach from the steering wheel during deployment, increasing the risk of injury to the occupant in the event of a crash.
Dealers will inspect the serial number on the driver\u2019s air bag inflator in recalled vehicles to identify the air bag inflator lot. If the inflator is part of the affected lot, the dealer will remove and replace it with a new inflator manufactured by a different supplier. This repair will be performed free of charge. See NHTSA Recall No. 26V230 for further details.
Based on Nissan's recall action, this Preliminary Evaluation is closed.
","investigationNumber":"005","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-03T18:59:47Z","nhtsaId":"PE25005","openDate":"2025-06-13T13:00:33Z","status":"C","subject":"Driver Airbag Inflator Rupture"},{"id":1848214,"artemisId":101876,"closeDate":"2026-03-11T18:47:02Z","description":"On April 29, 2025, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation (PE25004) to investigate inoperative windshield wipers in model year (MY) 2024-2025 Kia EV9 vehicles. The complaints report windshield wipers that malfunction while driving, when snow and/or ice accumulates on or at the bottom of the windshield or in the cowl. ODI further received videos and photographs that depict relatively small amounts of snow and/or ice accumulation that leads to the wipers\u2019 malfunction. Inoperative windshield wipers could reduce driver visibility during inclement weather and increase the risk of a crash.
ODI identified 7 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) related to this investigation. Five VOQs describe inoperative windshield wipers due to snow and/or ice accumulation. Two other VOQs describe other malfunctioning windshield wipers including snow build-up on the blades and an odor of overheating. The wipers are equipped with thermal overload protection designed to limit overheating of the wiper motor. Further, consumers describe windshield wipers that temporarily stop working when they are not able to clear the windshield. This may happen when the wipers stop before the parked position in the cowl at the bottom of the windshield.
In January 2026, Kia informed ODI that it will conduct a Product Improvement Campaign with owner notification for approximately 47,000 MY 2024-2026 EV9 vehicles. The campaign includes a hardware change to the passenger-side wiper arm and an Owner\u2019s Manual revision. The replacement wiper arm will be a different shape and angle that increase the space/clearance between the cowl and the wiper. The Owner\u2019s Manual revision will emphasize the importance of snow removal prior to driving, and it will recommend that drivers place the wipers in service mode when the vehicle is parked outdoors, and snow is forecasted. In addition, Kia is planning to develop pop-up cluster warnings that will be temperature-dependent, and they will remind owners to clear snow/ice pre-drive and to place the wipers in service mode post-drive.
In view of Kia\u2019s field action, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. ODI will take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"004","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-03-11T18:47:02Z","nhtsaId":"PE25004","openDate":"2025-04-29T18:15:40Z","status":"C","subject":"Windshield Wiper Failure"},{"id":1837009,"artemisId":101873,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a complaint alleging a compressed natural gas (CNG) fuel leak from a Luxfer Type 4 CNG 60 diesel gallon equivalent (DGE) 26x108 size fuel container. The container was used in a system built and installed by Natural Gas Fuel Systems, LLC, dba Cummins Clean Fuel Technologies (CCFT). A strong odor alerted the driver of the fuel leak, which occurred at a fracture at the fuel container's threaded aluminum alloy fixed end boss.
The fuel container is positioned longitudinally within an enclosure structure that is attached to the truck's passenger side frame rail in a side-mount configuration. The fuel container is held in position relative to the enclosure structure via neck mounting blocks and two aluminum alloy end bosses, each at opposite ends of the fuel container. The threaded fixed end boss is securely held in position, while the other floating end boss has some degree of freedom to allow for normal expansion and contraction with internal pressure and temperature changes.
The complainant reports they are aware of five other trucks purchased by other customers from the same dealership that have experienced the same alleged condition. Furthermore, previous discussions with CCFT have revealed that they are also aware of other similar incidents.
A fuel leak in the presence of an ignition source may result in a fire or explosion. To better understand the frequency, severity and scope of the alleged condition, a Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is being opened. To review the ODI report number cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Numbers document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On June 3, 2022, the O\ufb03ce of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE22005 after the agency received VOQs and several \ufb01eld reports concerning the Auto Idle Stop (AIS) feature on 2016-2019MY Honda Pilot vehicles. The complaints allege that the engine fails to restart on its own from a complete stop at a tra\ufb03c light or road intersection with the AIS function engaged. The subject vehicles are equipped with a 3.5L engine with a 9-speed automatic transmission.
On January 6, 2023, Honda released service bulletins 23-008 and 23-009. These service bulletins address the failure to restart issue in the 2016-2019MY Honda Pilot vehicles, as well as the 2015-2020 Acura TLX, 2016-2020 Acura MDX, 2019-2022 Honda Passport, and 2020-2023 Honda Ridgeline vehicles.
The repair outlined in the service bulletins is a two-stage countermeasure to remedy the issue. The first stage is a Programmed Fuel Injection (\u201cPGM-FI\u201d) software update. The second stage is only deployed if the software update fails to remedy the issue. The second stage, depending on the model and model year, consists of replacement of the starter assembly, starter relays, and a valve adjustment. Additionally, Honda extended the warranty coverage to 10 years with unlimited mileage for vehicles requiring the second stage component replacement.
ODI continues to receive complaints of the AIS failure to restart, with many complainants alleging the campaign countermeasures had been completed. NHTSA has reviewed Honda's Information Request Letter responses involving warranty claims, lawsuits, and consumer complaints in addition to ODI's own data.
This Engineering Analysis is being opened to further consider the potential safety defect, including gathering additional data regarding Honda\u2019s service campaign efficacy. ODI is additionally expanding the scope to encompass all vehicles addressed in Honda\u2019s service bulletins 23-008 and 23-009 as well as newer model year vehicles, which are substantially similar to the vehicles covered by the service campaign. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"004","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-03-26T13:06:29Z","nhtsaId":"EA25004","openDate":"2025-03-26T13:06:29Z","status":"O","subject":"No Restart After Auto Start/Stop Engages"},{"id":1835442,"artemisId":101874,"closeDate":"2026-01-30T21:52:12Z","description":"On March 21, 2025, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation (PE25002) to investigate instances of unexpected transmission downshifting without driver input in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford F-150 vehicles (subject vehicles) manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). The complaints allege that, without warning or driver input, the subject vehicles experienced a sudden and rapid deceleration often accompanied by temporary rear wheel lockup, seizure, or skidding, resulting in a loss of vehicle control that increases the risk of crash and injury to all motorists, including those not within the subject vehicles. The MY 2015 and MY 2016 F-150 vehicles were equipped with the \u201c6R80\u201d transmission, while the MY 2017 vehicles were equipped with either the \u201c6R80\u201d transmission or the \u201c10R80\u201d transmission. This investigation was limited to MY 2015-2017 Ford F-150 with the \u201c6R80\u201d transmission.
ODI identified 329 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) related to this investigation and sixty percent of these consumers were interviewed to confirm the details of their allegations. Consumers reported that their vehicles\u2019 transmission suddenly downshifted to a lower gear, often to 1st or 2nd gear, without driver input or advance warning. Consumers described the downshift events to be regular and repeated occurrences, with some consumers stating that they no longer drive the vehicle due to safety concerns. Forty-three percent of consumers reported experiencing at least one wheel lockup event, during which the rear tires locked, screeched, or skidded during the transmission downshift. ODI also found that 114 of the 329 consumers reported having their vehicle\u2019s molded lead frame or valve body assembly (which comes with a molded lead frame) replaced, 80 of which were confirmed through consumer submitted repair invoices.
In its response to ODI\u2019s Information Request, Ford provided an assessment of potential root cause of failure for the subject vehicles and how this failure is different from the failure associated with MY 2011-2014 Ford F-150 vehicles that was addressed by four safety recalls (16V-248, 19V-075, 19V-433, and 24V-444). Ford has identified that the defect in the recalled vehicle population involved lead frame supplier production issues resulting in signal loss from the Output Shaft Speed (OSS) sensor. Ford has identified that the alleged defect in the subject vehicle population involved degradation of electrical connections within the lead frame due to thermal cycling and vibration over extended time in service resulting in signal loss from the Transmission Range Sensor (TRS).
Signal loss from the TRS can result in an unintended shift to neutral, unintended upshift, or unintended downshift which are regulated by a gear \u201cshift map\u201d based on the vehicle\u2019s speed at the time of signal loss. According to Ford\u2019s \u201cshift map\u201d, at speeds between 35-64 mph, the maximum allowable downshift would be to 2nd gear (i.e. a 6th to 2nd gear downshift event) which Ford has designated to represent the worst-case scenario for subject vehicles. Ford has also acknowledged that the worst-case scenario may also involve temporary wheel lockup. However, Ford has stated that the failure mechanism in the MY 2011-2014 F-150 vehicles\u2014previously addressed through recalls\u2014primarily involved OSS sensor signal loss that could result in 6th to 1st gear downshift events. This OSS-related failure mode is distinct from the TRS-related signal loss identified in the subject vehicle population.
ODI has identified an additional potential safety defect associated with the alleged defect in the subject vehicles. Preliminary testing performed by NHTSA\u2019s Vehicle Research Test Center (VRTC) showed that when the TRS experiences an intermittent signal loss, one possible outcome is a change in vehicle direction. Specifically, if a vehicle is operating in reverse up an incline when the TRS signal loss occurs, then the vehicle may shift into neutral causing the vehicle to change directions and roll forward.
Based on NHTSA\u2019s analysis of consumer data, information provided by Ford, and preliminary testing conducted by NHTSA\u2019s VRTC, this Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA26001). During this Engineering Analysis, the agency plans to, among other things, perform component-level testing and vehicle testing, as well as review additional technical information to better understand the alleged defect that has been identified from this Preliminary Evaluation. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identi\ufb01cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-01-30T21:52:12Z","nhtsaId":"PE25002","openDate":"2025-03-21T16:56:06Z","status":"C","subject":"Unintended Transmission Downshift and Rear Wheel Lock-up"},{"id":1828897,"artemisId":101847,"closeDate":"2026-09-18T16:36:48Z","description":"On November 23, 2022, American Honda Motor Co. (Honda) filed recall 22V-867 to address a loss of the Rear-View Camera (RVC) function in model year (MY) 2017-2019 Honda Ridgeline vehicles. On May 3, 2024 Honda filed another recall, 24V-321, relating to the loss of the RVC function in MY 2020-2024 Honda Ridgeline vehicles. The production parts recalled under 24V-321 and the parts used for the remedy in 22V-867 used the same supplier and materials for critical components in the RVC wire harness. As such, on June 26, 2024, ODI opened Recall Query RQ24011 to investigate the long-term suitability of the remedy in recall 22V-867. After receiving 14 total reports of RVC wire harness failures in vehicles that received the remedy for recall 22V-867, NHTSA upgraded the RQ investigation to this Engineering Analysis (EA25003) to further assess these failures.
Recall 22V-867 states that the RVC wire harness was manufactured with a protective corrugated tubing that was insufficient to protect against bending wear and zip ties that were insufficiently tightened and would not keep the protective tubing in place. The consequence is that the RVC wire harness may fatigue and break after the tailgate is repeatedly opened and closed. This ultimately results in the failure of the RVC to display an image due to a lack of connectivity. Honda\u2019s remedy, as identified in the recall filing, was a replacement harness with longer protective corrugated tubing and sufficiently tightened zip ties. This remedy part was also installed as a production part in certain MY 2019 Ridgeline vehicles.
Recall 24V-321 states that the RVC wire harness was manufactured with a material which was susceptible to breakage upon repeated opening and closing of the tailgate, which ultimately leads to a complete loss of RVC function. Honda\u2019s remedy identified in the recall filing was a replacement harness manufactured by a new supplier with improved material properties to withstand wear from bending. Since the remedy parts for recall 22V-867 and the production parts recalled under 24V-321 use the same supplier and materials for critical components in the RVC wire harness, ODI opened this investigation.
To date, ODI has received 4 allegations of RVC failures. Honda reported a total of 27 complaints of RVC failure. ODI\u2019s analysis of these reports revealed that the majority of these reports are related to different failure modes within the RVC or harness. Thus, these reports cannot be attributed to the durability concern being assessed in this investigation.
During the investigation, ODI utilized NHTSA\u2019s Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC) to analyze further the potential safety related consequence and frequency of the alleged failures. VRTC surveyed owners of the subject vehicles in Ohio to collect additional information on the presence of RVC wire harness failures in vehicles subject to recall 22V-867. VRTC also performed inspections of select vehicles identified from the survey responses. The survey responses received and results of inspections did not show any RVC failures resulting from wire harness damage. Additionally, VRTC completed durability testing on the subject wire harness in an attempt to duplicate the failure mode. The test results indicated that the subject part is not expected to fail within a reasonable vehicle life span.
As a result of ODI\u2019s analysis of the field data and available test data, this Engineering Analysis is being closed without further action. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"003","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2026-09-18T16:36:48Z","nhtsaId":"EA25003","openDate":"2025-02-11T22:08:44Z","status":"C","subject":"Rear-View Camera Failure"},{"id":1823150,"artemisId":101834,"description":"On March 7, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24008) to assess reports of inadvertent activation of the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system in model year 2019-2022 Honda Insight and 2019-2022 Honda Passport vehicles. The complainants allege activation of the AEB system with no apparent obstruction in the vehicle's path, resulting in rapid vehicle deceleration.
Honda indicated that it is aware of a total of 412 reports that may relate to the alleged defect. Honda provided analysis of the alleged defect and stated that some customers possibly had an inadequate understanding of the AEB system and its limitations. However, many consumer complaints received by ODI allege that Honda dealerships were unable to reproduce the condition or state that Honda dealerships informed the consumer that this is considered normal AEB operation.
To date, ODI has received a total of 106 consumer complaints of inadvertent activation of AEB in the subject vehicles. In total, ODI reviewed 475 reports involving vehicles with unique VINs that may relate to the alleged defect. Of the reports reviewed by ODI, three (3) allege a crash caused by the inadvertent activation of AEB and two (2) allege injury.
This Engineering Analysis is being opened to further assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety related consequences of the inadvertent AEB activations. Further, the scope of the investigation is being expanded to include assessment of model year 2023 Honda Passport vehicles. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-01-17T20:06:42Z","nhtsaId":"EA25002","openDate":"2025-01-17T20:06:42Z","status":"O","subject":"Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking"},{"id":1823151,"artemisId":101843,"description":"On April 25, 2024, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance.
In its response to ODI\u2019s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles.
For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle\u2019s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination.
In addition to reviewing Ford\u2019s response to ODI\u2019s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford\u2019s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information.
In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles\u2019 event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency\u2019s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle.
Based on NHTSA\u2019s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Engineering Analysis (EA) is being opened to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers\u2019 ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-01-17T16:39:25Z","nhtsaId":"EA25001","openDate":"2025-01-17T16:39:25Z","status":"O","subject":"Collisions Involving Ford BlueCruise"},{"id":1820729,"artemisId":101836,"closeDate":"2025-10-23T18:24:09Z","description":"On January 16, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE25001 after receiving complaints and field reports concerning engine failures in MY2019-2024 GM\u2019s full-size truck and SUV T1XX platform equipped with the L87 6.2L V8 engine. These complainants alleged engine bearing failures resulting in knocking and growling noises from the engine\u2019s bottom end and in some cases more severe consequences such as broken connecting rods leading to engine damage, or engine failure. If the engine fails during vehicle operation, the vehicle will lose propulsion, increasing the risk of a crash.
On April 24, 2025, GM issued recall 25V-274 to address the concern with L87 engines produced between March 1, 2021, and May 31, 2024. GM cited the root cause as a supplier manufacturing and quality issues. GM\u2019s recall remedy will be either an oil change to an oil with a different viscosity or engine replacement depending on the results of the remedy inspection procedure.
To date, ODI has received 1,157 allegations of engine bearing failure. GM submitted 55,464 reports in total, with 29,752 unique VINs.
ODI continues to receive allegations of L87 engine failures which fall outside of the scope of recall 25V-274. Based on GM\u2019s recall, ODI will close this PE. NHTSA will continue to investigate complaints of engine failure outside the scope of recall 25V-274 as part of Engineering Analysis (EA25007).
To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"001","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"25","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-23T18:24:09Z","nhtsaId":"PE25001","openDate":"2025-01-16T19:03:12Z","status":"C","subject":"Loss of motive power due to engine failure"},{"id":1820281,"artemisId":101833,"closeDate":"2026-04-03T13:52:06Z","description":"On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away.
Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user\u2019s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards.
During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app.
On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation.
In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates.
Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
","investigationNumber":"033","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2026-04-03T13:52:06Z","nhtsaId":"PE24033","openDate":"2025-01-06T21:23:06Z","status":"C","subject":"Actually Smart Summon sessions resulting in low-speed impacts."},{"id":1817750,"artemisId":101755,"description":"On September 28, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23017) to assess reports of inadvertent activation of the Front Assist automatic emergency braking (AEB) system in model year (MY) 2018-2019 Volkswagen Atlas vehicles. The reports alleged that activation of the AEB system occurred while driving with no apparent obstruction in the vehicle's forward path, resulting in sudden vehicle deceleration.
Volkswagen indicated that it is aware of a total of 226 reports that may relate to the alleged defect in MY 2019 Volkswagen Atlas vehicles. Volkswagen stated that some customers possibly had an inadequate understanding of Front Assist and its limitations. However, many consumer complaints alleged that Volkswagen dealerships were unable to reproduce the condition or stated that Volkswagen dealerships informed the consumers that this braking is considered normal Front Assist operation.
ODI's analysis shows that MY 2019 Volkswagen Atlas vehicles have the highest rate of unique incident reports alleging AEB inadvertent activation when compared to their Volkswagen peers.
To date, ODI has received a total of 44 consumer complaints of inadvertent activation of Front Assist in MY 2019 Volkswagen Atlas vehicles. In total, ODI reviewed 187 unique (i.e., non-duplicative Vehicle Identification Numbers) reports that may relate to the alleged defect, which include four reports on injury incidents and one report involving a crash.
PE23017 has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis to further assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety-related consequences of inadvertent AEB activations in MY 2019 Volkswagen Atlas vehicles.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"004","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-12-18T20:16:05Z","nhtsaId":"EA24004","openDate":"2024-12-18T20:16:05Z","status":"O","subject":"Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking"},{"id":1810140,"artemisId":101764,"closeDate":"2025-07-23T14:42:19Z","description":"On November 22, 2023, the O\ufb03ce of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE) PE23021 to investigate complaints of front seat belt retractor pretensioner inadvertent deployment in model year (MY) 2019 Ford Expedition vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company. Some complaints alleged hearing a loud, explosion-like sound immediately followed by the seat belt tightening around the occupant\u2019s torso area. The complaints did not state that a crash occurred that may have resulted in the deployment of the pretensioner system, suggesting that this deployment was inadvertent or otherwise unwarranted.
On February 9, 2024, Ford issued safety recall 24V-099, recalling certain MY 2018-2020 Ford Expedition and Lincoln Navigator vehicles equipped with driver and front passenger seat belt retractor pretensioners built between October 1, 2018, and June 30, 2019. Ford described the defect as a seat belt retractor pretensioner assembly that may develop corroded squib pins, resulting in high resistance or an open circuit, which could result in an inadvertent deployment of a pretensioner and an increased risk of injury due to the loss of the pretensioner\u2019s protection and a seat belt that remains in the locked position. This recall includes 77,574 vehicles.
On November 15, 2024, ODI opened this Recall Query (RQ24015) after receiving 3 complaints involving vehicles not included in recall 23V-099 but that alleged a similar failure. As a result of this investigation, Ford issued safety recall 25V-197 on March 28, 2025, to expand the scope of 24V-099 to include MY 2018-2020 Ford Expedition and Lincoln Navigator vehicles equipped with driver and front passenger seat belt retractor pretensioners built between October 1, 2018, and July 31, 2020. This recall includes 105,322 vehicles, some of which are also included in 24V-099. Additionally, on May 23, 2025, Ford issued 25V-197 Amendment #1, which further expands the recall population\u2019s scope for vehicles with build dates of September 2018. This amendment added 7,627 additional vehicles to the 25V-197 population.
In response to ODI\u2019s inquiries in RQ24015, Ford indicated that it cannot conclusively determine the root cause of the relevant failure. Ford was able to determine that certain pretensioners may develop corroded squib pins potentially resulting in inadvertent deployment, but it was unable to specify the cause of corrosion. Without a speci\ufb01c root cause, Ford assessed \ufb01eld performance of pretensioners to determine the scope of the recalls.
ODI is aware of three vehicles that experienced pretensioner inadvertent deployment that are not included in either 25V-197 or 24V-099. Two of these vehicles are MY 2018 Lincoln Navigator vehicles built prior to October 1, 2018, and both experienced failures after more than six years of use/exposure while the recalled vehicles experienced higher rate of failures with less exposure. The remaining incident involves a MY 2021 Ford Expedition that was built after July 31, 2020. ODI is not aware of any other relevant failures in vehicles built after July 31, 2020. As such, ODI has not currently identified a safety defect trend for this issue in vehicles outside of the recalled populations. ODI will continue to monitor allegations of pretensioner inadvertent deployment in subject vehicles that are not included in 25V-197.
In view of the safety recall action being taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Recall Query (RQ24015). The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identi\ufb01cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"015","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-07-23T14:42:19Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24015","openDate":"2024-11-15T22:05:11Z","status":"C","subject":"Seat Belt Retractor Pretensioner Inadvertent Deployment"},{"id":1810139,"artemisId":101760,"closeDate":"2025-10-10T14:34:51Z","description":"On January 31, 2024, The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24002) to investigate loss of motive power allegations in model year (MY) 2021 Ford Bronco Sport vehicles. Consumers reported a loss of engine power accompanied by complete electrical system failure either while driving or after stopping at a traffic light or stop sign. The vehicles generally could not be restarted, and the incidents were commonly diagnosed by dealerships to a failed 12-Volt (12V) battery.
On April 12, 2024, Ford issued safety recall 24V-267 covering 456,565 MY 2021-2024 Ford Bronco Sport and MY 2022-2023 Ford Maverick vehicles. The recall addressed loss of motive power resulting from sudden degradation of the 12V battery during the drive cycle. The recall remedy consisted of software updates to the body control module and the powertrain control module. The updated software aimed to provide warning to consumers when the battery is failing and inhibit certain vehicle functions which can lead to loss of motive power incidents. Additionally, Ford removed the existing 12V Enhanced Flooded Battery (EFB) as both a service component for the subject vehicles and original equipment for newly built Bronco Sport vehicles (during MY 2024 production), replacing it with a more robust absorbed glass mat (AGM) battery. The same AGM battery had been incorporated into Ford Maverick production in late 2022.
Following recall 24V-267, ODI received loss of motive power complaints in vehicles that had previously received Ford\u2019s software-based remedy. Consumers reported that they did not receive warnings related to the 12V battery or the vehicle\u2019s electrical system before the loss of power. On November 15, 2024, ODI opened Recall Query (RQ24014) to assess the effectiveness of the 24V-267 recall remedy.
On January 19, 2025, Ford issued recall 25V-019 covering 272,817 MY 2021-2023 Bronco Sport and MY 2022-2023 Ford Maverick vehicles. The new recall addressed the same hazard as 24V-267 but required replacement of the existing 12V battery with an AGM battery as the remedy. Ford reported that following the opening of RQ24014, it evaluated several field-returned 12V batteries, and determined that EFBs produced by battery supplier Camel potentially contained internal manufacturing defects causing loss of motive power. Ford further concluded that the software updates provided in the 24V-267 recall remedy were unable to detect battery failures quickly enough to avoid loss of motive power.
Vehicles previously within the scope of recall 24V-267, but outside of the scope of recall 25V-019, are equipped with EFBs produced by a different battery supplier (Clarios). When recall 25V-019 was issued, Ford had not identified any Clarios EFBs exhibiting the same failure mode as the Camel EFBs. In light of Ford\u2019s recall action, ODI is closing this Recall Query. The agency will continue to monitor loss of motive power complaints in Bronco Sport vehicles equipped with Clarios EFBs and reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"014","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-10T14:34:51Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24014","openDate":"2024-11-15T17:59:31Z","status":"C","subject":"Loss of Motive Power"},{"id":1808717,"artemisId":101761,"closeDate":"2025-08-20T14:11:36Z","description":"On November 8, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Recall Query RQ24013 to assess the scope of Honda recall 23V-751 after receiving complaints that alleged connecting rod bearing failures in vehicles that were not within the scope of recall 23V-751. In November 2023, Honda recalled 248,999 various Model Year (MY)2016\u20132020 Honda and Acura vehicles equipped with the 3.5L V6 engine. Honda recalled these vehicles due to a crankshaft manufacturing defect that caused premature connecting rod bearing wear and engine seizure.
While the out-of-scope failures involved in these complaints appear to have a very similar failure mechanism as the recalled engines, a thorough analysis of all available data from Honda has not indicated that the same manufacturing defect exists in the out-of-scope engines as the engines recalled by 23V-751. Based on this analysis ODI has determined that Honda has properly defined the scope of recall 23V-751. Consequently, ODI will close this RQ investigation. NHTSA will continue to investigate these complaints of engine failure as part of a new Preliminary Evaluation Investigation (PE25008).
The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances.
","investigationNumber":"013","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-08-20T14:11:36Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24013","openDate":"2024-11-08T16:28:02Z","status":"C","subject":"Engine failure"},{"id":1807562,"artemisId":101759,"closeDate":"2025-06-10T12:59:01Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) on November 6, 2024, to investigate Electric Vehicle Distribution Module (EVDM) connector plate separation on model year (MY) 2020-2025 Freightliner eCascadia and MY2022-2025 Freightliner eM2 electric trucks. The EVDM connector plate contains multiple safety-related circuits including Anti-lock Brake System (ABS), stability control and vehicle protective mechanisms to de-energize the high-voltage propulsion system.
In January 2025, prior to Daimler Truck North America's (DTNA) final response to ODI's Information Request (IR) letter, DTNA conducted controlled testing of the EVDM. The final test results demonstrated that in certain circumstances of EVDM separation, the vehicle may lose motive power without prior warning to the driver. Based on the EVDM testing results, DTNA filed a recall (NHTSA ID 25V-046). This recall covers MY2020-2025 Freightliner eCascadia and MY2022-2026 Freightliner eM2 electric trucks. These vehicles will have the EVDM replaced if the plate shows separation from the housing. The recall chronology identified that DTNA had received nine warranty claims and six field reports for this issue.
This Preliminary Evaluation has been closed as a result of the manufacturer filing recall 25V-046. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.
","investigationNumber":"032","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-06-10T12:59:01Z","nhtsaId":"PE24032","openDate":"2024-11-05T13:09:13Z","status":"C","subject":"EVDM connector plate separation"},{"id":1803193,"artemisId":101753,"closeDate":"2026-03-18T21:10:45Z","description":"On October 17, 2024, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla\u2019s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla\u2019s assessment of their safety impact.
Tesla\u2019s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself.
During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla\u2019s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI\u2019s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes.
When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough \u201cdirect photon-counting\u201d capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system.
ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla\u2019s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla\u2019s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path.
Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period.
Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla\u2019s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred.
ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter.
The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
","investigationNumber":"031","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2026-03-18T21:10:45Z","nhtsaId":"PE24031","openDate":"2024-10-17T21:14:21Z","status":"C","subject":"FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions"},{"id":1802091,"artemisId":101754,"closeDate":"2026-02-02T21:17:02Z","description":"On October 11, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24030) to assess alleged failures of the rear-view camera in Model Year (MY) 2019 Ford Flex vehicles. Complaints submitted to NHTSA through Vehicle Online Questionnaires (VOQs), reviewed by ODI, report blank, distorted, or inverted rear-view camera images when in reverse. An inverted or upside-down image can provide false information to the driver increasing the risk of a crash. To date, ODI has received 85 VOQ complaints and additional EWR Field Reports with these allegations for MY 2019 Ford Flex vehicles.
During the investigation, ODI found that the MY 2019 Ford Flex vehicle and certain peer vehicles including MY 2015-2018 Flex, MY 2019 Fiesta, Taurus, and Lincoln MKT vehicles are equipped with Magna analog rear-view-only cameras.
On December 20, 2024, Ford filed Recall 24V-951 covering 30,715 MY 2019 Ford Flex, Ford Fiesta, and Lincoln MKT vehicles in which the rear-view camera may intermittently display a blank or distorted image. The dealers will replace the rear-view camera for vehicles in the recall population. Per the recall chronology, teardown of three cameras identified fractured solder joints between the microcontroller and the printed circuit board. Ford indicated that other causal factors are being investigated and asserted that the defect is contained within the camera.
ODI found that certain peer vehicles excluded from Recall 24V-951 showed a high rate of VOQ complaints. Also, ODI identified reports produced by Ford that indicate the peer vehicles have the same issue as the subject vehicles. To address ODI\u2019s concern, Ford analyzed some field-returned cameras, as well as Ford\u2019s field data and ODI\u2019s VOQ data. Ford stated it did not identify a specific root cause in the Magna supplied cameras. However, on October 13, 2025, Ford filed Recall 25V-695 covering 1,448,655 vehicles of various Ford/Lincoln models equipped with Magna supplied cameras. The cameras demonstrate the same blank or distorted images that prompted Recall 24V-951. It should be noted that Ford is conducting a recall of those vehicles by model/model year that exhibit VOQ complaint rates greater than 10 per 100,000 vehicles. For the remaining vehicles (rates less than 10/100K), Ford is providing a warranty extension (15 years/unlimited miles). Ford has stated that the differences in the rates (field performance) are likely due to the differences in the camera related hardware, such as the wiring harness type that are specific by vehicle model/model year.
In view of Ford filing Recall 24V-951 and Recall 25V-695 addressing the subject of this investigation, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"030","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2026-02-02T21:17:02Z","nhtsaId":"PE24030","openDate":"2024-10-11T13:33:15Z","status":"C","subject":"Rear-view Camera Failure"},{"id":1801885,"artemisId":101752,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received twenty-three complaints alleging excessive frame flex on model year 2017-2023 Grand Design fifth wheel recreational trailers, models Momentum and Solitude. Twenty-two of the complaints allege that excessive frame flex resulted in a cargo or entry door opening while in transit, some with objects lost on roadways, while six complaints also state that slideouts extended out partially.
ODI has been in contact with both Grand Design and Lippert, the frame manufacturer. Grand Design believes that some frame flex, generally considered to be vertical movement in the upper deck area of the fifth wheel, is normal. However, Grand Design has developed a technical service bulletin (TSB), to evaluate concerns of excessive frame flex, defined as vertical movement greater than 3/8 inch. Per Grand Design, the frame flex is only occurring in the upper deck area of the fifth wheel and is resulting in cosmetic defects such as moving sidewalls, damage to cabinets, binding doors, etc. However, Lippert believes that the effects of frame flex may also extend back to the front axle of the trailer. While Lippert provides frames for multiple trailer manufacturers, the majority of complaints are for these Grand Design products.
Cargo and entry doors that open and slideouts that extend while in transit increase the risk of injury or a crash. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to evaluate the severity of the potential problem and to determine whether an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety exists.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"029","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-10-09T14:29:00Z","nhtsaId":"PE24029","openDate":"2024-10-09T14:29:00Z","status":"O","subject":"Frame Flex on Grand Design Fifth Wheel Recreational Trailers"},{"id":1800879,"artemisId":101751,"closeDate":"2025-06-05T17:02:19Z","description":"On October 3, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened PE24028 to investigate alleged failures of Enel X Way's JuiceBox Level 2 residential EV chargers. The allegations were described as thermal incidents and electrical malfunctions, which could trip the circuit breakers in Juicebox owners\u2019 homes and disrupt electric vehicle charge cycles.
On October 2, 2024, Enel X Way posted on its website that Enel X Way North America would cease operations in the United States and Canada on October 11, 2024. The closure would potentially impact the charging app and supporting software.
ODI sent Enel X Way an Information Request (IR) letter on October 21, 2024. Enel X Way provided an incomplete response to the IR on December 9, 2024. Enel X Way later provided a complete response to the IR on January 24, 2025.
ODI reviewed Enel X Way\u2019s IR submissions to determine whether further action is required. Based on ODI\u2019s analysis, there was no clear trend in the cause of the failures described in customer complaints and warranty reports. Additionally, there have been no recent reports alleging safety issues. The available information does not warrant further action at this time.
The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency will continue to monitor for any safety trends and reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in this Closing Resume, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"028","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-06-05T17:02:19Z","nhtsaId":"PE24028","openDate":"2024-10-03T19:11:33Z","status":"C","subject":"Electrical arcing and thermal events, potentially leading to fires, while utilizing Enel X Way USA, LLC's JuiceBox residential charger."},{"id":1800062,"artemisId":101750,"closeDate":"2025-10-30T19:35:20Z","description":"On October 3, 2024, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation to investigate instances of rear brake hose ruptures causing a sudden and unexpected loss of braking in model year (MY) 2015-2017 Ford Edge vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company. The complaints allege that, without warning, the vehicle lost its ability to brake causing an unanticipated increase in the vehicle\u2019s stopping distance. The complaints also allege that, prior to the rear brake hose rupture event, the vehicle had been serviced under recall 20V-469.
Recall 20V469 involved MY 2015-2018 Ford Edge and MY 2016-2018 Lincoln MKX vehicles which may experience front brake hose ruptures causing increased brake pedal travel and a reduction in the rate of deceleration. Ford identified the cause of this safety defect as a consistent localized failure of the internal reinforcement braid of the brake hose due to cyclic fatigue via tensile/bending and torsional inputs during suspension and steering articulations. Ford also identified that only 88% of suspension articulation was utilized on the front brake hose test rig during life cycle testing. These findings, along with ODI\u2019s identification of an emerging trend involving rear brake hose ruptures, prompted the opening of this investigation.
ODI identified 64 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires related to this investigation, 2 involving a crash. These consumers were interviewed and reported experiencing sudden loss of braking ability while traveling at low and highway speeds without any prior warning such as a \u201clow brake fluid\u201d warning indicator. Consumers reported that, as they tried to stop their vehicle, the brake pedal traveling to the floorboard and the vehicle required more stopping distance than anticipated or considered normal. Consumers also observed brake fluid present on the rear tires and roadway near the rear tires immediately after the incident. Some consumers provided photographs of the rear brake hose ruptures which depicted a similar rupture pattern and location (near the crimp on the dynamic section of the brake hose). 1 photograph showed an installation alignment mark pulled out near the crimp suggesting exposure to unanticipated tensile forces pulling the hose away from the crimp.
During this investigation, Ford responded to Information Request Letters detailing information such as warranty claim data, brake hose specifications and engineering drawings, production part changes logs, and Ford\u2019s assessments of potential root cause. Ford reported that the front and rear brake jounce hoses equipped on the subject vehicle population utilized the same construction and material. Therefore, Ford\u2019s analysis consisted of a comparison between the front and rear hoses demonstrating that the rear hose bend radii in full jounce and full rebound were larger than the front hose. Ford also described that the two hoses are exposed to different loading environments as the rear brake hose is exposed to suspension inputs only, while the front hose is exposed to both suspension and steering inputs; thus, the rear hose is subjected to lower tension and fatigue loads. However, it is important to point out that larger bend radii alone do not necessarily mean a brake hose can withstand the dynamic loading requirements of a brake hose (as discussed earlier, the defect identified in the front brake hoses were attributed to the hose material). Rear brake hose failures were identified through exemplar vehicle and parts inspections conducted by NHTSA\u2019s Vehicle Research and Testing Center.
Ford stated that its investigation did not identify any specific or common root cause for this safety defect, and that brake hoses can fail for many reasons including contact with road debris, improper vehicle servicing, and fatigue, as well as vehicle age and miles in service. Based on its assessment of failure rates and warranty claims, Ford concluded that the rear brake hose ruptures did not present an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety because consumers would experience a progressive leak accompanied by a red brake warning indicator within the instrument panel and would not experience a total loss of braking due to the diagonally split brake system. Note that these assessments are contrary to the consumer experiences described above. As previously described, consumers described a sudden, unexpected loss of braking ability with no prior warning in their instrument cluster (not a progressive leak) and an increase in anticipated vehicle stopping distance (presenting an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety). ODI conveyed these perspectives and investigative findings to Ford during a technical discussion on July 23, 2025.
On August 22, 2025, Ford submitted recall 25V-544 which included MY 2015-2018 Ford Edge and MY 2016-2018 Lincoln MKX vehicles, for a total recall population of 499,129 vehicles. As described in the Part 573, in September 2024, Ford concluded that this concern did not present an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and closed its investigation into allegations involving rear brake jounce hose ruptures within this vehicle population. Ford reopened this investigation in July 2025 following the technical discussion with ODI referenced above. Ford identified the safety defect as a rupture of the rear brake jounce hose resulting in an increase in pedal travel and increase in vehicle stopping distance elevating the risk of a crash. To date, Ford has not fully determined the root cause of this safety defect and is currently working to develop a remedy program.
In view of the recall action taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identi\ufb01cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"027","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-30T19:35:20Z","nhtsaId":"PE24027","openDate":"2024-10-03T13:56:40Z","status":"C","subject":"Loss of braking caused by rear brake hose failure"},{"id":1797201,"artemisId":101748,"closeDate":"2025-04-22T14:51:01Z","description":"On April 18, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a Defect Petition (DP) requesting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) investigate Nuna Rava child seats for a harness that can allegedly loosen without pressing the harness release button. The Petitioner stated there were 24 complaints in the NHTSA database all describing a similar issue. According to the Petitioner, \"this condition has poor detectability and the consequence of failure in case of a crash would be severe or fatal injury\".
On April 25, 2024, ODI received a second DP requesting NHTSA investigate Nuna child seats for a similar allegation as the initial petition.
Upon receiving these petitions, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Nuna on May 16, 2024, asking for information regarding the petitioners\u2019 allegations. Nuna responded to ODI\u2019s IR letter on June 21, 2024. On July 18, 2024, Nuna submitted a supplemental response to ODI\u2019s IR letter.
After evaluating the petitioner\u2019s allegations and Nuna\u2019s responses to ODI\u2019s IR letter, ODI decided to grant the petition and open this defect investigation.
On September 18, 2024 ODI opened PE24026 on the 2020-2022 Nuna Rava child seats. These seats had significantly higher failure rates than other model year Nuna Rava child seats analyzed in the DP IR response.
Following a meeting with ODI to discuss precedent recalls from peer manufacturers, Nuna filed recall 24C-002 on November 27th, 2024. This recall affected Nuna Rava child seats manufactured from July 16, 2016, to October 25, 2023, which covered the entire scope of PE24026. After submitting this recall, Nuna requested relief from responding to a new IR letter ODI sent on October 24, 2024 for PE24026. ODI granted partial relief but required Nuna to respond to some of the requests. After receiving recall 24C-002 and Nuna\u2019s partial PE24026 IR response, ODI is closing this investigation with recall 24C-002. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"026","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-04-22T14:51:01Z","nhtsaId":"PE24026","openDate":"2024-09-18T14:18:25Z","status":"C","subject":"Child seat harness may not restrain occupant in the event of a crash."},{"id":1795585,"artemisId":101747,"closeDate":"2025-10-21T13:22:58Z","description":"On September 10, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE) 24025 to assess allegations of lane departures with the Lane Keep Assist (LKA) system engaged in Model Year (MY) 2023 through 2024 VinFast VF8 vehicles. The reports further alleged that the system exhibited difficulty detecting lanes on the roadway and, under certain conditions, provided improper steering inputs that resulted in an inconsistent control effort required by the driver, potentially elevating the risk of a crash or injury. To date, ODI has received a total of 17 related Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) of the LKA system in the subject vehicles.
As a part of the investigation, NHTSA\u2019s Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC) replicated the VOQ- reported conditions in a MY 2024 VinFast VF8. VRTC documented that two conditions within the MY 2024 VinFast VF8 LKA system may induce the vehicle to deviate laterally outside of the intended travel lane when navigating sweeping roadway curves. First, during sweeping turns, the steering wheel force required may abruptly change mid-turn, altering the steering wheel force equilibrium between driver input and roadway force, potentially causing the driver to unintentionally steer excessively leading vehicle to cross over its lane boundaries. Second, the LKA system may apply steering inputs to maintain the curve that move the vehicle toward the inside lane line and, in some cases, across the lane boundary, increasing the risk of a collision.
On August 27, 2025, VinFast filed NHTSA Recall No. 25V-559 to address the safety-related defect in the LKA system. This recall consists of a software update that is intended to refine the system\u2019s steering control and improve the overall driving smoothness. Specifically, the software update will: (i) reduce steering wheel vibration during the activation of the vehicle\u2019s advance driver-assistance system (ADAS); (ii) make it easier for the driver to override the ADAS; and (iii) smooth the transition between an active and inactive LKA system, so that driver inputs deactivating the system may not cause unintended vehicle maneuvers.
Because this recall action is taken by VinFast, ODI is closing PE24025. NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The opening resume identified VOQ #11585817 as a fatal crash involving a vehicle roadway departure at high speed. ODI\u2019s analysis found the crash conditions are not consistent with those observed during VRTC testing for this investigation. The subject vehicle\u2019s Event Data Recorder (EDR) sustained fire damage during the collision, rendering the recorded data inaccessible at this time. ODI has no evidence linking this crash to the LKA behavior identified in PE24025 and will continue to monitor for any additional information that might warrant further assessment of this incident.
","investigationNumber":"025","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-21T13:22:58Z","nhtsaId":"PE24025","openDate":"2024-09-10T20:18:28Z","status":"C","subject":"Lane Keep Assist System"},{"id":1794452,"artemisId":101744,"closeDate":"2026-09-24T19:27:57Z","description":"On September 6, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE24024 to investigate allegations of engine compartment fires in model year 2021-2023 Jeep Wrangler and Gladiator vehicles. Most reports described fires starting on the front passenger side of the engine compartment while the vehicle was turned off, with several originating specifically at the electrohydraulic power steering pump's electrical connector.
Following the opening of the investigation, ODI sent an information request letter to the vehicle manufacturer to assess the cause, scope, and frequency of the alleged defect. Additionally, ODI continued to receive reports of vehicle fires with a likely origin at or near the power steering pump. Throughout this investigation, ODI continued to discuss these new reports and the information request letter response with the manufacturer.
On June 4, 2026, FCA issued recall 26V363 to address power steering fires caused by high electrical resistance at the pump's connector. Recall 26V363 includes the 781,459 vehicles identified in the opening resume of this investigation and expands the population to include all 2021-2025 Jeep Wrangler and Gladiator vehicles produced between June 24, 2020, and December 2, 2024.This recall directly covers the vehicles and issues examined in this investigation. Accordingly, ODI is closing this investigation and is not requiring FCA to provide any additional information about this issue at this time. The Agency will continue to monitor field performance and reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition from Eric Hein, Director of the Institute for Safer Trucking dated July 3, 2024, requesting an investigation of all van-type (also known as box) semi-trailers due to collisions with passenger vehicles and other vulnerable road users (pedestrians, bicyclists, or motorcyclists) resulting in significant injuries or death due to the lack of side underride guards (SUGs). On August 26, 2024, NHTSA opened Defect Petition DP24004 to evaluate the petitioner\u2019s request. No trailer manufacturer or equipment supplier was identified as the specific subject of the petition. The petition itself can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11599188.
Currently, a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) requiring side underride guards on semi-trailers does not exist. The petitioner contends that a failure to include side underride guards equates to a safety defect in the semi-trailer\u2019s design, construction and performance. ODI was petitioned in 2021 for this same issue and, after evaluation, denied the request (DP21004). The petitioner here states that evidence of SUG effectiveness to prevent fatalities and mitigate serious injuries \u201chas continued to accumulate\u201d since the denial of DP21004. The petitioner also alleges that \u201c[d]espite a high severity of risk resulting in frequent severe or fatal injuries from side underride crashes, NHTSA has taken no action to investigate recalling semi-trailers without SUGs.\u201d
Pursuant to the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), NHTSA published an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that summarized and requested comment on a 2022 NHTSA report with an analysis of potential effects of a requirement for side underride guards on new trailers and semitrailers. 88 Fed. Reg. 24536 (Apr. 21, 2023). NHTSA\u2019s Office of Rulemaking is currently reviewing over 2,000 comments received. Also pursuant to the IIJA, on June 18, 2024, the NHTSA-facilitated Advisory Committee on Underride Protection (ACUP) issued its biennial report to Congress and the Secretary of Transportation. This biennial report consists of a majority report and a minority report summarizing its work to provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary on safety regulations related to underride crashes that have caused severe injury and death. Though the committee\u2019s charter was extended through June 2025, the committee concluded its work following the publication of the biennial report in June 2024.
In addition, NHTSA previously announced several actions related to truck trailer underride safety, including improving data collection of underride crashes by recommending inclusion of underride data in state crash data systems and by providing educational materials to state and local police departments on identifying and recording underride crashes. ODI also actively participates in the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) events where it has encouraged law enforcement to report underride crashes, and proposed CVSA focus on underride guards during the 2024 Operation Road Check, a nationwide 72-hour safety blitz. NHTSA is, further, conducting research on rear impact guard designs that better protect occupants of passenger vehicles in even more rear underride crash scenarios. And NHTSA, with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, published a pamphlet in August 2022\u2014which was distributed to law enforcement through various channels\u2014that explains how to identify and record such crashes (this pamphlet is available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/les/2022-08/Underride-Crash- Pamphlet_071522_v6atag.pdf).
ODI searched its databases and found no injury or fatality trend specific to any make, model, or model year trailer within Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) and Early Warning Reporting (EWR) data and found one EWR report of vulnerable road user injury or fatalities. ODI also met, separately, with Utility Trailer Manufacturing Co. (UTM) and Auto Haulers Association of America regarding UTM\u2019s SUG and to better understand the operational environment of low clearance vehicles, respectively. Based on the information available to the agency, trailer manufacturers continue to pursue side underride guard technology, and at least one manufacturer is currently offering an optional guard.
The petitioner submitted two documents to ODI on September 11, 2024. The first was a letter from UTM to Marianne Karth (Petitioner of DP21004 & DP22004) which recounted UTM\u2019s testing of SUGs. The second document was an information sheet generated by the petitioner contesting UTM\u2019s claims. The petitioner also submitted certain documents to ODI on October 1, 2024, which the petitioner had previously submitted separately as part of comments on a collection of information pertaining to Reporting and Documents About Potential Defects (Docket No. NHTSA-2024-0055). This included 45 files regarding 49 unique crashes. ODI reviewed that information and found that of the 49 crashes, twenty-nine (29) potentially involved a subject vehicle. The majority of the 45 files were from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), which is a NHTSA-maintained database of state crash data comprised of certain, albeit often relatively limited information. Notably, of the 29 files, only 2 included the make, model, and model year of the subject vehicle.
After consideration of the petition, including the reports and documents provided by the petitioner, NHTSA believes the issues raised here are best addressed through its recent rulemaking and the ongoing actions under IIJA. Accordingly, NHTSA has decided not to open a defect investigation, and the petition is denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the agency from taking further action if warranted or making a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive.
","investigationNumber":"004","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-03-28T13:14:53Z","nhtsaId":"DP24004","openDate":"2024-08-26T14:48:29Z","status":"C","subject":"Semi-Trailer Side Underride Guards"},{"id":1789056,"artemisId":101629,"closeDate":"2026-01-16T20:35:39Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation, PE24023, on August 14, 2024, to investigate allegations of Thor Motor Coach motorhome frame or trailer hitch structure cracking and separating. The hitch was manufactured by Lippert and installed by Thor as standard original equipment. ODI received eight Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) describing the hitch structure cracking. If not caught in time, a cracked hitch can fully fracture and separate from the vehicle.
ODI sent information requests to Thor and Lippert on September 6, 2024 and September 27, 2024, respectively. Thor's full response was received October 31, 2024, and Lippert's full response was received December 6, 2024. ODI reviewed the responses and learned of improvements introduced to increase the overall strength of the system.
The manufacturers reported 32 total incidents, and ODI is aware of 37 non-duplicative subject vehicle incidents in total, including four crash incidents where the towed vehicle separated and struck a roadside feature. The overall failure rate for all subject vehicles is low, and ODI is not aware of any failures on vehicles produced in the last 30 months.
Although a defect has not been identified, the manufacturers understand the seriousness of a potential hitch receiver structure failure. As a result, Thor, supported by Lippert, is conducting a customer satisfaction campaign that instructs consumers to inspect their hitch structure and informs what to look for and what to do if issues are found. If consumers are uncomfortable performing this inspection, Thor dealers can inspect the trailer hitch for them. The inspection and repair will be done at no expense to the consumer. ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) with this manufacturer action.
The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"023","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2026-01-16T20:35:39Z","nhtsaId":"PE24023","openDate":"2024-08-14T13:51:52Z","status":"C","subject":"Trailer Hitch Receiver Structure May Crack and Separate"},{"id":1787179,"artemisId":101741,"closeDate":"2025-12-12T16:49:20Z","description":"On August 7, 2024, the O\ufb03ce of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE24021 to investigate complaints alleging inadvertent unlatching of seat belts in model year (MY) 2020-2023 Hyundai Palisade vehicles manufactured by Hyundai Motor America. The complaints alleged that, without warning, the seat belts sometimes inadvertently unlatch, increasing the risk of injury due to full loss of seat belt protection in the event of a crash.
As a result of information exchanged as part of the investigation, on April 3, 2025, Hyundai initiated a warranty extension policy for seat belt buckles on model year 2020-2025 Palisade vehicles in the U.S. and Canada. Hyundai subsequently initiated a request for warranty parts returns to support further analysis by the buckle supplier, ZF Lifetec. The warranty extension (reference \u201cZ06\u201d) noted that certain 2020 \u2013 2025 model year Palisade vehicles may experience abnormal seat belt buckle(s) operation. Hyundai extended the warranty coverage for the seat belt buckle under this condition to 15 years/150,000 miles (whichever occurs first) from the date of original retail delivery or date of first use. This action is valid for original and subsequent owners.
On September 11, 2025, Hyundai \ufb01led recall 25V-607 for certain 2020-2025 Hyundai Palisade vehicles. Hyundai explained in its recall filing that the subject vehicles are equipped with seat belt buckle assemblies in the front row and second row outer seating positions that may contain out-of-specification components manufactured by the supplier. These components can cause interference within the latch channel, potentially increasing friction, particularly under cold ambient temperatures. Improperly produced seat belt buckles, combined with slow insertion of the seat belt tongue plate, may prevent the seat belt buckle from fully latching.
The recall remedy is currently under development. In view of Hyundai\u2019s recall action, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation, but will continue to monitor the issue as a remedy is developed and implemented. ODI will take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identi\ufb01cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"021","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-12-12T16:49:20Z","nhtsaId":"PE24021","openDate":"2024-08-07T18:37:15Z","status":"C","subject":"Inadvertent Seat Belt Unlatch"},{"id":1786406,"artemisId":101729,"closeDate":"2026-08-24T14:12:36Z","description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to assess allegations of tie rod bending, deformation, or related steering linkage damage in certain 2021 Nissan Rogue vehicles. A bent tie rod can affect wheel alignment and steering geometry, and in some circumstances may result in steering pull, abnormal tire wear, reduced steering precision, difficulty maintaining directional control, or loss of vehicle steering control, increasing the risk of a crash.
ODI reviewed Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs), Early Warning Reporting data, manufacturer field reports, warranty claims, consumer complaints submitted to the manufacturer, and other information provided by Nissan in response to ODI\u2019s information request. ODI also evaluated the reported failure circumstances, vehicle age and mileage, incident severity, and whether the available evidence indicated a defect trend occurring in the absence of external impact or other non-defect causes.
Based on the information reviewed, ODI identified a low number of tie rod bending or deformation allegations relative to the subject vehicle population and exposure. The available reports did not indicate a consistent failure pattern, common production period, common mileage, or repeatable failure mode suggestive of a safety-related defect. Many of the reviewed incidents involved circumstances consistent with external loading or impact-related damage, including pothole strikes, curb contact, road debris impacts, prior collision damage, or other abnormal steering/suspension loads.
ODI\u2019s analysis did not identify a trend of tie rod bending occurring during normal vehicle operation without evidence of external influence. The complaint and warranty rates were low, and ODI did not identify a pattern of crashes, injuries, or loss-of-control events attributable to a tie rod defect in the subject vehicles.
Accordingly, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by new circumstances or additional information. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"020","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-24T14:12:36Z","nhtsaId":"PE24020","openDate":"2024-08-05T19:50:43Z","status":"C","subject":"2021 Nissan Rogue Inner Tie Rod Failures"},{"id":1785207,"artemisId":101529,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE23-008 on May 1, 2023 to investigate an incident involving a 2009 Dodge Journey alleging occupant entrapment during a vehicle fire that resulted in a fatality. During the investigation, ODI collected information from the manufacturer and involved parties to confirm or refute the defect allegation. ODI has determined that additional reports of vehicle entrapment exist for other model year Dodge Journey vehicles. ODI continues to explore the cause of the thermal event and its potential effect on the actuation of the door locks. ODI also continues to explore other potential causes for door lock malfunction. ODI has determined that an upgrade to an Engineering Analysis (EA) is necessary to continue the review of the investigative material and to assess the risk to motor vehicle safety .\t\t\t\t\t
To review the ODI report cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"003","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-08-01T16:07:47Z","nhtsaId":"EA24003","openDate":"2024-08-01T16:07:47Z","status":"O","subject":"Vehicle entrapment"},{"id":1784382,"artemisId":101728,"closeDate":"2025-09-19T17:08:42Z","description":"On July 29, 2024, the O\ufb03ce of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE24019 to investigate complaints of low-pressure fuel pump failures in MY 2021 Ford Bronco vehicles. Some consumers reported that the failure occurred without warning while driving, resulting in a complete loss of motive power with no ability to restart the engine.
Ford determined that several other vehicle models contain low-pressure fuel pumps substantially similar to the 2021 Ford Bronco, including the 2022-2023 Ford Bronco, 2018-2023 Ford F-150, 2022-2023 Ford Expedition, 2019-2023 Lincoln Navigator, 2020-2023 Ford F-250-F-550, 2024 Ford Super Duty Chassis Cab, 2024-2025 Ford Ranger, 2020-2023 Ford Explorer, 2020-2023 Lincoln Aviator, and 2021-2025 Ford Mustang.
ODI's investigation found that the a\ufb00ected vehicles may lose fuel pressure and \ufb02ow from the fuel delivery module (consisting of a low-pressure fuel pump, jet pump, reservoir, and other parts) due to a low-pressure pump failure. This can cause the engine to stall while driving. The root cause is reduced internal clearance in the fuel pump, increasing friction and sensitivity to vapor lock. Fuel blockage from contamination inside the jet pump also contributed to the failure. Ford stated that the contamination source was unknown.
On July 7, 2025, Ford \ufb01led recall 25V-455 for certain 2021-2023 Ford F-550 SD/F-450 SD/F-350 SD/F-250 SD, 2021-2022 Lincoln Navigator, 2021-2022 Ford Mustang, 2021-2022 Ford F-150, 2021-2023 Ford Explorer, 2022 Ford Expedition, and 2021-2023 Ford Bronco vehicles produced between July 1, 2021, and July 30, 2022. The recall also included certain 2021-2023 Lincoln Aviator produced between July 1, 2021, and December 21, 2022.
Ford explained in its recall filing that the production dates used for the recall were based on changes in the manufacturing process. Specifically, Ford determined that in June 2021, the supplier modified the jet pump manufacturing process, producing fuel pump chambers with a lower-than-specified internal clearance. In July 2022, the supplier implemented corrective actions to the manufacturing process by adding two additional vacuum pumps to reduce contamination during the production of the jet pump.
ODI has identified approximately 1,000 reports involving vehicles covered in this investigation but excluded from recall 25V-455. However, even with such reports, these vehicles experienced comparatively lower failure rates than the vehicles that are subject to Recall 25V-455. Ford has explained that these vehicles were excluded from the recall population because they did not experience the manufacturing changes that prompted the recall. Specifically, according to Ford, vehicles built before July 1, 2021 (the recall production start date), were not affected by the supplier\u2019s change to the jet pump manufacturing process. Even after closing this investigation, ODI will continue to monitor complaints for vehicles excluded from recall 25V-455 to consider whether they exhibit the same risks as the vehicles encompassed by the recall.
The recall remedy is currently under development. In view of Ford\u2019s recall action, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation, but will continue to monitor the issue as a remedy is developed and implemented. ODI will take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identi\ufb01cation Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"019","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-09-19T17:08:42Z","nhtsaId":"PE24019","openDate":"2024-07-29T15:12:06Z","status":"C","subject":"Low-pressure fuel pump failure"},{"id":1782463,"artemisId":101695,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 80 consumer complaints alleging an engine stall and loss of motive power on model year (MY) 2022 RAM 1500 pickup trucks and 2022 Jeep Wagoneer SUV vehicles. The particular engines in the subject vehicles are equipped with the Fiat Chrysler Automotive Group LLC (FCA) 5.7L Hemi eTorque system. The eTorque system is a mild hybrid system that lets the vehicle partially power itself. It accomplishes this by converting the captured energy from the braking system into electricity for the battery pack, which is then used to power a variety of electrical components. ETorque engines replace the alternator with a 48-volt battery-powered belt drive and a motor generator. The motor generator provides extra torque to the crankshaft during gear changes. Simultaneously, the motor generator uses the 48-volt battery pack to increase torque.
Many of the complaints state that the vehicle's engine would shut off, often while travelling at slow speed, the vehicle would shift into park and apply the emergency brake. The vehicles were sometimes able to be restarted. In addition, complaints state that the malfunction warning light with the battery fault symbol appeared on the dash. Many complaints state that a low voltage condition fault is present, sometimes not being able to restart the vehicle.
On April 13, 2023, FCA announced recall 23V-265 describing a defect in certain 2021 Ram 1500 vehicles equipped with 5.7L eTorque engines. The recall described a defect in the powertrain control module software can cause an incorrect fuel mixture condition in the engine, and result in an engine stall.
In February of 2024, ODI provided the complaints on the 2022 Ram 1500 and Wagoneer vehicles to FCA. After reviewing the complaints, FCA stated that \u201cthe loss of motive power was likely not caused by an over rich fuel condition (as outlined in recall 23V-265), but rather some other cause (e.g., an electrical concern that causes the engine to shut down).\u201d
A Preliminary Evaluation has been opened to assess the scope, frequency, root cause(s) and consequences of these loss/stall of motive power incidents. Additionally, ODI may expand the scope of the subject population during the investigation, if needed. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"018","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-07-19T16:45:08Z","nhtsaId":"PE24018","openDate":"2024-07-19T16:45:08Z","status":"O","subject":"Engine Stall With Intermittent Restart"},{"id":1779797,"artemisId":101562,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has identified 68 Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) reports for model years (MY) 2021 through 2024 Jeep Wrangler 4xe vehicles alleging a loss of motive power. Recall 22V-865 was issued by the manufacturer to address an engine shutdown condition in certain MY 2021-2023 Wrangler 4xe vehicles. The complaints noted here contain both post recall remedy failures and failures in vehicles not included within the scope of 22V-865. An analysis comparing complaints received before the issuance of recall 22V-865 and complaints outside the scope of the recall has been conducted. The results show the current complaint rate is higher in the out of scope vehicles than it was for vehicles that were later covered by the recall.
ODI is opening this Recall Query (RQ) to assess the severity of the alleged defect in vehicles not included in recall 22V-865. ODI will also assess the scope and remedy effectiveness of the recall. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"012","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-07-05T19:05:00Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24012","openDate":"2024-07-05T19:05:00Z","status":"O","subject":"Loss of Motive Power"},{"id":1777342,"artemisId":101662,"closeDate":"2025-02-11T22:11:05Z","description":"On June 26, 2024, the O\ufb03ce of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Recall Query (RQ24011) to assess the long-term suitability of the remedy for recall 22V-867, which was \ufb01led on November 23, 2022 by American Honda Motor Co. (Honda). Recall 22V-867 addressed concerns of a loss of the Rear-View Camera (RVC) function in model year (MY) 2017-2019 Honda Ridgeline vehicles. Recall 22V-867 states that the RVC wire harness was manufactured with a protective corrugated tubing which was insufficient to protect against bending wear and zip ties which were insufficiently tightened and would not keep the protective tubing in place. The consequence is that the RVC wire harness may fatigue and break after repeated opening and closing of the tailgate. This ultimately results in the failure of the RVC image to display due to a lack of connectivity. Honda\u2019s remedy identified in the recall filing was a replacement harness with longer protective corrugated tubing and sufficiently tightened zip ties. This remedy part was also installed as a production part in certain MY 2019 Ridgeline vehicles.
On May 3, 2024, Honda submitted recall 24V-321 to ODI, addressing concerns of a loss of the RVC function in MY 2020-2024 Honda Ridgeline vehicles. Recall 24V-321 states that the RVC wire harness was manufactured with a material which was susceptible to breakage upon repeated opening and closing of the tailgate, which ultimately leads to a complete loss of RVC function. Honda\u2019s remedy identified in the recall filing was a replacement harness manufactured by a new supplier with improved material properties to withstand wear from bending. Since the remedy parts for recall 22V-867 and the production parts recalled under 24V-321 use the same supplier and materials for critical components in the RVC wire harness, ODI opened RQ24011.
To date, ODI has received 1 allegation of a 22V-867 remedy RVC wire harness failure. Honda indicated that it is aware of a total of 14 reports regarding remedy RVC wire harness failures associated with Recall 22V-867. Additional remedy parts may not have yet seen sufficient wear to induce the failure. ODI also believes further testing is necessary to assess the potential failures in these parts.
RQ24011 is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA25003) to further assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety related consequences of the Rear View Camera harness failures in 2017-2019 Honda Ridgeline vehicles. To review the ODI report cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"011","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-02-11T22:11:05Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24011","openDate":"2024-06-26T21:39:11Z","status":"C","subject":"Rear-View Camera Failure"},{"id":1771266,"artemisId":101595,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received multiple Early Warning Reporting (EWR) field reports alleging inadvertent deployment of the side curtain air bags in Model Year (MY) 2015 Nissan Rogue Select vehicles. The field reports allege the side curtain air bags inadvertently deploy after the door is shut and/or slammed. Inadvertent deployment of an air bag can cause occupants to be injured or result in the loss of protection from the air bag when needed in a crash.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and severity of the inadvertent deployment allegations.
","investigationNumber":"017","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-05-31T18:14:57Z","nhtsaId":"PE24017","openDate":"2024-05-31T18:14:57Z","status":"O","subject":"Side curtain air bags may deploy inadvertently"},{"id":1768629,"artemisId":101496,"closeDate":"2024-11-04T21:54:13Z","description":"On May 16, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Recall Query (RQ) RQ24010 to investigate the remedy and scope of recalls 23V-213 and 23V-312. The affected vehicles by these recalls included model years (MY) 2021 through 2023 Volkswagen ID.4 vehicles. ODI received reports of the vehicle\u2019s doors opening while the vehicle was in motion post recall remedy. ODI, also, received similar allegations on vehicles that were outside the scope of the recalls.
Volkswagen issued recall 23V-213 on March 29, 2023, and recall 23V-213 on May 03, 2023. These recalls addressed the defect of water ingress into the circuit board assembly of the door handle. Water ingress can cause communication issues between the door handle and the door control until. This malfunction resulted in the vehicle door inadvertently opening while the vehicle was in motion.
Over the course of the investigation, ODI received 17 unique VIN VOQ complaints of the vehicle doors opening while the vehicle was in motion occurring either post recall remedy or on a vehicle that was outside the recall scope. Volkswagen submitted 190 unique VIN complaints reporting the same circumstances.
On September 4, 2024, Volkswagen submitted recall 24V-651 to address the issue of inadvertent opening of the door while the vehicle is in motion. The scope of this recall expands the affected vehicles to include all MY2021-2024 Volkswagen ID.4 models, including those remedied under the subject recalls. The recall remedy consists of replacement of the door handle assembly on all four doors as well as a software update. The software update is performed to update the door handle parameters. The new door handle will have the membrane relocated to the back of the handle to avoid standing water within the handle. Also, a protective coating will be on the front and back of the circuit board to avoid direct moisture formation.
In view of the action being taken by Volkswagen, Recall 24V-651, ODI is closing this Recall Query. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"010","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-11-04T21:54:13Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24010","openDate":"2024-05-16T18:10:28Z","status":"C","subject":"Inadvertent Door Opening"},{"id":1767539,"artemisId":101463,"closeDate":"2025-07-22T19:38:02Z","description":"On May 13, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24016) to investigate the Waymo 5th Generation automated driving system\u2019s (ADS) performance based on 22 reports of unexpected driving behaviors identified through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO) and other publicly available sources. The initial reports and additional reports received during the investigation included incidents in which a Waymo ADS-equipped vehicle was the sole vehicle operated during a collision or in which the ADS-equipped vehicle exhibited driving behavior that potentially violated traffic safety laws.
ODI identified 367 total incidents during the investigation with 109 crashes, of which 102 met SGO reporting criteria and were reported by Waymo under the SGO. Incidents involving potential traffic safety law violations included both non-crash and crash incidents and involved behaviors such as unexpected responses to traffic control devices and entering construction zones. One crash incident involved an injury. Crashes and non-crash incidents that involved traffic safety law concerns had no injuries reported.
Within the set of identified incidents, ODI focused its review on a pattern of crashes where Waymo vehicles struck stationary or semi-stationary objects such as gates, barriers, chains, and other objects with similar physical characteristics. Waymo conducted two recalls during the investigation to improve perception and response to objects. Recall 24E049 was filed on June 10, 2024, regarding software updates made following a May 2024 crash in which an unoccupied Waymo vehicle struck a utility pole. Waymo also updated the ADS system to improve the detection and avoidance of roadway barriers, such as chains strung across the path of travel, gates, and other gate-like roadway barriers and filed Recall 25E034 on May 12, 2025.
In view of the recall actions taken by Waymo and ODI\u2019s analysis of the available data, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. NHTSA will continue to monitor crash reports and other sources of data and will take additional action if warranted.
The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume and additional SGO reports involving crashes with stationary or semi-stationary objects, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs:
30270-1160
30270-1220 (Duplicate of 30270-1160)
30270-1494
30270-4363
30270-5081
30270-5318
30270-5758
30270-6133
30270-6548
30270-6561
30270-6838
30270-6981
30270-7048
30270-7054
30270-7058
30270-7308
30270-7312
30270-7534
30270-7729
30270-7794
30270-7936
30270-7947
30270-7969
30270-8145
30270-8146
30270-8152
30270-8156
30270-8219
30270-8344
30270-8356
30270-8357
30270-8397
30270-8443
30270-8483
30270-8513
30270-8602
30270-8624
30270-8661
30270-8809
30270-9082
30270-9126
30270-9169
30270-9177
30270-9192
30270-9287
30270-9355
30270-9372
30270-9410
30270-9420
30270-9437
30270-9442
30270-9517
30270-9606
30270-9763
30270-9764
30270-9823
30270-9828
30270-9855
30270-9873
30270-9883
30270-9886
30270-9893
30270-9907
30270-10006
30270-10042
30270-10076
30270-10087
30270-10274
30270-10288
30270-10361
30270-10421
30270-10471
30270-10497
30270-10558
30270-10561
30270-10563
30270-10602
30270-10631
30270-10727
30270-10863
30270-10865
30270-10891
30270-10909
30270-10912
30270-11001
30270-11007
30270-11010
30270-11062
30270-11088
","investigationNumber":"016","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-07-22T19:38:02Z","nhtsaId":"PE24016","openDate":"2024-05-13T14:17:56Z","status":"C","subject":"Unexpected ADS behavior"},{"id":1767285,"artemisId":101462,"closeDate":"2025-03-31T14:35:13Z","description":"On May 10, 2024, the O\ufb03ce of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24015) to assess reports of sudden unexpected braking in Zoox vehicles, leading to rear-end collisions, as well as to evaluate the performance of the Zoox Automated Driving System in crosswalks around vulnerable road users and in other similar rear-end collision scenarios.
These unexpected braking events can increase the risk of a collision. To assess these risks, ODI collected information from Zoox as part of this investigation. In response to ODI\u2019s Request for Information, Zoox provided information describing hard braking events commanded by the ADS. These hard braking events were identified by certain thresholds, including rate of deceleration. ODI analyzed the hard braking events commanded by the Zoox ADS and determined that Zoox ADS-equipped vehicles contributed to 4 collisions. Each of these collisions involved a vulnerable road user, with three of the incidents resulting in injury. Three of the collisions were reported under Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), while the other collision was not reportable under the SGO.
On March 13, 2025, Zoox \ufb01led a safety recall (NHTSA Recall No. 25E019) stating that in specific circumstances \u201cthe Zoox ADS software may have reacted over-cautiously and braked unnecessarily hard\u201d and that \u201cthe Zoox ADS software may have incorrectly anticipated a collision and braked unnecessarily hard.\u201d These behaviors could lead to increased risk of a rear-end collision caused by unnecessary hard braking. The Zoox recall report indicated that Zoox's ADS has been remedied through a software update that addresses the described defects. As of November 7, 2024, the updated software was released to all impacted Zoox vehicles.
In view of the recall action taken by Zoox and ODI\u2019s analysis of the available data, including data presented by Zoox demonstrating a resolution of these hard braking incidents after the software update, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances.
To review the SGO reports cited above, go to NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. The SGO report ID numbers are provided below:
30610-7578 30610-7589 30610-4810
","investigationNumber":"015","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-03-31T14:35:13Z","nhtsaId":"PE24015","openDate":"2024-05-10T19:50:29Z","status":"C","subject":"Rear-end Collisions Involving Zoox Vehicles"},{"id":1766880,"artemisId":101231,"description":"The Office of Defect Investigations (ODI) has received 27 complaints alleging diesel fuel leaks due to a fracture in the secondary fuel filter housing in model year (MY) 2015-2021 Ford Motor Company (Ford) F-250, 350, 450, and 550 Super Duty vehicles equipped with 6.7L diesel engines. Of these complaints, 12 describe an engine compartment fire. The proximity of the secondary fuel filter to high heat sources creates a potential for autoignition thermal events and fires.
ODI has contacted the vehicle manufacturer, Ford, and the filter manufacturer, Allevard Sogefi USA (Sogefi), and learned that the low-pressure fuel system is capable of a maximum operating pressure of 8.5 Bar, while the secondary fuel filter is only tested to seven (7) Bar during the manufacturing process. Additionally, changes starting in 2022 by both Ford and Sogefi align with a lack of similar complaints on MY 2022 and newer vehicles.
ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to evaluate the severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related problems. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"014","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-05-09T16:14:34Z","nhtsaId":"PE24014","openDate":"2024-05-09T16:14:34Z","status":"O","subject":"Sogefi Secondary Diesel Fuel Filter Leak"},{"id":1766881,"artemisId":101429,"closeDate":"2025-01-16T20:11:35Z","description":"On May 8, 2024, the O\ufb03ce of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE24013 to investigate reports of inadvertent activation of the automatic emergency braking (AEB) system in model year (MY) 2023 Fisker Ocean vehicles manufactured by Fisker Group Inc. (Fisker). The complaints allege the activation of AEB without an apparent roadway obstruction in the vehicle\u2019s forward path, resulting in sudden vehicle deceleration. This sudden deceleration occurs without adequate warning or input from the driver. The braking applications range from momentary, partial application resulting in rapid loss of speed to full application, which brings the vehicle to a complete stop in the travel lane.
ODI sent Fisker an Information Request (IR) letter on May 20, 2024. On June 17 and 19, 2024, Fisker and its affiliates filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Fisker provided an incomplete response to the IR on July 1, 2024. Limited information pertaining to system validation and failure data was provided. Fisker subsequently requested more time to provide additional responsive files due to limited available resources. Fisker sent additional responsive files on September 9, 2024, September 17, 2024, and December 16, 2024, but Fisker\u2019s response did not contain sufficient information for ODI to fully evaluate the alleged safety defect.
Further, on December 27, 2024, the Fisker employees with whom ODI had been corresponding informed ODI that all Fisker employees were being \u201cdismissed\u201d as of that date. ODI therefore does not anticipate receiving any further responsive submissions such that it can fully evaluate the reports that led to this investigation. ODI performed phone interviews and sent a survey to consumers to obtain more information and validate the allegations. Additionally, ODI reviewed allegations of the alleged safety defect that were submitted to various online forums. Most of these reports were similar in nature to the reports received by ODI. Some of the reports in online forums appear to be duplicative reports that were also submitted to ODI. Based on the responses received and analysis of similar online reporting, there was no clear trend in the following factors pertaining to the allegations: reoccurrence of events (i.e., single or multiple incidents), speed immediately prior to the event, whether the event concluded in a reduction of speed or a full stop, roadway conditions, and warning immediately prior to the event.
To date, between the reports provided by Fisker and complaints made directly to the agency, ODI is aware of over 20 reports alleging inadvertent AEB activation. Before the employees were dismissed, Fisker\u2019s testing done in response to the inadvertent AEB allegations reportedly did not result in any inadvertent AEB activations. The \u201cManufacturer\u201d and \u201cTotal\u201d counts in the above table have been left blank because of a pending request for confidential treatment by Fisker that could not be timely addressed given the company\u2019s status. This information factored into ODI\u2019s investigation and analysis.
The available information does not warrant further action at this time. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. Additionally, the Agency notes that the Vehicle Safety Act states: \u201cA manufacturer\u2019s filing of a petition in bankruptcy under chapter 7 or chapter 11 of title 11 does not negate the manufacturer\u2019s duty to comply with section 30112 or sections 30115 through 30120 of this title,\u201d which include the recall provisions of the Act. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"013","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-01-16T20:11:35Z","nhtsaId":"PE24013","openDate":"2024-05-08T15:47:32Z","status":"C","subject":"Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking"},{"id":1762323,"artemisId":101198,"description":"The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla\u2019s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla\u2019s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that \u201cthe prominence and scope of the system\u2019s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,\u201d and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion.
EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla\u2019s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla\u2019s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role.
Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI\u2019s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk.
ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
","investigationNumber":"009","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-04-25T20:31:48Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24009","openDate":"2024-04-25T20:31:48Z","status":"O","subject":"Recall 23V838 Remedy Effectiveness"},{"id":1762795,"artemisId":101396,"closeDate":"2025-01-17T18:24:58Z","description":"On April 25, 2024, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance.
In its response to ODI\u2019s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles.
For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle\u2019s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination.
In addition to reviewing Ford\u2019s response to ODI\u2019s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford\u2019s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information.
In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles\u2019 event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency\u2019s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle.
Based on NHTSA\u2019s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA25001) to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers\u2019 ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.
","investigationNumber":"012","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-01-17T18:24:58Z","nhtsaId":"PE24012","openDate":"2024-04-25T19:15:32Z","status":"C","subject":"Collisions Involving Ford BlueCruise"},{"id":1761725,"artemisId":101363,"closeDate":"2024-10-02T14:55:25Z","description":"On March 21, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) was sent a defect petition (DP) that requested the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration investigate the NUNA RAVA car seats for a harness that can allegedly loosen without pressing on the harness release button. The Petitioner stated there were 24 complaints in the NHTSA database all detailing the same issue. According to the Petitioner, \"this condition has poor detectability (there are no warning lights) and the consequence of failure in case of a crash would be severe or fatal injury\". ODI conducted a thorough search of its database and found 32 consumer complaints that were potentially related to the alleged defect.
Following the receipt of a second DP mailed on April 1st, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to the manufacturer Nunababy Essentials. The IR letter requested information on NUNA RAVA child seats regarding allegations of a harness loosening without the harness release button being pressed. After reviewing ODI\u2019s internal data and Nuna\u2019s response to the IR letter, ODI decided to grant the petitions and open Preliminary Evaluation PE24-026. This Defect Petition will now be closed due to the opening of the PE.
The petitions can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov using the following ODI Report reference numbers: 11583786, 11585272. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"003","investigationType":"DP","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-10-02T14:55:25Z","nhtsaId":"DP24003","openDate":"2024-04-22T14:22:30Z","status":"C","subject":"Seat harness can loosen without using harness release button on Nuna Rava car seats."},{"id":1759969,"artemisId":101165,"description":"On February 21, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE22003) to assess reports of inadvertent activation of the Collision Mitigation Braking System (CMBS), an automatic emergency braking (AEB) system, in model year 2017-2019 Honda CR-V and 2018-2019 Honda Accord vehicles. The reports allege that activation of the AEB system occurs while driving with no apparent obstruction in the vehicle's forward path, resulting in sudden vehicle deceleration.
Honda indicated that they were aware of a total of X,XXX reports that may relate to the alleged defect. Honda provided analysis of the alleged defect and alleges that some customers possibly had an inadequate understanding of the CMBS and its limitations. However, many consumer complaints allege that Honda dealerships were unable to reproduce the condition or state that they were informed that this is considered normal CMBS operation.
To date, ODI has received a total of 1,294 consumer complaints of inadvertent activation of CMBS in 2017-2022 Honda CR-V and 2018-2022 Honda Accord vehicles. A total of 31 complaints alleged a crash and 50 alleged an injury. The Total column in the Failure Report Summary removes duplicate reports and shows the total number of reports with unique VINs from all Manufacturer, ODI, and EWR data sources. In some cases, there were multiple reports associated with a particular vehicle in which recurring failures were alleged. In total, there were X,XXX reports, 93 injury incidents and 47 crashes involving vehicles with unique VINs that may relate to the alleged defect.
PE22-003 has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis to further assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety related consequences of the inadvertent AEB activations. The scope has been expanded to include assessment of model year 2020-2022 Honda CR-V and Accord vehicles.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"002","investigationType":"EA","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2024-04-15T20:52:21Z","nhtsaId":"EA24002","openDate":"2024-04-15T20:52:21Z","status":"O","subject":"Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking"},{"id":1759392,"artemisId":101264,"closeDate":"2026-08-21T15:44:51Z","description":"On April 11, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE24011 after receiving complaints concerning a loss of brake assist in 2023 MY Cadillac Lyriq vehicles. These complaints allege a hard brake pedal, followed by a \u201cBrake System Failure\u201d message at start up or while driving.
GM shared records regarding several internal investigations for loss of brake assist due to alleged spindle fractures in the eBoost system. GM has stated that in the event of a spindle fracture, anti-lock brakes (ABS), stability control, and traction control remain functional until the vehicle comes to a complete stop. At this point, ABS, brake assist, stability control, and traction control functions are lost. The loss of these functions causes the vehicle to set one of three Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) based on failed performance criteria for the Electronic Brake Control Module (EBCM). These DTCs, in turn, activate several driver alerts: an audible chime, a visual \u201cService Brake System\u201d message in the display, and multiple illuminated Malfunction Indicator Lights (MILs) for the ABS, Traction Control, and Brakes informing the driver of loss of functionality. The vehicle speed will also be limited to 70 KPH (43 MPH).
Since opening PE24011, ODI has continued to receive reports of loss of brake assist. Some of these reports describe symptoms inconsistent with GM\u2019s description of a spindle failure. These reports allege an immediate loss of brake assist functionality as opposed to the loss occurring after the vehicle comes to a complete stop. The sudden loss of brake assist during a braking event could result in extended braking distance, which increases the risk of a crash or injury. ODI believes further analysis is necessary to assess the potential for failures in GM\u2019s eBoost system to resulting in safety-related outcomes.
At this time, ODI is aware of the following vehicles that are equipped with this eBoost system: 2023-2026 MY Cadillac Lyriq, Chevrolet Colorado, and GMC Canyon; 2024-2026 MY Buick Enclave, Envision; Chevrolet Blazer EV, Equinox EV, Traverse; Cruise Origin; and GMC Acadia; 2025-2026 MY Cadillac Celestiq and Optiq. ODI is also aware of 2024-2026 MY Acura ZDX and 2024-2026 MY Honda Prologue vehicles that were built with this system. The Acura and Honda vehicles were manufactured by GM in a joint venture with Honda, and will be included in the Engineering Analysis as peer vehicles.
ODI is upgrading this Preliminary Evaluation to an Engineering Analysis, EA26006, to gain further understanding of the safety-related consequences of a failed eBoost system. In addition, ODI is expanding the scope of the investigation to encompass all GM vehicles that share this eBoost system.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"011","investigationType":"PE","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2026-08-21T15:44:51Z","nhtsaId":"PE24011","openDate":"2024-04-11T20:46:29Z","status":"C","subject":"Electronic Brake Module Component Failure"},{"id":1758896,"artemisId":101297,"closeDate":"2025-10-30T19:43:21Z","description":"On April 11, 2024, NHTSA\u2019s Office of Defects Investigation (\u201cODI\u201d) opened this Recall Query (\u201cRQ\u201d) to investigate the adequacy of, including various safety concerns associated with, the remedy program in recalls 22V-859 (filed Nov. 18, 2022) and 24V-187 (filed Mar. 8, 2024). The vehicle population associated with these recalls includes certain MY 2020-2022 Ford Escape vehicles and MY 2021-2023 Ford Bronco Sport vehicles equipped with 1.5L engines. The safety defect in each recall involves high-pressure fuel injectors that are susceptible to cracking, allowing liquid fuel and fuel vapor to migrate onto hot surfaces within the engine compartment potentially resulting in underhood vehicle fires.
The remedy programs described in recalls 22V-859 and 24V-187 are identical and involve both a software component and a hardware component. Specifically, Ford developed an updated engine control software designed to detect a pressure drop in the high-pressure fuel rail, provide instrument cluster messaging to the driver, invoke a strategy to disable the high-pressure fuel pump, derate the engine output, and lower the temperatures of possible ignition sources within the engine compartment. Additionally, Ford would install a tube into the engine\u2019s cylinder head drain hole to shunt spilled liquid fuel past the various hot surfaces within the engine compartment and ultimately discard the spilled liquid fuel onto the roadway.
ODI identified various safety concerns with this remedy program, which, among other things, notably did not include repairing or replacing the defective part and potentially did include the introduction of new safety defects (like fuel spilling near the spark plugs and fuel spilling onto the public roadway). NHTSA opened this investigation to evaluate these concerns with the remedy program, including whether the vehicles were still susceptible to underhood fires even post-remedy.
As described in more detail in the Additional Summary posted simultaneously with this resume, ODI conducted a thorough investigation that included analyzing data and other materials received in response to two Information Requests, as well as inspections of post-remedy vehicles that experienced an underhood fire. ODI and Ford worked to identify and locate vehicles that experienced post-remedy fires and conduct joint vehicle inspections. ODI\u2019s investigation also prompted Ford to initiate a more in-depth evaluation of the defect, including Ford\u2019s conducting component level testing of high-pressure fuel injectors. ODI met with Ford on several occasions throughout this investigation to jointly conduct certain of these described tasks and to discuss test results.
A collateral issue surfaced as a result of this investigation: in March 2025, Ford realized that despite relevant repairs having been recorded as successfully completed, approximately 33,576 vehicles subject to recalls 22V-859 and 24V-187 did not have the software component of the remedy program installed correctly. Thus, on March 27, 2025, Ford filed a new related recall (25V-165) for these vehicles, notifying NHTSA and the public that they were still at risk of experiencing an underhood vehicle fire due to cracked fuel injectors despite the consumer having had their vehicle remedied pursuant to one of the two earlier recalls.
In June 2025, Ford committed to implementing a new remedy program to repair the vehicles. On July 11, 2025, Ford documented this commitment in a new recall filing (25V-467), which explains that Ford\u2019s upcoming remedy program will involve proactive replacement of all high-pressure fuel injectors within the recall population.
In view of the recall action taken by Ford, ODI is closing this Recall Query, which was opened given NHTSA\u2019s concerns that the initial remedy programs of the software to detect the pressure drop plus installation of the drain tube did not constitute an adequate repair. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.
","investigationNumber":"008","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-30T19:43:21Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24008","openDate":"2024-04-11T20:25:59Z","status":"C","subject":"Underhood fires caused by fuel leak"},{"id":1759391,"artemisId":101132,"closeDate":"2025-10-27T11:57:34Z","description":"On April 11, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Recall Query (RQ24007), to investigate certain GN30402-EC-6P chassis trailers experiencing mid-beam bending and cracking. The subject chassis trailers were produced by Pratt Industries LLC (Pratt) prior to the December 2021 sale of the company to Pratt Intermodal Chassis (PIC). Trailers produced by PIC are covered by recall 23V767.
On April 26, 2024, ODI sent Information Request (IR) letters to Pratt Industries LLC and PIC. On April 29, 2024, Pratt Industries LLC responded to the IR letter informing ODI that the company had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection on April 17, 2024, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Case No. 24-bk-10820). On June 6, 2024, PIC responded in full to the IR letter, and included the Asset Purchase Agreement between Pratt and PIC, which indicates that the Seller (Pratt Industries LLC) retains responsibility for the chassis trailers built prior to the December 2021 sale.
Because the responsible manufacturer, Pratt Industries LLC, has ceased operations, ODI is closing this investigation. Owners of GN30402-EC-6P chassis trailers built prior to December 2021 should have their trailers professionally inspected. As a guide, inspection and remediation information can be found at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2023/RCONL-23V767-7974.pdf.
The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does or does not exist in these or any other Pratt Industries LLC chassis trailers. Additionally, the Agency notes that the Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C.A \u00a7 30120A states: \u201cA manufacturer\u2019s filing of a petition in bankruptcy under chapter 7 or chapter 11 of title 11 does not negate the manufacturer\u2019s duty to comply with section 30112 or sections 30115 through 30120 of this title,\u201d which include the recall provisions of the Act. The Agency reserves the right to take further action as warranted. To review the ODI report cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
","investigationNumber":"007","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-10-27T11:57:34Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24007","openDate":"2024-04-11T20:17:28Z","status":"C","subject":"2022-2023 Pratt Container Chassis Trailers"},{"id":1757685,"artemisId":101131,"closeDate":"2025-03-26T17:08:10Z","description":"On April 4, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened RQ24006 to investigate American Honda Motor Co.\u2019s (Honda\u2019s) proposed remedy for recall 23V-782 as well as scope of the vehicles involved.
Honda issued recall 23V-782 on November 21, 2023, which concerns certain model year (MY) 2023-2024 Honda Accord, Honda Accord Hybrid, and Honda HR-V vehicles. Recall 23V-782 states that the driver and front passenger seat belt pretensioner assemblies may have been manufactured without a rivet that secures the pretensioner quick connector and wire plate. Recall documentation states that seat belt pretensioner assemblies that are missing the rivet will not properly restrain the occupant in the event of a collision, increasing the risk of injury. Subject defective seat belt assemblies are installed as original equipment for both the driver and front passenger positions for the HR-V, but only for the driver position for the Accord and Accord Hybrid.
The recall remedy for 23V-782 instructs the technician to inspect both front seat belt pretensioner assemblies and, if necessary, replace them. The inspection procedure requires the technician to utilize a pull force gauge to determine whether the subject component is missing the subject rivet and requires replacement. Parts requiring replacement are determined by whether the pretensioner quick connector separates from the pretensioner assembly while the technician is pulling on the seat belt. If no separation occurs, then the part is determined to be not defective and not require replacement.
There have been no reports alleging a failure of seat belt pretensioner assemblies after the inspect and replace remedy for recall 23V-782 was performed. Additionally, no comparable failures have been observed in field data for similar vehicles outside of the scope of the recall. As of the 4th quarter of 2024, the recall completion rate is at approximately 84% of the total recalled population.
In view of the lack of failures after the remedy for recall 23V-782 was performed, and the lack of failures in similar vehicles outside of the scope of the recall, ODI is closing this Recall Query (RQ). The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.
","investigationNumber":"006","investigationType":"RQ","issueYear":"24","latestActivityDate":"2025-03-26T17:08:10Z","nhtsaId":"RQ24006","openDate":"2024-04-04T12:57:03Z","status":"C","subject":"Front Seat Belt Assemblies may be Missing the Rivet that Secures the Quick Connector and Wire Plate"}]}